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Abstract 
From 1974 through 1997 the Galapagos experienced very rapid 
population growth, around six per cent per year. Sustained at this level, the 
population would continue to double every 12 years. Increased population brings 
an increased risk of invasive introduced species, which endangers the fragile 
ecosystems. On 18 March 1998, a Special Law was passed to protect the 
Galapagos. This law severely limits migration to the islands.  We discuss the 
environmental problems that motivated the law, describe the law, and discuss 
anecdotal evidence on its operation and potential to date.  We then theoretically 
assess the implications of limiting migration and empirically assess the history 
and drivers of migration to Galapagos.  In particular we discuss distorted 
incentives arising from subsidies and inadequate regulations that exacerbate 
migration pressure.  Finally, we draw on our analysis to offer some short and 
longer term policy solutions and ideas on how existing capacity could be 
enhanced to implement them. 
 
JEL classification 
Q320, J610, O130, O150 
 
Keywords 




1 Introduction .....................................................................................................1 
1.1 Previous  literature...................................................................................4 
1.2  Structure of report...................................................................................7 
1.3  Pressures placed by migration on the natural resources of the 
Galapagos Islands............................................................................................8 
2  The Special Law of the Galapagos................................................................28 
2.1  Description of the Special Law, March 1998 .......................................28 
2.2  How it works in reality?........................................................................31 
2.3  How could the Special Law be strengthened administratively?...........40 
2.4  How pressure on the Special Law can be reduced................................42 
3 Empirical  review  of  migration patterns.........................................................43 
3.1  Total population at each point in time ..................................................43 
3.2  Migration across time and by origin.....................................................45 
3.3  Migration since 1998 ............................................................................49 
3.4  How many people and how much cargo physically enters Galapagos?54 
4 Theory  of  migration.......................................................................................57 
4.1  Why are jobs and people located where they are?................................57 
4.2  What causes people to move?...............................................................62 
4.3  What are the impacts of limitations on migration?...............................64 
4.4  Summary: Simple economic model of migration.................................67 
5  Economic and policy incentives currently shaping migration.......................70 
5.1  Distortions from subsidies ....................................................................70 
5.2  Distortions arising from inadequate regulation of externalities............88 
5.3 Tourism  management............................................................................93 
5.4 Fisheries  management...........................................................................97 
5.5 Summary.............................................................................................106 





7  Potential policies to address migration and environment............................124 
7.1  Directly control population: Improve systems for controlling migration 
flow 126 
7.2  Reduce migration pressure created by subsidies.................................138 
7.3  Reduce migration pressure and mitigate environmental impacts: 
Policies to address inadequate regulation of resource use...........................144 
7.4  Reduce impact of migration and migration controls...........................161 
8  Capacity building needs...............................................................................173 
8.1  Capacity needed for migration control................................................174 
8.2  Capacity needed for effective regulation of economic activities........174 
9  Summary and recommendations .................................................................176 
9.1  Identify symptoms of concern and define clear final goals................176 
9.2 Diagnose  problem...............................................................................177 
9.3  Identify possible solutions: Recommendations...................................178 v 
9.4  Implementation and capacity building ...............................................182 
9.5  Further studies that should be conducted to more accurately inform 
policy makers..............................................................................................182 
References ...........................................................................................................183 




Table of figures 
Figure 1: Humid highland cleared in populated islands.........................................11 
Figure 2: Number of introduced plants in the Galapagos......................................13 
Figure 3: Resident population in Galapagos over time..........................................43 
Figure 4: Resident population growth rate in Galapagos.......................................44 
Figure 5: Ecuadorian and foreign tourists since 1979............................................44 
Figure 6: Contribution of migration to population growth since 1950..................46 
Figure 7: Source of immigrants from major provinces over time..........................47 
Figure 8: Births to permanent residents living in Galapagos.................................51 
Figure 9: Sources of eligibility for permanent residency.......................................52 
Figure 10: Passengers moved to and from Galapagos (in thousands) ...................55 
Figure 11: Impacts of migration limitations on the labour market........................65 
Figure 12: Airfares to Galapagos (US$)................................................................73 
Figure 13: Number of flights (adult passengers) between Galapagos and the 
continent.................................................................................................................74 
Figure 14: Air travel subsidy (revenue at real cost minus actual revenue)............75 
Figure 15: Volume of fuel sold annually by Petrocomercial.................................78 
Figure 16: Expected average electricity prices by region and major city 
($/kwh)...................................................................................................................82 
Figure 17: Revenue from sales and income tax in Galapagos...............................85 




Table 1: Summary of main biodiversity indicators for the terrestrial 
environment ...........................................................................................................10 
Table 2: Extinct, threatened and introduced species as a percentage of native 
species....................................................................................................................11 
Table 3: Registered artisanal fishing boats and fishers in Galapagos....................17 
Table 4: Population and migration across the populated islands...........................21 
Table 5: Waste production in Galapagos in 1998..................................................24 
Table 6: Characteristics of population, immigrants and emigrants........................36 
Table 7: Immigration, emigration and population growth.....................................47 
Table 8: Place of birth of immigrants to Galapagos ..............................................48 
Table 9: Permanent residents requalified since 2000.............................................52 
Table 10: Percentage subsidy on air tickets relative to Ecuadorian citizens' 
price .......................................................................................................................72 
Table 11: Airfares to Galapagos relative to other airfares within Ecuador 
(US$)......................................................................................................................73 
Table 12: Estimated annual air travel subsidy.......................................................74 
Table 13: Value of subsidy per unit of fuel transported (US$)..............................77 
Table 14: Subsidy for transport of fuel to Galapagos............................................78 
Table 15: Comparative gas subsidy: Galapagos relative to continental Ecuador..79 
Table 16: Annual transfers from FERUM for Galapagos and Ecuador.................80 
Table 17: Primary expenditures and taxes collected per capita, 1997–1998 ($) ...84 
Table 18: Municipal income by source (percentage).............................................86 
Table 19: Estimate of total annual per capita subsidies (in thousand $)................87 
Table 20: Estimated effects on migration and wages of a 10 per cent increase 
in tourism ...............................................................................................................96 
Table 21: Data summary......................................................................................116 
Table 22: Correlations among explanatory variables...........................................117 
Table 23: Mean socio-economic variables for Galapagos and the rest of 
Ecuador ................................................................................................................117 
Table 24: Immigration to Galapagos (five years) per 100,000 people ................120 
Table 25: Emigration from Galapagos (five years) per 100,000 people..............122 
 1 
1 Introduction 
The Galapagos Islands, a string of islands 600 miles off the Coast of 
Ecuador, have an array of unique plants and animals. Charles Darwin's work “The 
Origin of Species,” where he first proposed the theory of evolution, was inspired 
here by the differences among mockingbird and tortoise species across the many 
islands. During the 1990s large numbers of people have moved to the Galapagos 
Islands from mainland Ecuador in search of economic opportunities. Tourism is 
the main economic driver, yet the migration it induces threatens the future of 
tourism. 
From 1974 through 1997 the Galapagos experienced very rapid 
population growth, around six per cent per year. Sustained at this level, the 
population would continue to double every 12 years. Increased population brings 
an increased risk of invasive introduced species, which endangers the fragile 
ecosystems. It also puts increased pressure on sensitive habitats through farming; 
commercial development, including extraction of materials (e.g. gravel) for 
construction; and overfishing. Today “Lonesome George” is the only 
representative of one of the subspecies of tortoises that gave the Galapagos their 
name. Other species are severely depleted, though active breeding efforts are now 
reversing many declines. Increased population also has non-environmental 
impacts: pressure on infrastructure (roads, water and electricity); pressure on 
social services (health and education); and rapid change in the local culture as new 
people with different life experiences enter. 
Population growth is important but is not the only cause of 
environmental degradation. The environmental impact of any given level of 
population depends on the impact of each person: the types of activity, the way 
activities are done and the location of activities. Similarly, migration is an 
important cause but is not the only cause of population growth. Half to two thirds 
of population growth in Galapagos relates to immigration (3.5–4 per cent). Some 
of this is offset by emigration (1–2 per cent). The natural rate of population 
increase is between three and four per cent. 2 
On 18 March
 1998, a Special Law was passed to protect the Galapagos. 
This law severely limits migration to the islands. It limits permanent residents to 
those born in Galapagos, those who had lived there for more than five years 
before 1998, and their spouses and children. Temporary permits are only available 
for those whose employers can justify a need for their special skills. Fully 
enforced, this law would severely curtail migration and enhance environmental 
protection. Data from the 2001 census indicates that the rate of population growth 
has slowed, probably in large part because of the implementation of the Special 
Law. Population growth has fallen to 5.04 per cent annually between 1998 and 
2001, which is only slightly higher than the rate of natural increase in the 1980s. 
Net migration has probably fallen to below 1.5 per cent.
2 This has been achieved 
despite the potentially enormous migration pressure arising from the economic 
crisis that affected Ecuador during 1999/2000. 
When poverty comes into conflict with environmental protection, 
however, things are not so straightforward. In the short term it has proven difficult 
to administer the law effectively because of a lack of administrative capacity. This 
is now being addressed. In the long term, political and economic pressures are 
building up that could undermine or even overturn the law. 
Migration pressure has been exacerbated for a long time by a series of 
subsidies (for energy, airfares, and shipping, among other things) for those living 
in the Galapagos. Standards of living are higher in Galapagos than in many parts 
of the mainland. The direct limits on migration created by the Special Law 
conflict with these strong incentives to migrate and create problems both socially 
and economically. Permanent residents have a privileged position in the labour 
market because outsiders cannot compete for their jobs. Anecdotally we hear that 
it is difficult to get some skilled labour and the cost of other labour has become 
extremely high. Clearly some locals benefit from this, but others simply suffer 
from higher costs. Over time the Law risks creating a problem similar to a 
“welfare society” because young people in Galapagos will grow up knowing they 
do not have to get training or work hard to have a reasonably comfortable 
lifestyle. Valuable tourism opportunities might be hindered by lack of local skill. 
                                                           
2 The detailed derivation of these numbers is given in Section 3.2. 3 
Ecuador is not a rich country. It needs to use its resources wisely to 
benefit all its people. Economically, it is almost certain that the best long-term use 
of the Galapagos is to preserve the islands for high-value tourism done in the most 
efficient way possible. Some observers claim that 10 per cent of tourists produce 
75 per cent of revenue.
3 Improving the quality of the tourism experience is 
probably more valuable than increasing the flow of tourists. However, protecting 
this unique resource and gaining the maximum benefits from tourism requires far-
sighted regulation and loss of short-term opportunities that provide immediately 
visible benefits. 
We need to find ways to provide flexibility in the labour market while 
protecting the environment and bringing real benefits to the Ecuadorian people 
and particularly local residents who can most easily protect or threaten the 
environment. Effective regulation requires more than strong legislation. It must 
take into account the limitations in regulatory capacity, the interests of the local 
people and pressures that work against it. The best regulation has the support of 
the community that is regulated. Even though it constrains their behaviour, they 
recognise the benefits. 
The first step in regulatory reform is to remove poor regulations that 
exacerbate the problem. In the case of Galapagos these are primarily subsidies that 
have outlived their historical purpose. The second step is to enhance those 
regulations that already exist so that they can perform their roles. Galapagos has 
many good regulations, including the Special Law. These can be fine-tuned and 
strengthened in many ways. Third, where the problem is one of local cooperation, 
strengthening local bodies that can educate, build trust and self-regulate is helpful 
regardless of the other forms of regulation used. Effective local bodies will 
provide useful information, will be effective participants in formulation and 
implementation of regulation, and can reduce opposition and obstructive 
behaviour. 
                                                           
3 Interview with Fernando Espinoza. 4 
Finally, when the institutional capacity is strong enough, new more 
sophisticated regulations can be implemented to allow more flexible, efficient 
compliance. After analysing the goals, underlying pressures, and current 
regulations, we suggest a range of possible ways to improve regulation and reduce 
migration pressure. 
1.1 Previous  literature 
Here we highlight a few studies that we build on and discuss how our 
work complements and extends previous work. This is not intended to be a 
comprehensive literature review. Several qualitative studies have explored the 
causes of migration. Grenier (1994) surveys several different groups to understand 
the characteristics and experiences of migrants, tourists and conservation workers. 
He also looks at their motives for migration/visiting and their impacts. Ospina 
(2000a) takes a sociological approach to understanding the routes migrants take. 
He considers networks and their effects on migrants. His work finds that 
employers, private firms and the state directly recruit some migrants. The tourism 
and agricultural sectors are significant recruiters. Galapagos has followed the 
general pattern in Ecuador, with significant growth in government employment 
until the 1999 crisis. The process of devolution of power to provinces, 
strengthening of municipalities and creation of Galapagos National Institute 
(INGALA) have also increased state employment in Galapagos. Family networks 
are also important. People provide information and facilitate migration for their 
family members. These people find work once they arrive. Finally, some people 
move to Galapagos for adventure or to start a new life. They may know no one 
and have no job offers when they arrive. Ospina also considers the impact of 
migration on the culture of the Galapagos. 
A second type of research models the economic structure of Galapagos 
and analyses the economic implications of policies. Taylor and Yúnez-Naude 
(1999) build a computable general equilibrium model of the Galapagos economy 
and look at the implications of different activities for GDP, labour demand and 
migration pressure. Taylor et al (2002) extend this model and apply it to analysis 
of ecotourism and its effects on Galapagos. We use some of these results later in 
our analysis. 5 
Wilen et al (2000) study the likely economic benefits from the Special 
Law on the Galapagos Marine Reserve. They consider the impacts on fishing and 
on tourism. They include valuable information on the regulation of fishing and 
tourism. They find that the Marine Reserve is marginally beneficial for fishers in 
the long run. Short-run costs from having to cut fishing pretty much offset the 
present value of long-term benefits through sustainable catches. However, the 
Reserve has significant benefits for tourism. Tourists would be willing to pay on 
the order of US$3–4 million extra each year if marine species in Galapagos were 
protected. 
A third important set of research summarises statistical information on 
key factors affecting Galapagos and gives information on current regulations. It 
also often offers policy recommendations. For example, Bremner and Perez 
(2001) survey the demographics of Galapagos with particular attention to gender, 
and look at the implications for resource use. 
The MIGAMA report (Fundación Natura and The Nature Conservancy 
(TNC) (2000a)) is a crucial resource. It results from collaboration among a group 
of experts on Galapagos issues. It primarily draws on information from the 1998 
Special Census. It summarises the demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics of groups characterised by their migration status: natives, new 
immigrants, older immigrants, and emigrants. It also surveys perceptions about 
the causes and effects of migration and summarises some of the visible effects of 
migration pressure. It includes summaries from extensive interviews of migrants 
working in specific sectors: agriculture, fishing, construction, tourism and 
commerce. These address why and how they migrated and their experience of 
migration. It has extensive recommendations covering issues ranging from 
migration control to fishing, rural development, control of introduced species, 
education, and emigration. 6 
Each year Fundación Natura and the World Wildlife Fund produce a 
“Galapagos Report”. These include focused updates on key issues of concern: 
migration, tourism, development of the quarantine system, the Jessica Oil Spill 
and so on. They provide excellent information on regulations and the operation of 
institutions and programmes, and a data archive. They are an invaluable resource 
on a range of issues. 
The Galapagos Regional Plan was completed concurrently with this 
report. This plan was developed through an extensive participatory process. It 
outlines visions, recommendations and specific programmes for management of 
the marine and terrestrial ecosystems, for sustainable development, for human 
development and for improving governance. It allocates these responsibilities 
across sectors. Because of the wide scope of the plan, they are unable to develop 
either the justifications for the policies or their details in the Plan itself. In the 
areas where our concerns overlap, they identify similar pressures and problems to 
those we consider. Most of our recommendations are included in their list. 
Unfortunately resources are limited and the Plan does not prioritise these activities 
or provide detail on how they are to be achieved. 
Our report focuses primarily on issues relating to migration, so has a 
much narrower scope. We approach the issues from an economic perspective but 
also draw more broadly from the study of public policy. Our work is 
complementary to the Regional Plan in that it addresses some of the same issues. 
However, we provide analysis to motivate and justify the policies we propose. We 
try to determine not only if there is a problem, but also whether the feasible 
policies are likely to be effective in addressing it. We assess the importance of 
different issues and hence the likely gains from addressing an issue. We develop 
policy recommendations in more detail and try to make our recommendations as 
concrete as possible. We prioritise policies and emphasise those that seem most 
feasible and most likely to have significant positive effects given the institutional 
constraints. 7 
1.2  Structure of report 
The report begins with some background on the environmental 
problems that motivate it. We then review the Special Law passed in 1998, which 
was designed to help address these problems. We describe the Law and discuss 
anecdotal evidence on how it is operating and ideas on how its operation could be 
improved. We then assess the empirical history of migration and population in 
Galapagos. We consider the levels of migration, where migrants come from and 
where emigrants are going to. In Section Four we review the theory of migration 
and the relationships between migration and labour markets. Why do people 
migrate and what happens if they are constrained from migrating? Section Five 
considers the specific economic and policy conditions in Galapagos that distort 
incentives to migrate so that too many people migrate and some economic 
activities are more developed than they would be if all the environmental 
implications were taken into account. We consider the effects of direct subsidies 
and of inadequate regulation of resource use. In Section Six we empirically 
analyse the patterns of migration and emigration to gain insight into why people 
move to and leave Galapagos. 
By Section Seven we have a reasonably clear idea of the regulatory 
background and the theory and reality of migration to Galapagos. We then move 
on to consider policies that could reduce migration pressure without causing high 
economic costs or social pressures. We take into account the Ecuadorian context 
and existing regulations to come up with policy suggestions that range from short-
term very pragmatic ideas to longer-term goals to aim for. In Section Eight we 
consider how capacity could be enhanced to allow existing and new ideas to be 
implemented effectively. We conclude in Section Nine. 8 
1.3  Pressures placed by migration on the natural 
resources of the Galapagos Islands
4 
The flora and fauna of the Galapagos had evolved isolated from the 
presence of humans until the 17th century, when whalers and buccaneers started 
hunting enormous quantities of whales and giant tortoises. Since then, human 
activity has exerted pressure on the islands’ natural resources and resulted in 
increasing effects on their environment. Each person that moves to the Galapagos 
poses new risks to its fragile ecosystems. This not only includes new permanent 
residents but also new immigrants seeking better job opportunities on the islands 
and the increasing number of visitors to the Galapagos National Park. 
The Galapagos still retain 95 per cent of the biodiversity they possessed 
prior to the arrival of humans. This would appear to augur well for Galapagos 
biodiversity in the future. However, a scientific evaluation of ecological trends 
indicates that Galapagos ecosystems are changing quickly. The abundance and 
distribution of some species’ populations are decreasing, a high percentage of 
species are threatened, and they are losing the ability to survive natural cycles 
such as the El Niño event
5. If human activities—including mobility of people and 
products, over-exploitation and energy demands—continue their current pattern 
they will cause the loss of populations, species and sub-species. 
Biodiversity loss and threatened species are hard to assess, mainly 
because little is known about population numbers and the distribution of some 
species, as is the case of most terrestrial invertebrate species. There are many 
accounts of declines reported, with percentages higher than 50 per cent for some 
orders. In the case of the marine environment, the main factors hindering the 
assessment of biodiversity loss are the difficulty of establishing a reference point 
for a pristine state and the limitations in the study of specific taxa. 
                                                           
4 This section was primarily written by Susana Cardenas. 
5 Charles Darwin Foundation (CDF) and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) (2002) and Estación 
Científica Charles Darwin ( 2001). 9 
Furthermore, biodiversity losses, and specifically extinctions, are 
usually a long-term result, taking place in large chronological periods. However, it 
is possible to describe the current status and identify changes through comparison 
of measures or indicators related to the main activities which impact on those 
ecosystems. 
This section will compare a series of trends in biodiversity and 
environmental indicators. These will then be related to our knowledge of 
population trends and patterns of spatial distortion, with an emphasis on human 
activities that cause a direct or indirect effect on the islands’ environment. What 
local people do for a living affects the environment and local labour market. For 
example, if fishers dominate immigration, and fisheries are under stress, clearly 
fisheries regulation is a key problem. 
1.3.1 Biodiversity  Status
6 
Research suggests that Galapagos has lost more species per square 
kilometre in the past 400 years than most other island groups.
7 There is no doubt 
that contemporary extinction in all groups of plants and animals has been caused 
mostly by humans and is mainly due to the aggressive effect of introduced species 
and over-exploitation. There is no strong evidence of extinction in some groups of 
animals and plants; however, some species have gone unrecorded recently on 
islands where they were formerly recorded, with records only on islands that have 
not been affected by introduced species. This is the case for some endemic 
terrestrial isopods, spiders, scorpions, native ant species, weevils, and scarab 
beetles. 
                                                           
6 Data in this sub-section comes from Bensted-Smith (2002), based on an International Workshop 
of conservation biologists in may 1999, where some specific measures for evaluating general 
criteria regarding species, communities/habitats, landscape/habitat extent, processes and alien 
species were established in order to create a biodiversity vision for the future. 
7 Bensted-Smith(2002). 10 
Extinction levels are low for terrestrial biodiversity, around 1.5 per cent 
of total initial biodiversity, and there are no recorded marine extinctions caused by 
humans. However, the rates of threatened and endangered species are high, 
especially for vertebrates and invertebrates where 50 per cent and 60 per cent of 
native species are threatened, respectively (Tables 1 and 2). For both the terrestrial 
and the marine environments, there have been changes in abundance and 
distribution of some species. In the first case, these changes depend on the 
vegetation zone, which has been altered mainly by introduced species. For the 
marine environment, a high-level of exploitation of some target species has had an 
effect on the species’ abundance and its population structure, for example sea 
cucumbers after fishing periods. For some marine species, a reduction in 
population is more visible. One of the threats with small populations is that they 
are less liable to overcome environmental variations such as the El Niño event, 
which seems to become stronger and occur more frequently over time. 
Table 1: Summary of main biodiversity indicators for the terrestrial 
environment 
Extinct Species as per cent of total diversity  1.5% 
Diversity recognized as endangered   
 Plants  24% 
 Terrestrial  vertebrates  50% 
 Terrestrial  invertebrates  60% 
Change in abundance and distribution * 
1  0-90% 
Species and population with unstable population * 
2  70% 
Reduction in genetic and phenotipic variability *  60% 
Source: Charles Darwin Foundation (CDF) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) (2002). 
Notes: * compared to a baseline in 1534 
1. depending on vegetation zone altered 
2. caused by anthropogenic factors 11 
Table 2: Extinct, threatened and introduced species as a percentage of 
native species 
  Vascular plants  Vertebrates  Insects 
Species  #  % #  % #  % 
Extinct  3 1 10  9   
Threatened 85 16 54  51    
Natives  541   106   1616   
Introduced 600  111  25  24  300  19 
Source: Bensted-Smith (2002). 
The fact that 96 per cent of land is the National Park gives the 
impression that terrestrial habitats are well protected. However, the relatively 
small area that is not protected has a tremendous effect on the biodiversity of the 
islands. The biggest and highest islands have one of the most diverse of the four 
main types of vegetation, the humid zone. This is the zone that at the same time is 
preferred for agricultural and cattle-raising activities. San Cristobal has lost almost 
its entire humid zone and only about 25 per cent remains on Santa Cruz (Figure 
1). Endemic plants such as Miconia shrubs and the giant Galapagos tree fern are at 
risk. Thus, seeking ways to protect the inhabited islands is a primary need for 
biodiversity conservation. 
Figure 1: Humid highland cleared in populated islands 




































































Indicators of biodiversity status show that there is a high pressure on 
native species, most of it by anthropogenic causes that will be discussed in the 
following sections. However, these indicators are limited to the extent of possible 
research on populations and species. It is still unknown if the reduction of genetic 
variability will make them more susceptible to high-extractive human activities 
and climatic changes. 
1.3.2 Introduced  species 
Introduced species are the key threat in the Galapagos. These are related 
proportionally to an increasing population: more movements of people and 
shipments of goods to, from and within the islands. Mobility has even been 
subsidized, a fact which could have promoted its increase in recent decades. Now 
that transport subsidies have been reduced, it will be interesting to monitor 
variations in the rate of human mobility in relation to travel prices.
8 
Humans bring species accidentally with these movements, or on 
purpose, for agricultural and ornamental activities. Residents spread introduced 
species around the islands through development; new roads facilitate the dispersal 
of introduced species. Tourist movements are better controlled. 
Introduction rates of plants, vertebrates and insects are extremely high 
compared to their natural establishment rates: 10, 1.25 and 1.2 thousand times 
respectively. As Table 2 shows, there are around 600 alien plants, 30 introduced 
vertebrates and 300 invasive insects to date. Although the number of introduced 
vertebrates is low compared to other groups, their impact is higher; one single 
species, such as goats, can affect several native species. These numbers could be 
even higher. Not all areas have been evaluated and there is a high uncertainty 
about the number, especially for invasive plants and invertebrates.
9 
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The main general causes of alien species introduction are the changes in 
natural ecological processes that contribute to population declines and extirpation 
of native species. Invasive organisms affect natural ecosystems through predation 
and by outcompeting natives, altering habitats´ structures, and serving as disease 
hosts and transmitters. The effect of disease vectors and pathogens is still 
unknown and is therefore an increasing threat. 
Both introduced animals and plants have an advantage over native 
species. For example, humans have introduced some of them for agricultural 
purposes. The fact that they are adapted to pastures helps their distribution. A 
study carried out by Mauchamp in 1997 determined that 75 per cent of the 
introduced plants at that time were brought to the islands for crops. 
Mauchamp graphed the growth in the number of invasive plants since 
the colonization of Galapagos, and he suggested that it parallels population 
growth.
10 Although the increased number of recorded introduced plants is a result 
of an increase in research efforts during recent years, there was a true change in 
the introduction rate in the mid-twentieth century when migration and agriculture 
expansion were high (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Number of introduced plants in the Galapagos 
Source: Mauchamp (1997) and Charles Darwin Research Station (CDRS) database cited in 
Fundación Natura and WWF (2001). 
                                                           





























































Another issue related indirectly to introduced species and human needs 
is the availability of water resources. In the upper zone of inhabited islands, a high 
percentage of precipitation comes from rain condensation. The presence of 
introduced mammals, such as goats, and human activities, such as pasturing 
livestock, has reduced the native forest and, therefore, condensation.
11 Since 
population is increasing and there are few water sources, the availability of this 
resource will be a critical issue in the future. 
The impacts of introduced species cannot be controlled fully through 
the inspection and quarantine system and the eradication programs, but may be 
reduced or mitigated. Quarantine controls have been more effective (higher levels 
of inspection) since 2000 because the pilot project ended and the system was 
implemented definitively during this year.
12 It relies on more human resources; in 
addition to the airport luggage inspection that was the only inspection conducted 
prior to 2000, boat cargo is now inspected in the Caraguay wharf in the port of 
Guayaquil, from where around 75 per cent of boat cargo to Galapagos originates. 
A list of allowed and restricted products was issued in January 2000. 
During 2002 804 confiscations were made; most of them (47.8 per cent) took 
place in Baltra airport and 68 per cent were prohibited products. An analysis of 
confiscations by category of residency indicates that residents bring most risky 
products to Galapagos (74 per cent), followed by foreign tourists (17 per cent) and 
domestic tourists (nine per cent).
13 The role of residents is particularly significant 
when you consider how few residents there are on flights relative to tourists (less 
than a third in most years). This would suggest that the residents´ dependence on 
products from the continent contributes widely to increasing the probability of 
new alien species introductions. 
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12 Zapata, Carlos cited in Fundación Natura and WWF (2001). 
13 Zapata, Carlos cited in Fundación Natura and WWF (2001). 15 
Although the inspection and quarantine system has been improved in 
recent years, there are still some issues that need attention. There is not a 
systematic and thorough control in either departure or entry sea ports; one reason 
could be the lack of permanent base facilities in airports as well as ports and the 
lack of defined and approved regulation involving the participation of the Army 
and other sectors, such as tourism operators. Nor are there the necessary sanitary 
conditions in ports or cargo boats; there are no freezers and no adequate 
fumigation on boats. Actual control is based on visual/manual observation by 
inspectors; there are no x-ray machines or sniffer dogs specialised in identifying 
risky products in ports. There is inspection of movements within the archipelago 
and trade of goods between islands, but its level is low and should be reinforced. 
Finally, residents and tourists are more informed than in previous years. However, 
since September 2000, the effective operation of the system and its continuity 
depend on a division of the Ministry of Agriculture, which has had problems with 
personnel and strikes lately that could cause mistrust of the system by community 
members and a reduction in their involvement.
14 
1.3.3 Overexploitation 
Overexploitation, meaning a non-sustainable extractive use of natural 
resources, has been another important threat imposed by humans on Galapagos 
ecosystems.
15 Some terrestrial and marine species have been extracted in large 
quantities, not only for local human consumption but also as a trade source. Any 
increase in the population exerts more pressure for consumption. Likewise, 
immigrants from the mainland are attracted by the lucrative trade possibilities of 
some target species. Thus, a strong relationship is established between population, 
labour force, and the extractive use of some species. 
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15 Bensted-Smith (2002). 16 
Prior to 1990, the overexploitation of tortoises was serious. All 
populations of tortoises on all islands were exploited, and most were reduced by 
more than 60 per cent. However, efforts to prevent predation and promote 
reproduction in captivity have been effective. Other vertebrates that have been 
overexploited are hawks, doves, and ducks.
16 
In the terrestrial realm, few native plants are of direct use to humans, 
but trees have been used, principally for timber. The exploitation rate for some 
wood-tree species is higher than their regeneration rate within the national park. 
Not only has the fast population growth accelerated the need for these resources, 
but also a higher standard of living and the economic growth in the islands have 
increased the population’s demand for new boats and houses.
17 Matazarno and the 
endemic guayabillo are examples of species that have been affected by human 
activity. 
The extractive use by quarries of mineral resources, such as lime and 
gravel for paving and construction, has had an effect on certain species, including 
Bulimulidae snails and plants.
18 The scarcity of some of these non-renewable 
resources, mainly used for construction purposes, will result in the identification 
of other extraction sites or increase dependency on mainland products, thereby 
increasing imports and the risk of introduced species. 
1.3.3.a Fishing 
Regarding marine resources conservation, sustainable fishing is one of 
the biggest challenges. Fishing began as a formal commercial activity in the 
1930s, and is now the second most important economic activity in Galapagos 
following tourism.
19 The appearance of new lucrative markets, especially for non-
traditional products such as sea cucumbers and shark fins, had a great influence on 
the growth of this sector. 
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Not only have people working in other activities moved to fishing in 
specified periods, but the activity has also attracted recent immigrants from the 
continent. The overall result is an increased pressure on high-value species. 
In ecological terms, overfishing not only affects the abundance and 
distribution of certain species, but can also have an effect on the population 
structure. Moreover, some species are strong ecological interactors and their 
population reduction or loss would cause imbalance and effects in the rest of the 
marine ecosystem. At the same time, altered marine ecosystems would be less 
able to withstand other pressures such as oil spills and the El Niño event. 
Fisheries in Galapagos have increased and diversified. The number of 
registered artisanal fishers has increased from nearly 100 in the early 1940s to 
1950s to around 956 in 2002 (Table 3). This increase is due mainly to the use of 
new profitable practices and target species with high economic value in 
international markets. The numbers of fishing boats and species, 444 and 100 to 
date, respectively, have increased proportionally in relation to the number of 
fishers. 
Table 3: Registered artisanal fishing boats and fishers in Galapagos 
Year  Number of fishers  Fishing boats 
  Number  Annual per cent increase Number  Annual per cent increase 
1971 156       
1982 152  -0.2%     
1993 392  14%  101   
1996 455  5%  270  56% 
1998 613  17%  197  -14% 
1999 795  27%  254  29% 
2000 682  -14%  417  64% 
2001 921  35%  n.d.   
2002 956  4%  446  7% 
Source: Personal communication with the Marine Resources Department, Galapagos National Park 
Service. 18 
Migration generated directly by fishing differs across periods of 
fisheries development. The first important migration surge for the period 1982 to 
1984 related to the lobster fishery. The second surge was the result of the sea 
cucumber fisheries starting in the 1990s. There is no accurate data on the 
participation of immigrants in fisheries in recent years; however, as sea cucumber 
fisheries are a lucrative activity, it is likely that they continue to attract people 
from the mainland.
20 The number of fishers monitored by the Participatory 
Research and Monitoring Programme of Fisheries indicates that many more 
fishers are active than are registered in Galapagos National Park Service (GNPS) 
records during recent years.
 21 The difference was about 29.7 per cent in 1999
22 
and 80 per cent in 2000 for sea cucumber fisheries (1229 fishers in 2000). In the 
case of lobsters, 1183 fishers were monitored during the 2000 fishing period, 
compared with the 682 fishers registered. Most of this difference could be 
explained by residents who leave their usual activities in order to participate as 
temporary fishers. However, it could also include temporary migrants. 
During these migration surges, especially those that occurred before the 
Special Law was issued, migrants have significantly influenced the diversification 
of materials and techniques used in fisheries.
23 Large tuna fishing boats as well as 
migrants brought these new approaches from mainland Ecuador. The migrants 
came especially from the areas of Salango, Puerto Lopez and Puerto Cayo in 
Manabí Province. Isabela, a traditional fishing port, gives a perfect example of 
how techniques and materials have evolved. They now use diesel engines for 
transportation instead of traditional fishing boats moved by oars, and use a trident 
for fishing lobsters brought by Salango fishers in the 1980s. Improvements in 
fishing methods have also been motivated by higher potential incomes from 
fishing as target species have become more highly valued in recent years. As well 
as increasing the total number of fishers and boats, all these improvements have 
brought about an increase in total catches. 
                                                           
20 Fundación Natura and TNC (2000a). 
21 A programme was started in 1997 by the Charles Darwin Station with the objective of 
generating a technical basis for the sustainable use of marine resources within the Galapagos 
Marine Reserve. 
22 Cited in Fundación Natura and TNC (2000a). 
23 Explained in depth in Fundación Natura and TNC (2000a). 19 
One of the indicators marine scientists use to assess the reduction of 
species abundance by fisheries is the catch per unit effort. It is an estimation of the 
average catch per effective day of fishing and per fisher. If fishers obtain fewer 
catches per day of fishing, then fish stocks could be declining. This indicator 
shows that the Galapagos spiny lobster, sea cucumbers and the Galapagos grouper 
(the three most profitable fisheries) have declined significantly over recent years 
and show a typical pattern of overexploited populations.
24 
The sites located far away from ports in inhabited islands show higher 
levels of catch per unit effort both for lobsters and sea cucumbers, especially 
Fernandina, northern Isabela, Darwin, Wolf and Española.
25 This fact indicates a 
serious reduction in species abundance in coastal areas close to inhabited ports. In 
the case of sea cucumbers, 88.3 per cent of the total volume caught in 2001 came 
from western Isabela and Fernandina. There is a clear reduction on San Cristobal, 
where the percentages of total catches have diminished significantly: 26.4 per cent 
(1999), 12.6 per cent (2000) and 2 per cent (2001). 
For both lobsters and sea cucumbers, the biological fishery indicators 
suggest that as well as the reduction in population density, there is overfishing in 
the sense that undersized individuals are frequently caught in violation of 
minimum size restrictions. The population structure is affected, which in turn 
influences future recovery and abundance of the species. 
The fishing-monitoring programme managed by the Charles Darwin 
Station and the GNPS has defined regulations for lobster and sea cucumber 
fishing during recent years. These include size limits, trade controls, zones 
indicating allowed fishing sites, catch quotas, fishing calendars and sanctions. 
These actions have resulted in better resource management; however, high 
pressures have existed to violate regulations. In particular, total quotas, fishing 
seasons and size limits have been exceeded many times. The sustainability of 
target resources will be under extreme pressure if additional control measures are 
not undertaken and regulations enforced. 
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Not only is the increasing number of artisanal fishers and fishing boats 
alarming. According to the Special Law, only artisanal fishers registered in fishing 
cooperatives in Galapagos are allowed to fish in Galapagos. However, there is a 
continuous pressure from industrial fishers from the mainland, who are lobbying 
for fishing rights within the marine reserve. Illegal fishing is still out of GNPS 
control. Together with potential industrial fishing, it creates a stronger pressure on 
the islands’ marine resources, which may increase the overall catches to a degree 
the ecosystem will be unable to replenish. 
1.3.4  Other human impacts resulting from an increasing population 
The more the population grows, the more difficult it is to manage and 
mitigate human-caused impacts including land occupation, increasing resource 
demands, and pollution caused by solid and liquid waste. 
1.3.4.a  Pressure on land 
Further compounding the effects of population growth, people started 
abandoning rural areas and coming to ports. The main ports in the archipelago, 
Santa Cruz and San Cristobal, have developed rapidly and now there is little land 
available for future settlements in urban areas. 
Santa Cruz exhibits the most critical situation. This island has grown 
tremendously in the last ten years (1990-2001), from 5,310 to 11,163 inhabitants, 
an annual growth rate of 6.7 per cent, with a high concentration in the urban area 
(86 per cent of the actual population). In the beginning of 2002, 600 new lots were 
legalized, and with these adjudications all the urban area assigned to human 
settlements is now occupied.
26 This will put a high pressure in coming years on 
the legal acquisition of new lots, an issue that will involve considering alternatives 
such as evaluating the occupation of rural areas and land use optimisation. 
                                                           
26 Alfredo Ortiz, mayor of Santa Cruz, personal interview. 21 
Some rural areas are already beginning to be urbanized and subdivided. 
This is happening in Bella Vista in Santa Cruz and also southern Isabela. 
Interviews indicate that residents in Puerto Ayora are more and more interested in 
acquiring land in rural areas. New private residential neighbourhoods are even 
now being developed. 
Concern about the location of people within the islands is another 
relevant issue, although it is mostly a concern about residents. If Puerto Ayora 
becomes overpopulated, as is already happening, an alternative will be to move to 
other islands. As Table 4 indicates, during recent years, people already resident in 
Galapagos have considered Isabela to be an attractive island to move to. This 
interest could increase dramatically in the future. This location is critical, 
considering that Isabela has 50 per cent of the biodiversity of Galapagos and a lot 
of available land outside of the National Park compared to the other inhabited 
islands. 
Table 4: Population and migration across the populated islands 
Island of residence  Total population 
1998 
Per cent who are 
recent migrants 
(since 1993) 




San Cristóbal  5374  22%   1% 
Isabela 1424  17%    6.5% 
Santa Cruz  8513  27%   1% 
Total 15,3 11     
Source: Derived from Fundación Natura and TNC (2000) Tables 17 and 18. 22 
1.3.4.b  Increased numbers of vehicles 
The number of vehicles has increased significantly, with 88 new 
vehicles entering the islands in 2001, an increase of 54 per cent compared to new 
vehicles in 2000.
27 This could result in pressure for more development of roads. In 
addition to causing habitat loss and fragmentation, new roads would promote 
dispersal of introduced species. Also, the recent high level of vehicular traffic 
causes the death of several hundred birds a week in Santa Cruz. Land iguanas 
have been killed by buses on Baltra Island.
28 
1.3.4.c Resource  demands 
Population growth increases the demand for natural resources. Most 
non-renewable resources such as water, soil, and construction materials are 
limited and they are becoming scarce in the islands. Dependence on resources 
coming from the mainland—for example fossil fuels—puts the environment at 
high risk of possible contamination and potential for introduced species. 
According to the Regional Plan, the last inventory of water resources in 
Galapagos in 1989 indicates that permanent sources of water for human 
consumption exist in few islands, especially Floreana and San Cristobal, which 
has a fresh water lake. In general, fresh water cannot accumulate on the surface 
due to the islands’ geology. Rainwater usually settles deep in the highland areas 
where rain is more abundant. Because of fast population growth, especially in 
Puerto Ayora, where some of the fissures that were sources of water are now 
polluted, there may be severe water supply problems. Moreover, this situation 
may worsen if highlands suffer more from introduced species and habitat 
alteration caused by agriculture. 
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With regard to energy consumption, increasing numbers of vehicles and 
boats, both for fisheries and tourism, as well as new residents consuming 
electricity, have heightened the demand for fossil fuels.
29 This increasing demand 
is satisfied through resources from the mainland, and their transportation, 
unloading and storage put the islands’ fragile ecosystems at higher risk of possible 
accidents. The state subsidy policy has favoured increasing the use of these 
resources from the mainland, as will be quantified and discussed further in Section 
5. 
Oil pollution is a much larger threat, not only to marine ecosystems but 
also and principally to island birds and mammals, especially for flightless birds, 
such as penguins and cormorants. A recent well-known example is the Jessica oil 
spill of 200,000 gallons of diesel and bunker fuel in 2001. This accident caused 
widespread pollution, although its effects were controlled due to favourable 
environmental conditions and immediate rescue actions. If subsidies for fossil fuel 
are not reduced or eliminated and the use of renewable and less-contaminating 
energies is not promoted in the islands, the increasing demand for fossil fuel 
imports will continue to raise the probability of new fossil fuel accidents with 
severe effects on human health and the environment. 
1.3.4.d  Pollution and waste generation 
Waste generation in the islands has increased with the growth of 
economic activities such as tourism and commerce, as well as a rise in population. 
In 1997-1998, the waste production per day per person in the three inhabited 
islands was higher than the national average (Table 5).
30 If per capita waste 
generation has stayed constant on each island, total waste will have risen by 33 
per cent by 2001.
31 
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Table 5: Waste production in Galapagos in 1998 
 1997 –1998  1997–1998 
Island  kg/day/person  ton per year 
Santa Cruz  0.8  2,375
San Cristóbal  1.3  2,034
Isabela 0.6  284
National average  0.4   
Source: Data on Fundación Natura and WWF (1999). 
This particularly causes concern because although the level of 
municipal waste collection is high in the islands, no appropriate waste 
management program exists to ensure a low impact on the environment. Most of 
the solid waste is organic and is disposed of in open areas assigned for this 
purpose. These areas are a short distance from the main ports, 4 km from Puerto 
Ayora and 3 km from Puerto Baquerizo. Other waste is incinerated without 
treatment. The current means of solid waste management helps to spread disease 
and introduced species. Increases in solid waste generation, directly related to 
population growth, will raise the need to seek out new solid waste disposal sites. 
There is localized coastal pollution near developed ports. Although it is 
small, it constitutes a threat to humans and marine biodiversity.
32 It consists 
mainly of pollution generated by households (particularly organic waste) and 
littering in port areas, a local issue that relates directly to human settlements and 
their growth, in addition to being an aesthetic problem. 
1.3.5 Agriculture 
Agriculture is another human activity that has affected the Galapagos 
environment since the islands were colonized. As emphasized in Section 1.1.1, 
clearing the land for agriculture and pasture activities has altered one of the most 
diverse zones in the inhabited islands: the humid zone (see Figure 1). This land is 
attractive because the seasonal availability of rain makes it suitable for crops. 
                                                           
32 Bensted-Smith (2002). 25 
The amount of land converted to agricultural use increased by 31 per 
cent between 1974 and 1986 (18.6 to 24.4 thousand ha).
33 The results from the 
last national agricultural census in 1999 show that Galapagos has 23.4 thousand 
ha under agricultural use. This may indicate a reduction in agriculture on the 
islands. 
As the population has grown, the flow from rural areas to ports has also 
increased and large agricultural areas have been abandoned. This rural-to-urban 
migration took place, among other reasons, because of more lucrative job 
opportunities near ports in industries such as fishing and tourism.
34 Large portions 
of arable land were abandoned, and consequently many hectares are underutilised. 
The Agricultural Census in 1986 shows that 49 per cent of the islands’ 
agricultural land was used for pastures and 40 per cent was abandoned. In 1986, 
the area of agricultural land used for pasture in Santa Cruz was quite high 
compared to the technically recommended area: 10.2 thousand as opposed to only 
2.7 thousand ha.
35 An agricultural evaluation for Santa Cruz in 1996 showed that 
this situation has not changed.
36 According to a recent agricultural market study 
carried out by the Araucaria Program for the Galapagos
37 in San Cristobal in 
2000, 43 per cent of the total 8016 ha assigned to agriculture was abandoned.
38 As 
discussed earlier, some is being used for residential development. 
Both abandoned and underutilised land represent a high risk to the 
islands’ terrestrial environment because they favour seed dispersal of introduced 
species, which may lead to the potential expansion of these species into national 
park areas. A study on Isabela demonstrated that abandoned land helped the 
dispersal of guayaba and more, two of the most aggressive invasive plants.
39 
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38 Fundación Natura and WWF (2001). 
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One of the main objectives of agricultural promotion in Galapagos has 
been to supply products for the local market and in this way reduce the risk of 
introduction of alien species brought by the increased traffic of cargo boats. The 
amounts of food transported by cargo boats has increased greatly. In 1984, 520 
tons were transported to the islands, versus 2,242 in 2000, an increase of 4.3 
times.
40 Several causes have brought about the continual ineffectiveness and 
decline of agriculture, including: lack of water (dependent on rainy and mist 
season) and non suitability of soils; lack of appropriate sustainable techniques and 
technology; high labour costs; low availability of raw and primary resources; lack 
of organization among producers; and deficiencies in the marketing and trade of 
products. Currently, some programmes and studies funded by international NGOs 
are working to improve agriculture on the islands. 
If there were a limit on imports to promote self-sufficiency in 
agricultural products, local producers would have control over prices and could 
raise them because they would be the only suppliers. Monopoly pricing would 
start in the islands. The system would then require a process or procedures to 
establish price control for agricultural products so consumers would not be 
affected, and some competition from imports would certainly be needed. 
The limited labour force for this agriculture is crucial as a potential 
driver of migration to the islands. Owners of farms in the rural area of Bellavista 
on Santa Cruz affirmed that residents are not interested in working in agriculture, 
so they need to bring in people from the mainland. They pay the migrants low 
salaries relative to what they would need to pay locals and thus maintain their 
profitability. This situation is currently happening and could be a serious problem 
in the future if implementing self-sufficient agriculture on the islands becomes a 
priority. 
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It would be valuable to study whether self-sufficiency in agriculture is a 
good goal for the islands. One alternative would be to invest heavily in quarantine 
facilities to reduce the risk from imports. It may be that some products impose an 
especially high risk and imports of these could be banned and if possible these 
crops could be grown locally. If it is decided that self-sufficiency is a goal it 
would be necessary to evaluate the principal and real needs in order to achieve 
sustainable and efficient agriculture. Perhaps the best solution would be to make a 
strong investment in appropriate technology instead of hiring new migrants to 
work on the land, which creates an even higher pressure on and demand for 
natural resources. 
1.3.6 Conclusion 
Reconciling the short-term economic aspirations of a growing 
population with the ecological standards for a healthy environment is difficult. 
However, Galapagos still has the opportunity to develop in a sustainable way. 
Regulations for the application of the Special Law, which will contain important 
and specific guidelines for development, are still being developed and could play 
a crucial role. 
Humans have affected the environment of Galapagos in many ways. 
Considering that we are an introduced species on the islands, it is important to 
address and mitigate the effects we have on the environment. All the 
environmental impacts are strongly related to population growth. These pressures 
on natural resources are the responsibility not only of immigrants but of the whole 
resident community. However, immigration stands as an important cause of 
population growth in the islands. In addition, some argue that recent migrants are 
not committed to the real sustainable use of natural resources and concentrate on 
short-term profits. In the following sections we will analyse drivers of migration 
in the archipelago and what policies might be established to control population 
growth and mitigate its effects on the natural resources of Galapagos. 28 
2  The Special Law of the Galapagos 
2.1  Description of the Special Law, March 1998 
2.1.1 The  Law 
Here we summarise the key aspects of the law relating to migration and 
labour markets. Aspects relating to fishing, tourism and education are discussed in 
the relevant sections later. The Special Law requires a regulation before it can be 
fully implemented. The regulation relating to migration control is still being 
finalised.
41 The law defines three groups of residents: permanent residents, 
temporary residents and tourists and transients. 
2.1.1.a Migration  Controls 
Permanent Residents 
People can become permanent residents through birth, residency or 
marriage. The children of permanent residents are permanent residents. Any 
person (Ecuadorian or foreigner with permanent residency in Ecuador) who was 
resident in Galapagos for five years at any time before 1998 is eligible for 
permanent residency. Those who were living in Galapagos in 1998 when the law 
was passed may apply for permanent residency when they have stayed for five 
continuous years. Spouses of permanent residents become permanent residents 
and maintain their residency even if they later divorce. 
Permanent residents are able to work in any job in Galapagos, including 
being a member of a fishing cooperative. 
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Temporary Residents 
Employers can apply for temporary residency permits so that they can 
employ people who are not permanent residents. They need to show that the 
special skills they need in their employee are not available among the permanent 
residents. Initially employers could put any limitations on application for 
temporary permits without having to justify them (e.g. very specific language 
requirements). This is changing now so that they have to define qualifications for 
a job more broadly (they must always require the same qualifications of all 
applicants for the same type of position). An INGALA Committee on 
Qualifications and Residency Control reviews all these applications after an initial 
review by INGALA staff. 
The spouses (partner in recognised union) and children of temporary 
residents also gain temporary residency. Children born in Galapagos to temporary 
residents may be permanent residents. The law is currently ambiguous on this. 
Temporary residency permits can be renewed indefinitely. 
Temporary residents can work only on the activity that originally 
motivated their entrance to Galapagos. The employer is not responsible if they 
employ an illegal worker. Illegal workers are deported. According to the 
regulation (Article 61), employers should pay INGALA a guarantee equal to 30 
times the minimum wage. If their employee does not leave Galapagos within 15 
days of completing their contract this money should be forfeit. This regulation 
does not seem to be enforced, however. Anecdotally, tourism companies seem to 
comply with this but many others are able to ignore it. In many cases temporary 
workers move from one employer to another and no employer is held responsible. 30 
As a transitional process, the law states that the Qualification and 
Residency Control Committee must set up a process so that people can requalify 
for residency. Within 90 days of the regulation implementing the law being 
passed, the old identity cards legally expire. The Regulation was issued on 11 
January 2000, so Galapagan residents should have been requalified by April that 
year. This was not possible for political, technical and financial reasons.
42 The 
requalification process for permanent residents was completed at the end of 2000. 
Compared to the total cards issued up to 1999 by the Governor's Office 
(Gobernación), this process eliminated 2028 people previously qualified as 
permanent residents. From the beginning of 2001 a new registration process for all 
residents began. This process will give all residents a special identification card 
and will allow electronic control at the airports.
43 Currently, according to the 
INGALA database on residents, most of the permanent residents have been issued 
with cards (17,567 in the three islands). More time is needed to issue cards for all 
temporary residents; only 292 temporary residents have a valid card so far. 
Tourists and Transients 
Tourists and transient visitors can enter Galapagos and stay for ninety 
days as long as they have a return ticket and a control transit card issued by 
INGALA. INGALA retains the tourist’s return ticket in many cases as an extra 
control measure. Under exceptional circumstances this ninety-day permit may be 
renewed for total of 6 months per year. Tourists and transients are not allowed to 
work for profit while they are in the Galapagos. 
                                                           
42 Fundación Natura and WWF (2001). 
43 Previous identification cards were easy to duplicate. 31 
2.1.1.b  Other key provisions 
Labour Markets 
All employees who are permanent residents are organised in 
cooperatives (Article II of Title X Chapter 1). The aim of this was to tighten 
control over work permits. The law also requires that wages in Galapagos are at 
least 75 per cent higher than the minimum for that job in the mainland (Title X). 
This is true in the public and private sector, and workers do not pay social security 
tax on the extra 75 per cent. According to Fundación Natura and WWF (1998 p. 
33), the comparison between the minimum wages stated in the mainland and those 
in Galapagos varies depending on the profession; some wages in Galapagos are 
even higher than required, but others are lower. 
Subsidies 
According to the Law, permanent and temporary residents receive a 50 
per cent discount on air and sea transportation fares on all routes to Galapagos. 
They also receive a 30 per cent discount on cargo transportation fares on maritime 
routes. For in-depth discussion of how these and other subsidies actually operate 
see Section 5.1. 
2.2  How it works in reality? 
In reality the Special Law is not working exactly as envisaged yet. 
There are still serious problems with enforcement. Before the Law there was no 
complete register of people who were residents and it has proven to be difficult to 
identify people who are eligible. Some cheating and use of influence has probably 
given permanent residency status to people who do not qualify. 32 
On temporary residency the system is operating, but some people 
expressed concern that the law is being interpreted differently across the different 
islands. Probably more importantly, many temporary workers stay after their 
permits expire and the authorities find it difficult to locate and deport them. These 
illegal workers seem to be supported or at least tolerated by locals in many cases. 
They are often relatives or employees of permanent residents who want them to 
stay. Finally, some employers (but not all) expressed frustration with their 
inability to get the staff they need in a timely way to do their work effectively. 
On the positive side, now that the law has been in force for more than 
three years, locals are beginning to believe that they can control their future and 
they are being more active in planning and control. Serious efforts are underway 
to strengthen the implementation of the law. We discuss those below. 
The Law is under serious pressure, however, and this pressure is likely 
to grow. The primary source is the labour market. People want to come to 
Galapagos and other people want to employ them. The Law constrains this 
movement. As the economy grows further and tourist demand continues to 
increase this pressure is likely to get much more intense. Political pressures are 
also simmering and may intensify as living standards of those living in Galapagos 
and those on the continent continues to diverge and inequality grows within the 
Galapagos. In the following sections we discuss these effects in more detail. 
2.2.1  The effects of the Special Law on local labour markets 
Tourism is the major driver of the Galapagos economy. Tourist 
numbers in Galapagos have continued to rise steadily since 1997. In 1997 total 
tourist numbers were 62,809; by 2000 they had risen to 71,560.
44 Most of this 
growth is foreign tourists, who also contribute the most financially. Many of those 
who provide services to foreign tourists are based on boats offshore but local 
infrastructure and services are still used to a certain extent. 
                                                           
44 These data come from Table 4.1 in Annex 4 of Fundación Natura and WWF (2001). They are 
from National Park data. 33 
With new restrictions on employment of temporary residents, e.g. 
guides, more of the services will be provided locally in future. On Galapagos, the 
Park and the Research Station are the largest employers. 
In the same period employment growth has been limited. This means 
that demand is outstripping supply of labour, thus pushing up wages in tourism 
and other areas where the increased prosperity flows on (e.g. construction and 
local retail). This effect on wages may have been offset temporarily by the legal 
requirement to have wages in Galapagos 75 per cent higher than the mainland 
minimum (which would have reduced labour demand), but continuing economic 
growth could quickly outstrip this limitation. 
Taylor et al (2002) use their model of the Galapagos economy to 
estimate the impact of a 10 per cent rise in tourism on local wages and/or 
migration pressure. They also simulate the effects on local production and 
prices.
45 
This demand for labour is not for all labour but for labour in specific 
sectors. Many of those who work in tourism need very specialised skills: 
languages, the ability to effectively interact with people from different cultures, 
and biology. In contrast, the supply of labour from permanent residents tends to 
be relatively low-skilled. Twenty-three per cent of residents (temporary and 
permanent) over 24 in 1998 had completed University, but very few speak a 
second language.
46 Among those locals who have written qualifications, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the quality of their education, i.e. their skill level, is often 
low. It can be hard to get local people with special skills, such as top quality 
secretaries. 
Where local skills are not available (and that can be shown to the 
satisfaction of the Qualifications and Residency Committee), employers can hire 
temporary residents from outside. Even this, however, involves at least a 15-day 
lag to get a new employee. This delay is a real problem in tourism, where staff 
such as chefs are needed very quickly. 
                                                           
45 See Table Six, Taylor, Yunéz-Naude, Dyer and Ardila (2002). 34 
The imbalance between the skills demanded and supplied leads to low 
wages in low-skilled sectors and hence growth in these sectors. In particular, 
many local people have moved toward fishing (not diving for lobster, which is 
skilled work) on at least a part-time basis. This creates environmental pressure of 
its own. 
An unintended consequence of the requirement in the Law that workers 
belong to cooperatives is that this makes it easy to form cartels to push up local 
wages for specific occupations. By using the cooperatives to limit the supply of 
skilled labour and lobby against the entry of temporary workers, who would push 
down wages, permanent residents could raise their wages. Anecdotally, some 
services have now become very expensive in Galapagos (e.g. skilled construction 
workers). Residents, and particularly small employers who cannot easily recruit 
staff from outside Galapagos, have to pay the higher local wages. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the uneven rises in wages and costs are creating more 
inequality among residents of Galapagos, which creates some social pressure and 
resentment. 
As in any country with high living standards and where poorer people 
are protected by a social welfare structure (here preferential access to local jobs), 
local residents do not have to accept jobs they find unattractive.
47 It can be 
difficult, and will become increasingly difficult, to find people to do manual jobs 
such as cleaning and agricultural labour even when there are unskilled people 
around. People will not accept this work even if they are not really qualified for 
more skilled work. Local residents have little incentive to gain skills as long as 
they can get good work without the skills because of their privileged status. At the 
same time, local residents oppose entry of too many temporary residents where 
they might be in competition. Temporary residents take some of the best jobs and 
lower wages for others. The concerns about high costs or low quality of some 
local services make locals want freer labour markets at the same time that they 
want to protect the employment prospects and high wages of locals. 
                                                           
46 Fundación Natura and TNC (2000a), Table 22. 
47 This problem arises in many European countries where unemployment is high and menial work 
is largely done by immigrants. This creates serious social pressures and problems with racism. 35 
2.2.1.a  Effect of migration restrictions on the composition of the population 
The Special Law reduces migration from the continent to Galapagos. 
Living standards are already higher in Galapagos than on the continent. The 
difference in living standards between what a Galapagan resident can expect in 
Galapagos and if they move to the continent is only likely to increase. This will 
further discourage emigration. Immigration is now limited to spouses, existing 
permanent resident living elsewhere and those lucky enough to get temporary 
residency permits. The population of Galapagos is likely to become more stable 
than it was before 1998. This has some advantages in developing local institutions 
and environmental consciousness but may also have serious disadvantages in a 
world where the flow of ideas and skills is increasingly important for economic 
success and a vibrant healthy society. Recent research finds that intangible 
knowledge (which cannot be written down) is increasingly important and is 
effectively transmitted only through direct contact over a period of time. This is 
one reason why cities are increasingly attractive and why places such as Silicon 
Valley are so successful. 
Two issues are primary. The first is the absolute levels of flows. The 
second is the composition of those flows. We discuss the levels of migration flows 
in Section 4. 36 




















Age        
Per cent of 
population under 20 
years old 
45% 41% 40% 37%    
Per cent of 
population under 30 
years old
48 
68% 64% 60% 58% 64% 65% 
Per cent of 
population under 40 
years old 
82% 81% 79% 77%    
Education
49        
Very low skilled 
Per cent with 3 
grades primary or 
less (over 6 years 
old) 
24.2% 18.6% 15.6% 19.3%50  18.6% 11.2% 
Per cent with 
University Education 
(over 6 years old) 
6.3%  12%  15.1% 13.7% 18%  23%   
Per cent with 
postgraduate degrees 
(over 6 years old) 
  0.8% 0.5% 0.4% 0.8% 1%   
Table 6 shows a collection of data on the characteristics of people living 
in, migrating to and leaving Galapagos. We can see that overall the population of 
the Galapagos is getting steadily older after 1982. The age of immigrants and 
emigrants seems to be about the same (although we are comparing immigrants in 
the 1990s with emigrants in the 1980s). Both immigrants and emigrants are 
younger than the population as a whole after 1998 but roughly representative in 
1990. 
                                                           
48 Fundación Natura and TNC (2000a, Graph 2, Graph 3, Graph 4, Table 9, Table 13 and Table 
54). The data is ultimately from census data collected by INEC. 
49 All education information ultimately comes from INEC. The information for 1998, except for 
the very low skilled percentage of the Galapagos population, was drawn from Fundación Natura 
and TNC (2000, Table 22 and Table 23). Information on emigrant education comes from Table 54 
and on the population in 1990 from Table 60. 
50 2001 Census education data considers population over five years old. 37 
Looking at very low-skilled people, emigrants seem to be representative 
of the population as a whole in 1990. 18.6 per cent of those above six years old 
among both emigrants and the population as a whole have three years or less of 
primary school. In contrast, there are fewer very low-skilled people among 
immigrants than the population as a whole in 1998 (4.6 per cent relative to 7.9 per 
cent). Thus there appears to be a net outflow of people with very low skills. 
When looking at the upper tail of the skills distribution, both 
immigrants and emigrants are more highly qualified than the population as a 
whole in both time periods and both measures (except postgraduate degrees in 
1990). This could be partly to do with their age—younger people are probably 
generally more educated. It also appears that immigrants are better educated than 
emigrants so that Galapagos experiences a net gain in high-level skills through net 
migration. This may be simply because the emigrants are observed eight years 
earlier. If education levels are rising generally we would expect this to happen. 
The differences are marked, however, so may reflect a real effect. 
These rough results are consistent with international experience that 
suggests that people who move are generally younger and more educated. It also 
suggests that migration has been a means of raising the skill level in Galapagos. If 
migration is limited this might have negative implications. Since 1998 the level of 
unskilled people in Galapagos has risen and those with university education 
appears to have fallen. This might be able to be partly offset by more intensive 
local education and training (see Section 7.4.2.a). 
2.2.2 Political  pressures 
Generally Galapagans support the Special Law but not where the 
restrictions affect them personally. Local people feel they have made many 
sacrifices to protect Galapagos. They see the Law as creating new restrictions 
rather than recognising the benefits it confers on them. They cannot understand 
why they have to exert effort and bear losses to make it work. The benefits of the 
Law to local residents are not yet that visible. Some of the benefits will depend on 
adequate resolution of skills shortages that are pushing up prices for key goods. 38 
In contrast the costs when local residents cannot help a family member 
or friend move to Galapagos, or they cannot employ someone they would like, are 
very visible and affect a few people strongly. 
Some local politicians still favour immigration because they think 
migrants will vote for them rather than their opposition. This may well be true in 
the case where they facilitate entry for clearly defined groups. There may also be 
pressure from politicians at the national level who are more concerned about the 
well-being of Ecuadorians as a whole than that of locals. They could push to 
weaken the law so that more people can move to Galapagos from the continent. 
They could also push to allow industrial fishing and large-scale tourism in the 
Galapagos. The Law primarily benefits local residents. In the long run the Law 
should bring value to Ecuador as a whole by maximising the value of the tourist 
resource, but these gains are intangible relative to the immediate gains of 
increasing employment as well as tourism and fisheries output in a country faced 
with strong economic pressure. 
People from continental Ecuador also put political pressure on the 
Special Law. There have been a few attempts to change the Law, in particular to 
allow industrial fishing. These have had support from some local politicians. 
2.2.3  Illegal immigration and corruption 
The same factors that create political pressure to “reform” the law make 
people more tolerant of those who bypass the law and allow illegal migration. 
Some locals suggest that there is no bribery, but lots of people use their influence 
to help their friends, relatives or potential employees avoid the law. People cannot 
see why they should not. They see the merits of the individual case but not the 
overall implications for the integrity of the system. 39 
Direct falsification of documents is also a problem.
51 This is getting 
harder, with more sophisticated permit technology. One unusual situation may 
arise with the Ecuadorian Indian population. It has been suggested that Indians 
find that officials cannot distinguish among them easily based on their photos, so 
they can “recycle” temporary permits to allow several relatives and friends to 
enter Galapagos using one temporary permit. The new electronic identity cards 
are intended to reduce falsification and make the control process at the entrance 
ports easier. 
A larger problem is that people enter Galapagos legally but then do not 
leave when they are supposed to. Enforcement and deportation are costly. There is 
currently no incentive for employers to help INGALA identify and deport 
temporary residents who have overstayed their permit. Requirements for transient 
visitors to have a return ticket are not always enforced. Entry and exit is not 
closely tracked, particularly when people enter through unofficial channels—e.g. 
cargo boats, the military plane, or fishing vessels. Overall there are still significant 
problems with institutional capacity. INGALA has a very limited budget for 
controlling migration ($250,000 in 2001). Some people have questioned whether 
INGALA is the right institution for this operational role. Most of INGALA's role 
is in planning, so migration control may not be its top priority. INGALA's role is, 
however, enshrined in the Law so cannot easily be changed. As we discuss in the 
next section, INGALA is working hard to improve its operational performance. 
                                                           
51 Interview with Oscar Aguirre, Director of INGALA, January 2002.  40 
2.3  How could the Special Law be strengthened 
administratively? 
Parts of the Law, in retrospect, could have been written differently to 
make it easier to enforce and sustain. It is now impossible, however, to change the 
Law without the risk of opening up all aspects of the Law, incurring high costs 
and potentially making unfavourable changes as well. Some constitutional 
constraints also limit changes to the law and its interpretation. The general 
regulation to implement the Law was established in January 2000. The specific 
regulations on migration and fisheries are still in development. Some clarifications 
of the Law could be included in these regulations. 
Enforcement of the Law has four main components: tracking the 
residency status of permanent and temporary residents, tracking the entry of all 
people to Galapagos, verifying the legal status of people in Galapagos, and 
ensuring that those who do not have legal status actually leave. 
The first step is now well advanced. The process of identifying 
permanent residents is almost complete. Price Waterhouse have been contracted to 
analyse and find mistakes in the existing records in order to create a strong 
database to track both permanent and temporary residents. They are also creating 
a manual so that procedures for processing applications for temporary permits can 
be harmonised across the islands. The company CONTROLES will be in charge 
of developing a computerized system to control migration flows and IMPSAT 
Company will install the system and the equipment required. 
Currently it is possible to enter the islands without being recorded. 
Airports are well monitored but it is still possible to enter on the military logistical 
plane and not pass through control points. In the past it was possible to get to 
Galapagos on cargo boats. We talked to all cargo boat companies and one said 
that in the past they used to transport passengers. In 1999 they carried around 100 
foreigners, 50 people from the mainland and 70 Galapagos residents. 41 
However, after the Jessica oil spill in 2000, these boats were more 
controlled and were not allowed to transport passengers because they are only 
cargo boats. They do not meet the requirements for transporting people. These 
problems are being addressed through more formal agreements with the Navy and 
the shipping companies. At present agreements between these people and 
INGALA are with individuals, not the institutions, so gaps emerge as staff turn 
over. Some people also enter on private yachts and fishing boats. These create 
gaps in monitoring of entry that still need to be filled. 
Many people are already in Galapagos or enter Galapagos without 
being traced, or entered legally but have overstayed or are doing activities they are 
not authorised to do. They may not have legal status. INGALA does some random 
checking of people's status on the streets, but not surprisingly this is very 
unpopular. It raises many privacy issues and alienates locals as well as illegal 
migrants, thus reducing people's willingness to cooperate and support the effort to 
control migration. Another suggestion is to recruit tourism and transport operators 
to track transport of people among the islands. This would be particularly helpful 
to pick up people who land on one of the smaller islands and hence do not pass 
through migration control. It might face similar resistance and issues of privacy to 
the random checks unless done with discretion and caution. If it were limited to 
identifying people who travel from an outer island to Cristobal or Santa Cruz and 
who have not travelled in the other direction it might be sufficiently targeted to be 
acceptable. People identified in this way could be required to report to INGALA 
and a list of them could be given directly to INGALA staff to ensure they do 
complete the migration formalities. Identifying people in Galapagos who are 
working illegally requires cooperation from employers. It is not illegal to employ 
someone without legal residency status so employers are currently under no 
obligation to help INGALA. They might want to keep a worker or might have 
become friends and be unwilling to report them. 42 
The final problem is ensuring that people leave Galapagos when their 
temporary or transient permit expires or if they are found not to have legal status. 
One good idea to encourage employers to make sure their temporary workers 
leave would be to require all employers who employ a temporary resident to pay a 
significant guarantee when the person enters. This would be refunded when they 
have been proven to leave. This idea would not require a change in legislation; it 
could be included in the regulation. For illegal entrants who are identified a 
problem is that it is expensive to deport them. The one-way airfare is $100 for an 
Ecuadorian national. Currently INGALA has identified many illegal residents but 
the residents do not have enough money to pay the airfare and INGALA cannot 
afford to deport them. Two approaches would reduce this problem in future.
52 The 
first would be to have migration control points in Guayaquil and Quito to ensure 
that people do not arrive in Galapagos without the appropriate papers. The second 
is to enforce the requirement that all tourists and transients have a return ticket 
when they enter Galapagos. 
2.4  How pressure on the Special Law can be reduced 
The rest of the paper focuses on estimating the underlying pressures on 
the Special Law, understanding their causes and identifying possible solutions. 
Section 7 gives more detail on the range of policies that could help to reduce these 
pressures. They can be roughly grouped in four: policies that directly make the 
migration control more flexible, reducing skills shortages and allowing legal 
means of entry to those who strongly want to migrate; reducing or redirecting 
subsidies that currently make migration to Galapagos very attractive; regulating 
externalities caused by those in Galapagos (e.g. land use, fishing, and tourism); 
and raising the level of skills and education of those in Galapagos, thus reducing 
skill shortages and inequality that leads to social pressures. 
                                                           
52 If part of the problem is that some INGALA staff can be influenced by bribes or simply 
encouraged to not enforce the law, paying attention to their pay levels, job satisfaction and levels 
of training might help provide them with the incentives to strongly enforce the law. 43 
3  Empirical review of migration patterns 
For those concerned about environmental pressure in the Galapagos 
several aspects of human presence are important: people present, people entering 
Galapagos and goods transported to Galapagos. 
3.1  Total population at each point in time 
The largest group of people present at any point in time is the resident 
population. They demand services such as waste and sewage disposal, water and 
electricity, and they use land directly. They also create a demand for goods to be 
transported to the islands. The resident population of the Galapagos has been 
growing steadily since the early 1950s. 
Figure 3: Resident population in Galapagos over time 
Source: Population Census data from the Ecuadorian Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INEC); 
excludes tourists. 
The annual rate of growth has slowly increased in the period since the 


















Figure 4: Resident population growth rate in Galapagos 
Source: Population Census data from INEC; excludes tourists. 
Tourists and transient visitors also use services and cause 
environmental pressure. They also induce increased supplies of food and other 
goods to Galapagos. Figure 5 shows that tourist numbers have grown rapidly 
since 1979, with rapidly increasing numbers of foreign tourists since the mid 
1980s. By 2000, total tourist numbers exceeded 70,000. How big an 
environmental impact are they likely to have relative to residents? 
Figure 5: Ecuadorian and foreign tourists since 1979 













































































































A Fundación Natura study (De Miras 1995, cited in Fundación Natura 
and WWF 1996) suggests that visitors from Ecuador stay three days on average 
and foreign tourists stay four days. If we apply these numbers to the data we find 
that on an average day in 2000 there are around 743 tourists.
53 Tourists make up 
only four per cent of those present at any point in time so they will have a small 
direct impact. Their greater impact is on the resident population they help to 
employ and support. Because they spend more than local residents per day, they 
may also have a disproportionate impact on goods imported to Galapagos, though 
many of their supplies go straight to tourist boats and do not enter the islands. 
3.2  Migration across time and by origin 
Migration plays a major role in population growth. Another part of the 
population growth documented above is clearly natural increase resulting from 
births exceeding deaths. Figure 6 shows the relative roles of immigration, 
emigration and natural population increase in total population growth. The middle 
line gives the growth resulting from immigration of people born outside 
Galapagos. The number of immigrants in each period is either taken from the 
MIGAMA report or estimated by comparing the number of people living in 
Galapagos who were born elsewhere at the time of each census (data from 
INEC).
54 It is an underestimate because some previous immigrants will have died 
between censuses. It also excludes immigrants from other countries. Between 
1993 and 1998, three per cent of immigrants came from other countries. In 1998, 
1.3 per cent of the Galapagos population and 2.16 per cent of immigrants who had 
arrived since 1950 were born outside Ecuador. The growth rate from immigration 
seems roughly constant. Of course that means that the number of immigrants was 
growing rapidly up until 1998. 
                                                           
53 The 1998 Galapagos Census suggests there were slightly more than our methodology but their 
number clearly depends on the time of year. In 1998 we predict 670 while the census reports 772. 
54 All the data used in this section is provided in an Excel spreadsheet, galapagos_data.xls.  See 
Appendix A. 46 
The lower line gives net migration's contribution to growth, i.e. 
immigration net of emigration of people born in Galapagos. Emigration each 
period is measured by the change in the number of people born in Galapagos who 
are now living elsewhere in Ecuador. It is again an underestimate because it 
ignores people who leave the country and people who die after emigrating. It also 
does not include people who moved to Galapagos from somewhere else and later 
left Galapagos again. These people are incorporated in the immigration numbers, 
which are really net inflows of people born outside. The difference between the 
lower and top lines is an estimate of natural increase. 
Figure 6: Contribution of migration to population growth since 1950 
Sources: Fundación Natura and TNC (2000), INEC (1994), Census population data 1950, 1962, 
1974, 1982, 1990, 1998, 2001. 
In the years where we can estimate net migration growth, it accounts for 
30–50 per cent of population growth. Natural increase is clearly an important part 
of total population growth. Emigration is also important. Addressing immigration 























































1950–1961 4.9%    4.1%  
1962–1973 4.5%  2.3%  3.4%  3.4% 
1974–1982 6.1%  0.9%  3.9%  3.1% 
1982–1989 6.0%  2.3%  4.1%  4.2% 
1990–1997 6.4%    3.8%   
1998–2001 5.04%       
Sources: Fundación Natura and TNC (2000), INEC (1994), Census population data 1950, 1962, 
1974, 1982, 1990, 1998, 2001. 
3.2.1  Where do immigrants come from? 
In terms of sheer numbers, three provinces, Guayas, Tungurahua and 
Pichincha, provide most of the migrants to Galapagos. Their total share has fall 
somewhat since 1950 but they still contribute more than 60 per cent. Of these, 
Guayas is by far the most important. 
Figure 7: Source of immigrants from major provinces over time 
Source: Fundación Natura and TNC (2000) Tables 6, 7 and 14; INEC 1994. Data represents 















































To a certain extent their dominance simply reflects the fact that they 
have large populations. As we see in Table 8, Pichincha contributes a lower 
percentage of its population than Loja or Esmeraldas. Guayas and Tungurahua, 
however, not only provide a high percentage of total immigrants but immigration 
is also the highest as a percentage of the population in their province. Emigration 
from other provinces to Galapagos is certainly not simply a function of 
population. We explore other causes of migration in Section 6. We hope this will 
shed some light on why people come to Galapagos. 
Table 8: Place of birth of immigrants to Galapagos 









Per cent of internal 
emigrants from 
Galapagos going to 
province, 1962–1990 
Guayas 35%  0.045%  25% 
Tungurahua 14%  0.093%  3% 
Pichincha 12%  0.026%  47% 
Manabí 7%  0.016%  3% 
Loja 6%  0.035%  5% 
Esmeraldas 3%  0.033%  3% 
El Oro  3%  0.027%  6% 
Los Ríos  3%  0.016%  3% 
Cotopaxi 2%  0.016%  1% 
Chimborazo 2%  0.014%  1% 
Cañar 1%  0.015%  1% 
Azuay 1%  0.006%  1% 
      
Rest of Ecuador  5%  0.015%  1% 
Other Countries  2%     
Total 100%    100% 
Sources:Fundación Natura and TNC (2000), Tables 6, 7, and 14; INEC 1994; Census data 1950, 
1962, 1974, 1982, 1990, 1998. 49 
3.2.2  Where do people go to from Galapagos? 
As we see in Table 8, the vast majority of people who were born in 
Galapagos and leave go to either Guayas or Pichincha (where Quito is located). 
Guayas is the closest province and has Ecuador's largest city, Guayaquil. Quito is 
easily accessible at little extra cost and is the second largest city. These people are 
likely to be emigrating either for study or for urban job opportunities not available 
in Galapagos. This will reflect a larger flow of people leaving and then returning 
to Galapagos. With current data we cannot detect these gross flows. 
3.3  Migration since 1998 
2001 Census figures show population growth of 5.04 per cent (or 2557 
people) in the period from 1998 to 2001. This is lower than earlier in the 1990s. 
We do not yet know how much of this is accounted for by immigration, 
emigration and natural increase. It suggests that the Special Law has not yet been 
successful in controlling population growth though it has slowed it and may have 
had a significant effect on immigration, which is the only thing it controls. 
As Figure 5 indicated, the number of foreign tourists continued to rise 
from 1998 to June 2001. The events of September 11
th, however, have recently 
reduced foreigners' visits to the Galapagos. The number of visitors decreased by 
36 per cent between August and September 2001. In contrast, domestic visits 
decreased between 1998 and 1999, mostly due to bad economic conditions in 
mainland Ecuador. However, they rose again between 1999 and 2001. Overall, 
tourism has increased every year since 1998. This will have increased the demand 
for local services and hence increased migration pressure. 
During 1999 and early 2000 there was an economic crash on the 
mainland. Ecuador suffered an inflation crisis, which led to a dolarized economy. 
The crisis and constantly increasing tourism will have made immigration 
attractive since 1998. 50 
Emigration of the mainland labour force to European countries, 
especially Spain, reached its highest levels during this crisis. Maybe this reduced 
pressure that would have been placed on the Galapagos Islands. Maybe, however, 
it indicates that migration pressure was very strong during this period and could 
have resulted in strong flows to Galapagos if the Special Law had not been in 
force. 
In the following subsections we consider drivers of future legal 
population growth. Population can grow because more permanent residents are 
born in Galapagos and because there is net immigration (immigration minus 
emigration). Immigration is legal for permanent and temporary residents, so 
migration depends on how many permanent residents there are outside the islands 
and how many of them move to Galapagos; how many new people outside 
Galapagos gain permanent residency; and how many temporary residents are 
allowed to enter. 
3.3.1  Population growth through increasing numbers of permanent 
residents 
Permanent residency status can be gained by birth (when the child’s 
parents are permanent residents); by marriage or free union recognized legally; or 
by right (residents who at the time of the Special Law's enactment had lived for 
more than five consecutive years in Galapagos). INGALA is using a database to 
track residency while the process of issuing identity cards is taking place, but the 
process is not yet complete, so the data is hard to interpret. 
Data on births is relatively reliable though it excludes children born to 
permanent residents not living in Galapagos. It may suffer from variation in the 
definition of and accuracy of tracking of “permanent residents” over time. Figure 
8 suggests that natural increase from permanent residents could be a small but 
significant source of population growth.
55 We have no data on deaths, which 
clearly partly offset this. 
                                                           
55 This is preliminary data which should be validated when the registration process is complete. 51 
Figure 8: Births to permanent residents living in Galapagos 
Source: INGALA database, updated April 2002. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess the increase in numbers of 
permanent residents from other causes through time because the requalification 
process is incomplete and the data does not distinguish between those who are 
simply requalifying based on their long-term rights and those who have newly 
become eligible for permanent residency. By August 2002, 18,660 permanent 
residents had requalified (registered under the new system) in contrast to only 
11,282 in October 2000 (Table 9). By October 2000, the new qualification process 
had eliminated 1728 cards issued by the Gobernacion before 1999.
56 
Considering that the number of newborns in Galapagos has been only 
200–300 per year since 1999, this large increase in qualified permanent residents 
since 2000 may suggest that a lot of the increase in permanent residents is people 
who are eligible through marriage or “right”. Most of the observed increase is 
probably due to the backlog in the requalification process. As the new 
qualification process is completed the numbers will rise even further.
57 Once it is 
complete, only genuinely new permanent residents (new marriages and new 
children) will gain permanent residency. 
                                                           
56 13,010 permanent residency cards were issued by the Gobernación before 1999. Source: 
Fundación Natura and WWF (2001). 
57 There was a deadline for requalification, May 2001, but it has been extended. 
































































San Cristóbal  4392  6883 
Santa Cruz  5640  9936 
Isabela 1250  1841 
Total 11,2 82  18,660 
Sources: (a) Results of requalification process cited in Fundación Natura and WWF (2001). 
(b) INGALA database updated 15 August 2000. Other data on this section is based on April 2002 
update. 
Based on current INGALA data, the main sources of eligibility for 
permanent residency are being native (39 per cent) and by right (39 per cent), both 
followed by those whose parents are permanent residents and only seven per cent 
by marriage (Figure 9). The future growth from births and marriages is likely to 
be on the order of 300 per year, as marriage is a small contributor. 
Figure 9: Sources of eligibility for permanent residency 
Source: INGALA database, updated April 2002. 
3.3.2  Migration of permanent residents 
Another potential source of migration since the Special Law is from 
permanent residents moving to Galapagos. According to the INGALA database 
updated to April 2002, 2128 permanent residents live outside Galapagos. They 
could choose to return to Galapagos. As people outside Galapagos become 
permanent residents (through birth, marriage or “right”), they increase the pool of 
potential legal migrants. 
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3.3.3  Migration through temporary residency 
There is no reliable estimate of the number of temporary residents 
currently living in the Galapagos. We consider several indicators of the likely 
importance of temporary residents. The Gobernacion had issued 5798 temporary 
resident cards by 1999.
58 Some of these will have expired; others will be current. 
In August 2002, the INGALA database included 1325 temporary residents with 
new valid cards.
59 However, the process of issuing identity cards still continues, 
and a definitive number of temporary residents will be available only when this 
process is complete. INGALA staff currently estimate that there are around 2000 
temporary residents.
60 Others believe the number could be as high as 4000. 
Another source of indicative information is the number of job 
agreements authorised. In 2000, INGALA approved 1069 job agreements for 
temporary residency. The Special Law allows the spouses and children of those 
with job agreements to also have temporary residency status. This suggests that 
the number of new temporary residents in 2000 was much higher than 1069. 
Thirty-three per cent of these job agreements were for tourism, 15 per cent for Air 
Force and police and 14 per cent for conservation. In Santa Cruz, employers are 
most commonly in tourism and conservation, whereas in Cristobal, security 
institutions, tourism and the education sector employ the most temporary 
residents. 
Government is a major employer. More than 800 people are currently 
working for various government (and NGO) institutions. The national park 
employs around 280 (212 temporary residents), INGALA employs around 110 
(though some are on the continent) and municipalities employ around 250 
between them. 
                                                           
58 Fundación Natura and WWF (2001). 
59 Out of these 1325 temporary residents, 917 are living in Santa Cruz, 336 in San Cristobal and 72 
in Isabela. 
60 F. Castro, personal communication. 54 
In addition, the research station employs around 250 staff. This does not 
include the Provincial Council, representatives of government ministries, the 
military or employees of state-owned companies. When the families supported by 
these employees (if we assume three per household on average) are taken into 
account, these public institutions may directly account for more than 2400 
residents. Indirectly these employees are relatively well paid and increase the 
economic attractiveness of the islands. Many of these are temporary residents. 
By law, temporary residency of non-public employees must be renewed 
each year. We have no indication of how many of the 1069 people with job 
agreements have since left their temporary jobs. The requirement to renew 
temporary residency is unlikely to be enforced yet and does not apply to the many 
public employees. As there is increasing pressure to allow more temporary 
residents, this may be the major source of population growth in future. 
3.4  How many people and how much cargo physically 
enters Galapagos? 
Species introduction is the major environmental risk in Galapagos. The 
risk of species introduction relates most directly to the number of people and the 
quantity and type of goods that enter Galapagos. It also depends on the quality of 
the quarantine and inspection system, SICGAL. A higher resident population will 
tend to be correlated with higher numbers of trips to Galapagos and with higher 
levels of cargo. 
3.4.1 People 
In 2000, 49 per cent of the products retained by SICGAL were 
associated with passengers (in hand luggage, checked luggage or clothes). This 
high percentage may reflect the more intensive inspections at Baltra and of air 
passengers but also suggests passengers impose a high risk. In 2000, 96,368 
passengers flew into Galapagos (55,161 from Quito and the rest from 
Guayaquil).
61 Of these more than 25,000 were residents. 
                                                           
61 Fundación Natura and WWF (2001), Table 4.3. These numbers include all trips on TAME 
(Ecuadorian airline that serves Galapagos) toward Galapagos. The resident numbers include only 
those trips directly identified as resident trips. 55 
Thus, the average resident makes two round trips to the continent each 
year. We cannot separate trips by permanent residents from those by temporary 
residents. Total air trips have more than doubled since 1991 (not at an even rate) 
and residents have been responsible for a roughly constant share. Foreign tourists 
have been responsible for an increasing percentage of trips, while domestic 
travellers have decreased. 
Figure 10: Passengers moved to and from Galapagos (in thousands) 
Source: Fundación Natura and WWF (2001). 
Note: The underlying data is given in Appendix 1. These numbers do not include passengers 
transported with special tariffs, group tariffs, promotions, or courtesy tariffs. 
Some people enter Galapagos by boat. There are no reliable numbers 
for this and the information we have suggests numbers are small relative to air 
travel. Personal interviews with owners of cargo boats indicated that before the 
2000 Jessica oil spill, two of the five cargo boats transported passengers 
sporadically. In 1999 the cargo boat Virgen de Monserrate carried approximately 
220 passengers to the islands. Of these, 100 were foreigners, 50 nationals and 70 
residents. Since 2000, cargo boats are not allowed to transport passengers because 
these boats do not fulfil new requirements for passenger transport. People also 
enter on private yachts and fishing vessels. Control at maritime ports should be 
enforced, as legal or illegal entry of passengers is still possible. Illegal entrants 
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3.4.2 Cargo 
Cargo transport imposes significant risks. For example, it is known that 
mice were introduced through cargo boats. Four cargo boats currently transport a 
diverse range of products to the islands: Marina 91, San Cristobal, Virgen de 
Monserrate and Paola. Each of them goes once or twice per month to the islands. 
Consistent statistics about the amounts of cargo shipped to Galapagos 
are not available. The General Merchant Marine Directorate (DIGMER) holds 
some data since November 2000 but neither all boats nor all months are included. 
Table 9 shows estimates of cargo amounts shipped to Galapagos between 
November 2001 and February 2002. If December is a typical month, annual 
shipments are around eight million kilos. 
More data on the quantity and composition of cargo and trends in it 
over time would be useful. The quantity is likely to be closely related to the 
number of residents and tourists, which have both grown rapidly in the 1990s. 
Table 9: Cargo amounts shipped to Galapagos, Nov 2001—Mar 2002 
(thousand kilograms) 












148 246 163  245   
Cristobal 160  40    62  99 
Paola 135  104  179  293   
Marina 91    309  182    45 
TOTAL 443*  699  524*  600*  144* 
Source: Data provided by DIGMER; * incomplete data 57 
4  Theory of migration 
In this section we outline the factors that drive migration. Our 
framework for thinking about migration is primarily based on economic theory. 
Two other academic disciplines contribute complementary work on migration: 
1.  Sociologists and social psychologists have concentrated on individual 
motivation for migration, including factors such as personal, family and 
community stress, as well as demographic influences, including family 
networks, age and gender.
62 
2.  Geographers have focused on aggregate models of interregional 
population flows. They use mainly gravity models, which in their 
simplest form explain population flows between the two regions in 
terms of the two regions’ population stocks and the distance between 
two regions.
63 
We address the problem by considering three questions. First, why are 
jobs and people located where they are? Second, what causes people to migrate? 
Third, what are the impacts of limitations on mobility? We then present a very 
simple model that provides an organising framework for our later analysis. 
4.1  Why are jobs and people located where they are? 
In an efficient world, people will be located where there are good 
economic opportunities and where it is a nice, or at least acceptable, place to live. 
People need to have jobs to survive, so they will be located where there is 
employment. At the same time, firms need to employ people, so they will choose 
to locate where there are people to employ.
64 
                                                           
62 Ritchie (1976) provides an overview of migration research from a sociologist’s perspective (as 
cited in Greenwood, Mueser, Plane and Schlottmann 1991). 
63 Clark (1986) provides an overview of migration research from a geographer’s perspective (as 
cited in Greenwood, Mueser, Plane and Schlottmann 1991). 
64 Krugman (1995) presents an equilibrium model of spatial location of firms and workers that is 
the basis of many of the ideas in the following section. 58 
The Galapagos are isolated and small. This gives them many economic 
disadvantages. A major reason for employment in such a place is that there are 
natural resource-related opportunities that must be utilised on the spot if they are 
to be used. In particular tourism is a major opportunity and requires local services 
and inputs. Similarly, fisheries must occur onsite. Ecological/biological research 
provides another economic opportunity. It must also be done in the Galapagos. 
These factors lead to direct employment in tourism, fisheries and research. 
If people live and work in Galapagos for these reasons they will require 
services themselves. Thus there will be flow-on employment in retail, health, 
education, and construction, among other areas. 
How many people these activities will employ on site depends on the 
cost of on-site employment and the costs of doing parts of the activities elsewhere. 
For example, in tourism, clearly the guides, chefs and hotels need to be in 
Galapagos, but food can be grown and processed elsewhere and guides can live 
elsewhere when not working. In the extreme, as is clear in Galapagos, tourists, 
guides and chefs can actually live offshore on boats. Artisanal fishing requires that 
fishers live in nearby ports because the boats are small and hence fishing trips 
must be short. Industrial fishers could operate from the mainland through the use 
of factory ships and potentially never land at all. In research, researchers must be 
in Galapagos to collect field data or breed animals, but many of the other research 
activities could be carried out elsewhere. As an example of this consider the 
Antarctic research programmes, where only a skeleton staff remains over winter. 
Many research support roles can be largely carried out from afar with modern 
transportation and telecommunications. 
Similarly, the services provided to people who have jobs linked to 
Galapagos can be provided either on or offsite. In the past many services, such as 
banking, insurance, specialist retail or health care, would have to be provided 
onsite or not at all. 59 
Over the last 10 years increased tourism demand and increased access 
to international seafood markets will have placed upward pressure on the 
population in Galapagos. In contrast, improved transport and communications will 
have reduced the need to provide some services locally; goods and services can be 
imported more easily from the continent, which potentially reduces population 
pressure. The effects of the latter (improved transport and communications), 
however, is very small relative to the former. 
Some people will choose to live in Galapagos even though their jobs do 
not require it. This will include retired people and some people who have 
extremely mobile jobs (e.g. artists or writers) and could live anywhere. They 
might choose to live in Galapagos because they like the lifestyle and amenities. 
As more jobs become mobile with the Internet, and retirees become more mobile, 
improved services and amenities in Galapagos could attract more of these people. 
If these people love living in Galapagos it may be socially efficient for them to 
live there. 
If the costs of living and operating in Galapagos are subsidised, more 
activities that could have occurred elsewhere will occur in Galapagos and some 
activities that are not intrinsically linked to Galapagos may occur there. 
4.1.1  Effects of government policies on the location of population 
4.1.1.a Regulating  externalities 
An externality occurs when a person takes an action but does not bear 
the full consequences of it. For example, a fisher who collects a lot of sea 
cucumbers and then leaves Galapagos is not affected by the lower number of 
remaining sea cucumbers in the future. Other fishers bear these costs. A key 
externality in Galapagos is that every extra visitor (resident or tourist) brings an 
increased risk of introduced species. These introduced species can damage the 
environment, leading to reduced future tourism opportunities, which has costs for 
others (future tourists and tourism operators), as well as loss of biodiversity and 
ecosystem functionality. The visitors do not bear the cost of the risk they impose 
so do not take it fully into account. Externalities lead to inefficiency. 60 
Government's role in regulating externalities can either increase or 
decrease population pressure. Where a lack of regulation leads to overexploitation 
of a resource, such as excessive tourism that damages sites or excessive fishing 
pressure, an efficient regulation can reduce the number of jobs in the industry and 
reduce short-term population pressure. By preserving the resource they will 
increase the longer-term population but within sustainable limits. 
In contrast, if the externality makes life less attractive and productive in 
Galapagos, effective regulation of the externality can encourage migration. For 
example, poor management of sewage disposal can either raise the costs borne by 
local people for dealing with sewage or can lead to local pollution and hence 
reduce tourism, fishing and general quality of life. If the government can improve 
the sewage treatment infrastructure it can make tourism and fishing firms more 
productive and life more attractive. 
4.1.1.b Infrastructure 
National governments are often major providers of infrastructure 
because of the necessary scale of projects and the likelihood of natural monopoly. 
This infrastructure alters the costs and benefits of local activities. Government 
investments in infrastructure (roads, airports, port facilities) and long-term 
amenities (national parks) respond to current activity in different locations but 
also influence future location decisions. If infrastructure investments are higher 
than is justified by the economically efficient level of local activity, and are not 
funded out of local taxes, they will encourage additional migration. 
4.1.1.c  Central policies with “equal” effects across locations 
Policies such as health and education that offer equal levels of social 
services in different places are effectively subsidising areas such as Galapagos 
where the cost of providing those services is higher. Providing health services for 
a small population has a much higher cost on a per capita basis than for a large 
population. If equivalent levels of health service are paid for by central 
government, a remote area such as Galapagos will tend to be heavily subsidised. 
This will encourage excessive population levels. 61 
Education is similar, particularly at the post-primary level. Electricity 
supply and water supply are also more expensive to provide in remote areas. 
Equal access and prices across provinces implies high levels of subsidies to 
remote areas. 
If local government provides these services out of local tax revenues no 
subsidy is involved even if the level of service is high. Local people will choose 
the level of service that is efficient for them. In the extreme, local governments 
can be thought of as yet another type of firm where people have to buy the 
package of services and local taxes offered when they choose where to live.
65 In 
Galapagos, local government (municipalities and the Provincial Council) provides 
many services including urban development (sewage, waste, water, parks, 
libraries), rural development, and roads. Local government also has some control 
over education and health. Little is locally funded. 
Similarly, some central government policies may be inappropriate in 
isolated areas, for example, the complex bureaucratic infrastructure appropriate 
for a large province on the continent may be completely inappropriate for a region 
with fewer than twenty thousand people. If the bureaucracy were funded out of 
local resources this would be a drain on the province and would discourage 
population growth. If it is funded from central government it is not a direct drain. 
It will, however, reduce the efficiency of local government activities and will have 
a direct impact on population. A less efficient local government will make 
economic activities less productive and hence reduce total employment and 
population. However, it may also lead to less effective regulation of negative 
externalities, such as those that arise through subdivision of land, which will 
encourage population growth. 
                                                           
65 This is explored in the Tiebout model (Tiebout, 1956). 62 
4.2  What causes people to move? 
Over time, the optimal number of people and the composition of skills 
employed in a location changes. To adjust to this change either people will move 
or wages will change. If more people are needed, people will immigrate and/or 
wages will rise. If fewer people are needed, people should emigrate and/or wages 
will fall. People move because they do not have the right skills for the jobs that 
are available in their current location, or conversely jobs that will fully utilise their 
skills are not available where they are. They take their families with them. 
In addition, even without changes in the level of employment, if there 
are no restrictions there will be a continuous flow of immigration and emigration. 
Young people move to study or start a career. People also move because they 
prefer the lifestyle in a different place or for personal reasons such as marriage. 
When people make decisions about moving, they weigh up the net 
benefits they expect to receive in the new location and compare those to the costs 
of making the move. Economic models are based on the view that people migrate 
in order to maximise personal or family welfare. More complex models take into 
account the fact that wages are not fixed across time so that people may move to a 
new job with the same or even a lower current wage but better future prospects. 
For example, studies have found that people who move into large cities do not 
immediately become better off but over time their wages tend to rise, possibly 
because they are in an environment where they learn from those around them.
66 
                                                           
66 See for example Glaeser and Maré (2001). 63 
Another complication is that wages are uncertain and people don't 
really know exactly what sort of job and income they are likely to have in a new 
place unless they move to a specific job, and even then they may not stay in that 
job forever. People make decisions based on their expectations about their current 
and future wage prospects and based on their assessment of the probability that 
they will be unemployed.
67 
Potential migrants compare the current and future expected benefits to 
the financial costs of moving as well as the social and personal costs of having to 
create new social networks and become familiar with a new community. When the 
costs of moving are high they will be less likely to move and people will respond 
very little to changes that they do not believe are permanent. Some people are 
very attached to specific places for emotional and cultural reasons and are very 
unlikely to move. 
Empirically, younger, more educated people move more often. They 
probably have more to gain both in the short run from putting their skills to better 
use and in the long run because they will be in the labour market for longer. They 
also face lower personal and social costs from being dislocated. People who own 
houses are less likely to move. People tend to be more likely to move if the two 
locations are closer and if culturally the two areas are “similar”. Given that 
Galapagos is not close to anywhere, this might mean simply that those close to 
Guayaquil and Quito are more likely to move to Galapagos because the travel 
time is much shorter. Urban people might be more likely to move to urban areas. 
We do some empirical analysis of the factors that drive immigration 
into and emigration from the Galapagos in Section 6. 
                                                           
67 Herzog, Schlottmann and Boehm (1993) review empirical studies that treat migration primarily 
as spatial-job search. These studies focus on the uncertainty in wages and probability of 
employment in different locations. 64 
4.3  What are the impacts of limitations on migration? 
Figure 11 illustrates the effect of a limitation on migration on the labour 
market. The 1998 curves for supply and demand are those of an unrestricted 
market. In 2002, the curves are for a relatively fixed population. Labour demand 
has grown, possibly because of a local economic boom. Labour supply can only 
expand in a very limited way through limited migration and through increases in 
labour participation by people already living in Galapagos. 
The combination of the limitation on migration and the growth in 
labour demand creates latent pressure on migration. If mobility were unrestricted 
E*2002–E2002 extra people would be employed and a larger number would 
immigrate. The distance V indicates the amount a potential migrant would be 
willing to pay, and an employer would be willing to offer above the wage that 
they would have offered without the mobility limitation, if the potential migrant 
were allowed to enter the Galapagos. The higher is V, the greater is the pressure 
for illegal entry or for politically motivated changes to the migration rules. 
Although we talk about employers and employees, this also applies to 
people who are going to be self-employed. For example, when there are more 
tourists there will be an opportunity for more taxi drivers and hence the existing 
taxi drivers will make more money and/or new people will become taxi drivers. If 
people are self-employed, the “wage” is the income they can derive from the 
activity. 65 
Figure 11: Impacts of migration limitations on the labour market 
This is only a figure with theoretical slopes on the lines. It tells us the 
direction of the effects but not their size. How large a distortion will restrictions 
on migration really create, and how much pressure will that put on the 
enforcement and upholding of the restriction? 
4.3.1  How important is migration as a labour market adjustment 
mechanism? 
When the supply and demand for labour are out of equilibrium in an 
area five things can adjust. The first is that people can move. This response was 
discussed above and is the focus of this report. Other mechanisms can also be 
important. Adjustments can come from: 
1.  Creation and destruction of jobs in existing firms 
2.  Migration of firms 
3.  Changes in the labour force participation rate 
4. Wage  adjustments. 
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The importance of migration as an adjustment mechanism varies across 
countries. In the US the population is highly mobile and it is very important. In 
European countries it is generally less so. For Ecuador as a whole, if we take the 
total number of people who changed province between 1985 and 1990, divide by 
five to estimate annual flow and then divide by total population in 1990, we find 
that around 1.3 per cent of Ecuadorians move between provinces each year.
68 In 
contrast, around 1990 in the United States 3.32 per cent of the population moved 
between states and in Western European States, between 0.54 per cent and 1.64 
per cent moved.
69 When considering only Galapagos, in 1990 six per cent of the 
population had immigrated in the last year and three per cent had emigrated. Thus 
Ecuador has mobility comparable to Europe overall but much higher mobility 
with regard to Galapagos. Migration is likely to have been an important 
mechanism for labour market adjustment in Galapagos at least up until 1998. 
If population cannot adjust through immigration (it can adjust freely 
with emigration) then it will have to adjust in one of the other ways. Labour 
participation rates will tend to increase over time for general development reasons 
(women become more educated and there is less work in the home; older people 
become healthier and able to work later in life) as well as because with higher 
wages working will become more attractive. 
Firms can contract or move away if their activities are not particularly 
profitable in Galapagos and/or they can do their activities elsewhere. If this 
process is facilitated there will be less pressure on the labour market. The demand 
for labour will fall. If policies actively try to create new jobs or protect old jobs 
the pressure will be increased and wages and labour participation will need to rise 
still further. This would be counterproductive, although it will help some specific 
groups. A preferred policy would be to help people retrain when their existing 
jobs are lost so that they can move into the areas with labour shortages and higher 
wages. 
                                                            
68 These data are taken from INEC (1990) Table P-25. 
69 Data extracted from OECD (2000) p 53. 67 
If wages have a minimum level (as they do for temporary permit 
holders by law in Galapagos, see Section 2) wage adjustment is not possible. That 
is probably not limiting because wage falls are a substitute for emigration, which 
is not limited. Currently the pressures are for immigration in any case. 
With effective controls on in-migration we can expect higher wages in 
Galapagos, higher labour force participation rates (e.g. more women working and 
later retirement), reduced work for self-employed people (because their labour 
costs will be so high), destruction of jobs within firms and firms moving away 
from Galapagos. The more we depend on high wages for adjustment the more 
social pressure will arise and the more pressure there will be to allow more 
immigration. Galapagos residents able to work in the sectors with rising wages 
will become increasingly privileged. 
4.3.2  How much does it matter who moves? 
In general young, educated people with higher levels of motivation tend 
to move. If immigration is limited, emigration will continue to involve those with 
higher skills while the composition of the population who move to Galapagos will 
be controlled by the rationing rules. If these rules favour those with a lot to offer 
Galapagos, for example young energetic people with good skills, the composition 
of the population may not change dramatically. If the rules lead to immigration 
(permanent and temporary) primarily based on family connections and networks, 
the skills of those entering the Galapagos may be much lower than those leaving 
and the population composition may gradually change. This new composition 
may not meet the needs of the sectors with a growing demand for skills. We 
discussed these issues in more detail in the specific context of the Special Law 
(Section 2). 
4.4  Summary: Simple economic model of migration 
The basis for our analysis of migration is a comparison between the 
patterns of migration that would occur if all migrants took into account all the 
effects of their decisions on everyone else in society, “social optimal”, and the real 
decisions actual migrants make, “private decisions”. The decisions are primarily 
different because of government regulation or lack of regulation. 68 
We are interested in excessive migration pressure because it either has 
environmental effects, if the people can enter, or creates latent demand to migrate 
which leads to social, economic and political pressure because wages rise and 
employers have difficulty finding the skilled staff they need. 
In earlier sections we have outlined various aspects of the migration 
decision. This section summarises the key elements of these decisions. We can 
use this simplified framework to identify key problems that lead private decisions 
to be socially problematic. In Section 5 we use this framework to organise and 
interpret information about subsidies and regulation (or lack of regulation) in key 
sectors. 
4.4.1  Socially optimal decision making 
A person/family (henceforth individual) should move to the Galapagos, 
i.e. it will benefit Ecuador and even the population of the earth as a whole, if their 
increase in welfare by moving to Galapagos is greater than the increase in costs 
they impose on society. 
UiG – UiO > social expenditure on iG – social expenditure on iO 
UiG is well-being (utility) of individual i in the Galapagos (G), while 
UiO is the same individual's well-being if they lived in another place. Similarly 
social expenditure (health, education, water and sewage, energy subsidies, and so 
on) on individual i in the Galapagos is compared with the expenditure the same 
person will attract in another place O. 
The person's well-being depends on the wage they receive, the cost of 
living and also the economic and non-economic amenities associated with living 
in a particular place. 
UiG = U (wageiG, prices of consumer goodsiG, amenities) 
Amenities include proximity to national parks, climate, public services 
available, and other characteristics of life in a particular place. Different people 
will value these things differently. 69 
“Social Expenditure” = per capita spending on health, education, water, 
sewage and other public infrastructure 
•  – taxes paid by the individual for these services 
•  + subsidies on all consumer goods and wages 
•  + external effects on the environment 
•  + external effects on other fishers, tourism operators etc. 
Public expenditure should not include spending on conservation that is 
not sensitive to the interests of the local population but aimed at national or even 
global benefit. 
If all individuals took these things into full account when making their 
decisions the level of migration to the Galapagos would be optimal and no policy 
change would be needed. Unfortunately private decision makers usually face a 
different and much simpler decision. 
4.4.2  Private decision making 
In the absence of a strongly enforced law restricting migration, an 
individual (person or family) will move to the Galapagos if they are better off in 
Galapagos than where they come from: 
UiG > UiO 
If there are net subsidies that favour life in the Galapagos, more people 
will move to Galapagos than we would like. We want to measure the size of the 
distortion between the private and social decisions.  
Distortion = Social Expenditure iG – Social ExpenditureiO 
Then we can try to find ways to minimise the social distortion with a 
particular emphasis on reducing it for those who are considering migrating rather 
than those already resident in the Galapagos. In Section 6 we provide an empirical 
assessment of the distortions in migration pressure that arise from subsidies and 
from inadequate regulation of externalities. In Section 6 we assess the extent to 
which these subsidies affect observed migration. 70 
5  Economic and policy incentives currently 
shaping migration 
In this section we identify sources of spatial distortion that encourage 
people to move for inefficient reasons. These include subsidies to energy, 
education, transport or other goods where these subsidies are available to residents 
in the Galapagos but not on the mainland. 
They also include inadequate regulation of activities such as tourism or 
fisheries so that the return received by those taking part exceeds the return to 
society. For example, if a fisher can receive a good short-term return but the 
stocks are being diminished, society is subsidising the fisher because future 
generations (or even fishers in a few years) will bear the costs of their actions. 
5.1  Distortions from subsidies
70 
Subsidies were initially introduced to ensure a minimum standard of 
living in what was then a very backward part of Ecuador and to compensate 
residents for the long distance to the mainland and for National Park restrictions. 
When they were introduced, if anything, the government wanted to encourage 
more people to move to Galapagos. More recently, Galapagos has become an 
attractive place to live and concern has shifted from having too few people to 
having too many people. The subsidies, however, continue to encourage 
migration. 
The cost of providing services, such as health, education, electricity and 
water supply, is higher in a remote area such as Galapagos because of its isolation 
and lack of economies of scale. Therefore if the central government offers equal 
levels of services in different provinces, they effectively subsidise the cost of 
living in the islands. As well as promoting migration, subsidies also encourage 
activities that create environmental externalities, such as risky transportation of 
fossil fuels. 
                                                            
70 Susana Cardenas was the primary author of this section. 71 
This section will show the main clearly identifiable subsidies in 
Galapagos, their relationship with possible causes of migration and their effect on 
the environment. It will include an estimate of the size of each subsidy per unit of 
the subsidised good and in total terms, as well as considering how the subsidy has 
changed over time. Data analysis for this section depends on the subsidy type. For 
some subsidies it was possible to get a time series whereas for others we found 
only a pair of years or a single period. We discuss subsidies for transport, energy 
(fossil fuel and electricity) and public services. 
5.1.1  Transport (travel subsidies) 
In this section we mostly discuss air transport. The Special Law 
provides a discount for residents who use cargo transport, but cargo transport is 
carried out by private companies and the discount is not fully enforced so we do 
not discuss it further here. 
Air travel to and from Galapagos is heavily subsidised. Article 3 of Law 
151 (4 May) specifies that since 1992 permanent residents are entitled to a 50 per 
cent discount for both marine and air transport both within the islands and to the 
continent. Title 7 of the Special Law confirms this. 
The travel subsidies are probably designed to provide assistance to 
people living in remote areas. The indigenous residents of the Amazon region 
have also received travel subsidies since 1997. Their subsidy is around 75 per cent 
of the national tariff for defined routes. 
Travel subsidies are the main direct benefit for residents. They 
encourage migration and encouraged people to claim residency status even before 
the Special Law.
71 The subsidies also encourage residents to fly to the continent 
more frequently. This increases the risk of species introduction. 
                                                            
71 Fundación Natura and WWF (1998). 72 
According to the Law, residents of the Galapagos should pay only 50 
per cent of the airfare paid by other Ecuadorian citizens. Table 10 shows that this 
has been the case only since 2002. Before that, the subsidy fluctuated between 66 
and 75 per cent, with the level depending on the pressure exerted by locals for 
lower fares. Until 2000, permanent and temporary residents both received the 
same subsidy. In 2001 an attempt was made to differentiate the subsidies with a 
subsidy of 50 per cent for temporary residents and 73 per cent for permanent 
residents. Since 2002, the subsidies have been equalised again. 
Table 10: Percentage subsidy on air tickets relative to Ecuadorian citizens' 
price 
Price for passenger 
from continent 
(one way) 
Price for Galapagos 
Resident 
Subsidy  Year 
  Per cent 
1996 71.21  25.87  63.67 
1997 77.07  38.42  50.15 
1998 80.70  27.71  65.67 
1999 74.14  19.49  73.71 
2000 60.00  15.12  74.81 
2001 64.65  17.50  72.93 
2002 70.90  35.45  50.00 
 
The subsidy is defined relative to fares paid by Ecuadorian citizens. If 
we consider that the true opportunity cost of the flights by residents is the fare 
paid by foreign visitors, the subsidy would be much higher. By this measure, 
Ecuadorian citizens are also subsidised. 
Even the fares paid by Ecuadorians to Galapagos seem to be highly 
subsidised relative to other flights in Ecuador. Comparing the airfares to the 
Islands with other internal airfares, we find that the fare from Guayaquil to 
Galapagos (90 minutes) is less than both the fares from Quito to Guayaquil (30 
min) and from Quito to Machala (45 minutes). We also see that the airfares for 
flights within the continent have risen more than fares to Galapagos in nearly 
every year. 73 
Table 11: Airfares to Galapagos relative to other airfares within Ecuador 
(US$) 
















1997 77    33    42   
1998 81  5  46  41  52  23 
1999 74  -8  42  -9  42  -19 
2000 60  -19  40  -4  45  6 
2001 65  8  44  11  50  11 
2002 71  10  49  11  56  12 
Airfares converted at average annual exchange rate. 
Figure 12: Airfares to Galapagos (US$) 
The airfare paid by foreign visitors has stayed constant at $150 from 
1996 to 2002, while the airfares of Ecuadorians have varied (Figure 12). The 
number of foreign visitors has risen every year. The fare paid by residents fell 
from 1997 to 2000 and in the same period the number of flights by residents rose; 
when the fare rose in 2002, the number of flights fell (Figure 13). We do not see 











1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
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Figure 13: Number of flights (adult passengers) between Galapagos and the 
continent 
In total, the annual average subsidy for air travel in the period 1996-
2001 is US$1.26m. The calculations are given in Table 12.
72 The subsidy level has 
grown every year up to a maximum in 2000. It increased by 63 per cent in 1999 
alone. This is largely driven by the increase in the number of flights by residents. 
Since 2001 the level of the subsidy and the number of flights have both decreased 
so the subsidy fell slightly, 4.54 per cent. 
Table 12: Estimated annual air travel subsidy 
Year Nu mber of 
passengers 




























1996  2.5  12.2  N.D.  26 380 1,091  711  
1997  3.0  13.3  48  38 654 1,313  658 -7 
1998  4.8  10.0  35  28 445 1,297  852 29 
1999  7.9  13.3  25  19  456  1,733 1,277 50 
2000  13.8 28.9 18  15 679  2,764  2,085  63 
2001  13.6 24.7 20  18 704  2,694  1,990  -5 
  Total for Period  7,572   
 
                                                            
72 We extended the revenue analysis in Fundación Natura and WWF (1998) using the total revenue 
collected by the airline TAME excluding VAT and airport tax. We assume that the real cost of the 
flights is the fare paid by Ecuadorians from the continent and include only adult passengers, no 
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Foreigners Continent Residents75 
Figure 14: Air travel subsidy (revenue at real cost minus actual revenue) 
If we had calculated the total subsidy using the foreign airfare as the 
true cost, the total subsidy would have been nearly three times higher. If residents 
had paid the same fare as other Ecuadorians, they would have paid 200 to 400 per 
cent more than they actually paid. 
Although fewer seats are available for residents than for other 
Ecuadorians or foreign visitors, the benefits from the subsidy are evident. In 
response to increased subsidies, the number of flights by residents increased every 
year until 2000. Now the subsidy has been fixed at the level specified in the law 
and the number of flights has also stabilised. 
5.1.2 Energy  Subsidies 
5.1.2.a Fossil  Fuels 
All fossil fuel consumed in Galapagos is subsidised because the cost of 
its transport from Guayaquil to Baltra and among the islands is born by the state. 
The idea was to provide benefits to the isolated citizens who would face restricted 
























Actual Revenue Revenue at real cost Subsidy
* We assume that the airfare paid by passengers from the continent is the real cost.76 
Until 2 July 2001, everyone in the islands benefited from this subsidy. 
Large tourist companies are the major consumers of fuel. They consume 60 per 
cent of all diesel and are the second largest consumers of gasoline.
73 Since July 
2001, they must pay the cost of fuel transport including an eight per cent mark-
up.
74 The remaining subsidy mostly benefits local residents. It subsidises fuel used 
for generating electricity and direct purchases of fuel from gas stations. 
The subsidy reduces the cost of living in Galapagos, thus encouraging 
migration. In addition, the subsidy promotes activities that use fossil fuel 
intensively. It discourages use of alternative, less risky fuels. Increased population 
and economic activity in Galapagos, which are encouraged by the fuel subsidy, 
and the direct effect of the subsidy on fuel consumption per person, has led to 
continuous growth in fuel demand. This increases the risk of fuel spills and 
environmental damage. 
In the Galapagos, diesel, gasoline and LPG are sold through retail 
outlets. Petrocomercial, the state petroleum company, is the only diesel and 
gasoline retailer. In contrast, on the continent there are several private retailers 
(Texaco, Shell, Mobil). LPG is sold by Petrocomercial but also by private 
distributors. The prices charged by Petrocomercial are lower than private 
companies for all three fuels, and LPG is explicitly and heavily subsidised. 
Petrocomercial charges the same prices nationally. The retail price in Galapagos 
does not include the cost of transport. 
DIGMER specifies transport costs per unit of different products (fuels, 
appliances, food, construction materials, etc.) from Guayaquil to Galapagos and 
among the Islands. Diesel and gasoline are brought once or twice a month in the 
Army ship Taurus. LPG is transported in private ships such as the Paola, 
Cristóbal,  Virgen de Monserrate, and Marina 91. The prices they charge to 
Petrocomercial are those defined by DIGMER. The average subsidy per gallon of 
diesel and gasoline was 14 cents between 1995 and 2000 (in current US$). The 
average subsidy for LPG was US$1.91 per 15kg cylinder (Table 13). 
                                                            
73 Cardenas (2001). 
74 Article 5 of Decree 1610 published in Official Register No. 359 of 2 July 2001. 77 








1995 0.195  1.83 
1996 0.172  2.71 
1997 0.148  2.54 
1998 0.080  2.11 
1999 0.140  1.37 
2000 0.106  1.23 
2001 0.138  1.61 
2002 0.169     
 
As well as absorbing the transport cost, Petrocomercial bears the costs 
of port delays. These delays depend on the conditions for loading and unloading. 
In 2002, the daily cost of delays for Taurus was $515.97. One estimate of the 
annual subsidy for fuel transport, not including the costs of delay or of interisland 
transport, suggests that from 1995 to 2000, the state bore $508 thousand annually 
or $3.05 million from 1995 to 2000 (Table 14). 
The value of the subsidy increased every year, primarily because of 
increases in fuel consumption (Table 14). Consumption rose because of increased 
tourism, increased electricity production and growth in the vehicle fleet. From 
July 2001 the level of subsidy reduced because of a regulation that requires large 
tourism operators to bear the transport costs of the fuel they use. Because local 
tourism operators purchase their fuel through local retailers they continue to 
benefit from the subsidy. 
                                                            
75 The fall in the subsidy in dollars arises because of the fall in the value of the sucre. Consumers 
may have perceived an increased price if their salaries and price expectations did not keep pace 
with inflation. 78 
Table 14: Subsidy for transport of fuel to Galapagos 
  Fuel Type  Estimated Transport Cost 
Gasoline Diesel  Gas  per 
gallon 














1995 590  2,498  493  0.20  122  487 60  547 
1996 703  2,525  528  0.17  181  435 95  530 
1997 1,254  2,881  452  0.15  169 427  76 503 
1998 738  3,490  458  0.08  141  279 64  344 
1999 793  4,043  477  0.14  91  566 44  610 
2000 1,173  4,582  379  0.11  82 486  31 517 
     Annual  Average  447  62 508 
     Total Period 1995–2000  2,679  371  3,051 
Source: Volume data from Petrocomercial 
Figure 15: Volume of fuel sold annually by Petrocomercial 
The government subsidises delivery of fuel to final users on the 
continent also. However in the case of LPG, between 1996 and 2001 the cost of 
delivering fuel by sea to Galapagos was 817.7 per cent more than the average cost 
of delivery by land on the continent. Given that the retail prices are the same, LPG 







1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Gasoline (thous. gallons) Diesel (thous. gallons) Gas (ton)79 
Table 15: Comparative gas subsidy: Galapagos relative to continental 
Ecuador 
Continent Galapagos 
Year  Thousands of sucres per 
ton 
1996 79.8  576.7 
1997 76.0  676.7 
1998 86.0  766.7 
1999 96.0  1086.7 
2000 262.5  2050.0 
2001 547.5  2683.3 
 
5.1.2.b Electricity  subsidy 
Electricity is generated from diesel in Galapagos because it is not 
connected to the national grid. In contrast the primary source on the continent is 
hydroelectricity. Electricity generation creates environmental risk because of the 
use of fossil fuel. Electricity demand is rising. 
Since 1997, The Ecuadorian Electrification Institute has controlled 
electricity provision and established retail prices. Fundación Natura and WWF 
(1998) shows the financial deficit from electricity production in Santa Cruz 
between 1990 and 1996. The government paid this.
76 Through the process of 
privatisation, the firm ELECGALAPAGOS  was created in 1998. It generates, 
distributes and retails electricity in Galapagos. The National Energy Control 
Centre, CENACE, sets the regulated prices for generation, distribution and 
transmission based on information provided by the regional companies. In 
Galapagos electricity is subsidised in several ways. 
                                                            
76 Ospina and Erickson, cited in Fundación Natura and WWF (1998). 80 
Electricity Generation Subsidy 
Electricity prices do not cover the costs of operation and maintenance 
of electricity generation in Galapagos. The subsidy per kwh of electricity is the 
difference between the cost of generation (estimate by ELECGALAPAGOS) and 
the retail price set by CENACE. In 2001, the subsidy was 5.86 cents (11.39 minus 
5.53) per kwh. This shortfall is covered by FERUM, the Fund for Rural and 
Marginal Urban Electrification. 
During the period 1998 to 2002, the total subsidy to Galapagos from 
FERUM was $5.18 million. This represented 5.38 per cent of the total FERUM 
subsidies in Ecuador. Table 16 shows that the subsidy has increased substantially 
nearly every year. 
Table 16: Annual transfers from FERUM for Galapagos and Ecuador 









1998 407.67   9953.849 4.10% 
1999 813.42 99.53%  21468.865  3.79% 
2000 802.21 -1.38%  13316.507  6.02% 
2001 1316.76  64.14%  21154.195  6.22% 
2002 1840.45  39.77%  30367.553  6.06% 
Total Period  5180.51    96260.97  5.38% 
 
FERUM is funded from 47 per cent of resource rentals paid by oil 
extraction companies and payments to the state for the right to transport crude oil; 
and since 10 October 1996, 10 per cent of the revenue from commercial and 
industrial consumers. Very little of FERUM's funding originates in Galapagos 
because the industrial and commercial sectors are small. FERUM covers only 
operating and maintenance deficits. Other costs (transmission and distribution) are 
included in the electricity price. All residents, firms and institutions in Galapagos 
benefit from this subsidy. 81 
Another electricity subsidy is that, as we discussed above, fuel is 
subsidised. In an average month, ELECGALAPAGOS consumes 26 per cent of 
the diesel used in Galapagos.
77 Final prices also involve cross subsidies from high 
electricity users to low users. These do not especially benefit Galapagos. 
Potential Subsidies for Renewable Energy 
FERUM also has a fund for renewable and non-conventional energy in 
marginal, isolated rural areas. Renewable energy is attracting increased attention 
in Galapagos. One project being currently developed involves a hybrid system, 
wind and solar energy, to provide electricity in Floreana (one of the inhabited 
islands).
78 
Use of the provisions for subsidies for renewable energy from FERUM 
would not be an increased subsidy to residents unless it leads to electricity prices 
that are lower than they would be when electricity is generated from diesel. 
Instead, renewable energy would directly reduce the risk of environmental 
damage currently caused by electricity production. If all electricity were produced 
in a clean way, any subsidies that lower electricity prices would continue to 
encourage migration but would no longer lead to perverse incentives that directly 
damage the environment. 
Comparison with Continental Ecuador 
In Figure 16, we see that electricity prices in Galapagos are gradually 
rising relative to the country as a whole. However, the price is still lower than all 
areas except Quito and Guayaquil despite higher generating costs. This is because 
these higher costs are borne by FERUM while the Galapagan residents benefit 
from lower distribution costs from the generator to the end-user. 
                                                            
77 Cardenas (2001). 
78 This project is being coordinated by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation. 82 
Figure 16: Expected average electricity prices by region and major city
79 
($/kwh) 
Source: Consejo Nacional de Electrificación (2002). 
5.1.3  Subsidies for Public Services 
Another subsidy derives from the difference between public 
expenditure and revenue generated from local residents. If subsidies allow a 
higher level of public services than would have been possible if they were locally 
funded, or if they increase overall economic activity in the islands thus creating 
more jobs, they will encourage migration. Subsidies are provided through direct 
provision of services and through subsidies to municipalities. 
5.1.3.a  Central government: Incomes and expenditures at provincial level 
Around 30 per cent of central government expenditure is transfers to the 
provincial level for health, education, public works and other activities (including 
conservation). On the other hand, 20 per cent of the income of central government 
comes from identifiable payments from provinces including VAT, targeted sales 
taxes and income tax.
80 
                                                            
79 These may not be actual prices because of political and economic adjustments during the year. 





































































































































In general, provinces receive more from central government than they 
pay directly.
81 The difference between transfers to provinces and provincial tax 
payments is not an absolute measure of subsidy because some other income 
comes from states. It is, however, an indication of relative levels of subsidy across 
provinces. 
Table 17 shows that Galapagos gets the highest subsidy per capita by 
far. Government expenditure is four times the average, while tax payments are in 
the middle of the range. This high level of subsidy allows Galapagos to enjoy a 
level of services similar to other provinces despite its high costs of provision 
resulting from isolation and lack of economies of scale. The isolated Amazon 
provinces also receive high subsidies and have very high levels of expenditure 
relative to the taxes they pay.
82 
                                                            
81 The difference is made up through other forms of taxes, such as income tax, and other sources of 
revenue. 
82 Amazon provinces: Morona Santiago, Napo, Pastaza, Zamora Chinchipe, Sucumbíos. 84 
Table 17: Primary expenditures and taxes collected per capita, 1997–1998 
($) 





Galapagos 691.93  11.92  680.01 
Morona 
Santiago 300.46 2.47  297.99 
Pastaza 210.10  5.92 204.18 
Loja 184.67  6.18  178.49 
Bolívar 167.34  2.65 164.69 
Zamora 
Chinchipe 164.02  1.81  162.21 
Napo 141.41  2.61  138.80 
Azuay 136.61  61.32  75.29 
Carchi 136.58  6.47  130.11 
Chimborazo 136.54  5.16  131.38 
Esmeraldas 127.78  7.22  120.56 
Cañar 123.82  4.98  118.84 
Imbabura 121.48  22.40  99.08 
Pichincha 118.59  175.61 -57.02 
El Oro  116.80  7.07  109.73 
Cotopaxi 114.04 7.55  106.49 
Manabí 111.50  11.02  100.48 
Sucumbios 106.05  6.40  99.65 
Guayas 104.11  103.39  0.72 
Tungurahua 103.12  34.10  69.02 
Los Ríos  99.65  2.91  96.74 
Source: Albornoz (2000). 
* Primary expenditure does not include debt or interest payments 
A large part of the high expenditure by central government goes on 
wages because the Special Law requires that public servants are paid 75 per cent 
more in Galapagos than in the continent. In addition, a significant part of the 
central government spending is for conservation services. These do not directly 
raise the quality of life in Galapagos. Many of the benefits are for people outside 
Galapagos who care about conservation. Thus the higher expenditure does not 
necessarily correspond to higher quality services. 85 
Tax Collection 
The level of subsidy through public finances is reducing as the level of 
tax collection rises at a provision level. We see in Figure 17 that between 1993 
and 1998 the average annual revenue from VAT and income taxes was only 
$157,000. The rate of tax evasion was high; as the economy grew the level of tax 
collection did not.
83 Tax collection in Galapagos has improved significantly since 
1999. Revenue rose by 340 per cent and 119 per cent in 2000 and 2001 
respectively. 
Figure 17: Revenue from sales and income tax in Galapagos 
 
5.1.3.b  Revenue raised by provincial and municipal governments 
Here we consider the income of municipal governments and how they 
depend on funds from central government and other external funds. From 1990 to 
1997 Santa Cruz and San Cristóbal decreased their reliance on central government 
transfers. In 1990, 73.7 per cent of Santa Cruz's income came from central 
government; in 1997 it was only 36.4 per cent.
84 In general, transfers from central 
government have fallen and the revenue has been replaced by park entrance fees. 
Municipality income from local sources has remained roughly the same. 
                                                            
83 One distortion in the estimate of total taxes is that firms can pay taxes in a different location 
from where they operate. Some of the tourism operators in Galapagos pay taxes elsewhere. 




























Total Income Tax Sales Tax86 
Table 18: Municipal income by source (percentage) 
  1998 1999  2000 
Municipality of Santa Cruz 
Municipal Revenue*  26  26  28 
Park entry tax**  32  57  52 
Transfers to Municipality***  36  17  20 
Other 6  0  0 
Municipality of San Cristóbal 
Municipal Revenue*  6  10  6 
Park entry tax**  21  52  63 
Transfers to Municipality***  64  32  22 
Other 9  6  9 
Municipality of Isabela 
Municipal Revenue*  12  21  16 
Park entry tax**  10  41  56 
Transfers to Municipality***  59  32  28 
Other 19  7  0 
Source: Fundación Natura and WWF (2002). 
* Includes taxes, fees, contributions, sales of goods and services among other things. 
** Entrance fees for Galapagos National Park; paid by tourists. 
*** Transfers for current expenditure and capital. Includes entrance fees. 
The levels of municipal revenue, which rarely pass 25 per cent as a 
source of municipal income, suggest that the residents of the islands make small 
contribution to the provision of their services. The level of subsidy, whether 
directly from central government as in the past, or indirectly through the park 
entry fee, as now, remains high. To the extent that municipalities spend on 
conservation and provide services for tourists, use of the park entry fee is not a 
subsidy for resident services. We could not separate conservation spending and 
tourist services from other activities, however. 87 
5.1.4 Summary 
One estimate of the total level of subsidy for the province of Galapagos 
from 1998 to 2000 is given in Table 19. To calculate this we sum each of the 
subsidies considered in this section. In the case of subsidies through public 
finances, we have included the transfers from Central Government, the entrance 
taxes used by Municipalities and the expenditures by central government through 
local departments, municipalities and the provincial council. These are offset by 
the taxes paid at the provincial level. 
The state subsidy is around $15 million annually. Only one to three per 
cent of this is recouped through taxes. Per capita, each resident of Galapagos is 
subsidised around $1,000 per year (1998 $). The per capita subsidy is a significant 
percentage of GDP per capita in Ecuador (76 per cent in 2000). It may, however, 
overstate the total subsidy to the extent that government payments are for 
conservation services.
85 
Table 19: Estimate of total annual per capita subsidies (in thousand $) 
  1998 1999 2000 
Travel subsidy 
1  852 1,277 2,085 
Fossil fuel subsidy 
1  344 610 517 
Electricity subsidy 
2  408 813 802 
Public Finance subsidy 
3  12,996 10,288 9,000 
Total Subsidy (TS)  16,598 14,987 14,404 
Taxes raised in Galapagos 
(Tx) 
203 106 466 
% Taxes over total subsidy  1 1 3 
Effective Subsidy (TS-Tx)  16,394 14,881 13,938 
Effective Subsidy per 
capita ($) 
1,071 924 825 
GDP per capita ($) 
4 1,61 9 1,109 1,079 
Notes: 1. Estimated in this study 
2. FERUM amounts assigned to Galapagos 
3. Source: Fundación Natura and WWF (2001), includes revenue from GNPS visitor fees 
4. Source: Banco Central del Ecuador 
Population Data: 1998 (15,311), 2000 (16,885) 
                                                            
85 On the other hand we have only included easily identifiable subsidies. 88 
The level of subsidy decreased a little from 1998 to 2000. The total 
level of subsidy has fallen steadily since 1998, though some individual categories 
of subsidy have risen. Both the travel and fossil fuel subsidies have fallen 
significantly since 2000. The level of public finance subsidy has fallen and has 
also moved from direct government transfers to payments through the park 
entrance fee. The level of tax collection rose from 1998 to 2000 so the effective 
subsidy has fallen even further. 
In summary, the services enjoyed by the Galapagan population and the 
activities they engage in receive high levels of subsidy. The level of subsidy is 
falling and the tax collection rates and charges for services are rising, so the 
effective subsidy is falling. If the effective subsidy continues to fall the pressure 
for migration from subsidies will continue to diminish. 
Another source of economic distortions that encourage excess migration 
is external effects on the environment and on other users of natural resources that 
are not borne by those who are involved in tourism or fisheries because of poor 
regulation. This is addressed in the next section. 
5.2  Distortions arising from inadequate regulation of 
externalities 
In this section we will describe the operation of the fishing and tourism 
sectors, current regulations and perceived problems. 
Suppose two rival fishing groups are taking sea cucumbers from the 
same area. In the short term it is profitable to collect them until the cost of 
collecting and processing one more is higher than the price they get for them. If 
either group had sole control over the sea cucumber fishery, they would take 
fewer sea cucumbers than that each year because they want to maintain a healthy 
breeding stock for the next year, when they expect to be collecting them again. 
They would stop taking sea cucumbers even while it was still profitable, in the 
short run, to take more. They have an incentive to protect the resource because 
they will reap the future benefits. 89 
When there are two rival groups, however, there is no point in either 
group holding back. They will expect that if they take fewer their rivals will 
simply take more and the total take will be the same as if they did not think about 
next year. This is worse for both groups. If they were able to communicate and 
trust each other they could agree to each take fewer cucumbers and in the long run 
both would be better off. If they cannot trust each other, both are better off racing 
to take as many as they can before the other does. 
The problem arising here is known in economics as an “externality”. An 
externality exists whenever the welfare of some agent, either a firm or household, 
depends on activities under the control of some other agent. Each fishing group's 
welfare depends on what the other fishing group does. This leads to two 
inefficiencies. First, they jointly do not conserve as many sea cucumbers as they 
would want to for the next fishing season. Second, they fish too quickly. They 
may end up diving on days when the weather is unfavourable or working 
overtime. 
If people using resources where they impose externalities on each other 
are unable to regulate themselves through cooperation and there is no regulation 
imposed by outside authorities several things will happen. In the short run, too 
much output will be produced (too much fish, too many tourist visits), the prices 
for the outputs will be too low, wages/profit for people working in these sectors 
will be too high, and people won't try hard to find creative ways to avoid or 
reduce their impacts on others. Too many people will want to work in the industry 
so the externality creates migration pressure. In the long run the resource will be 
damaged or exhausted, and output, wages and employment will fall. 
Important externalities arise in Galapagos in fishing, in tourism where 
extra tourism operators may lower the quality of the tourism experience offered 
by existing groups (discussed further below), through people and goods entering 
the Galapagos imposing risks of introduced species, through disposal of solid and 
liquid wastes where these are not charged for appropriately, and through use of 
energy that increases the risk of fuel spills. 90 
Externalities can be addressed through cooperation among competing 
users of a resource or those who affect each other, or can be addressed through 
regulation imposed and enforced by government. Which is appropriate depends on 
the nature of the externalities, the group creating them and the group affected by 
them. 
Both fishing and tourism are basically dealing with “common property 
resources”. Research has found that several conditions will help groups of people 
find cooperative solutions to managing their resources without government 
intervention. The first key requirement is that the group of people able to use the 
resources is clearly defined and consistent over time. People need to be able to 
exclude outsiders; current users need to have the incentive to take into account the 
interests of future users. In Galapagos one problem with rapid migration has been 
that the resource user groups have been expanding rapidly and many of the 
newcomers do not intend to stay in Galapagos in the long term. Thus they are not 
that interested in the future management of the resource. The Special Law may 
help to stabilise the groups that need to cooperate. 
If the group of people involved in using these resources is small and 
well defined, they may be able to self-regulate. This allows them to avoid the 
“tragedy of the commons” where people overuse a resource, thus destroying it 
even though they would all be better off if they could coordinate and trust each 
other to protect it. 
In fishing, the group of people involved is defined by the fishing 
cooperatives. In tourism it is mostly defined by those who have licenses to take 
people into the National Park. Other people are involved in tourism (e.g. hotels 
and restaurants) but people will only come to Galapagos if they can enter the 
parks, so that is the ultimate limitation. The group of people who enter Galapagos 
as tourists and temporary workers is not clearly defined. New people are involved 
all the time. Permanent residents are a more defined group now and have common 
interests in dealing carefully with local issues such as land use and waste disposal. 
They are a large group, however, and difficult to coordinate. They are beginning 
to work to achieve their common interests through the INGALA and municipality 
planning process. 91 
A group that agrees to coordinate to protect the resource they depend on 
has to make two basic types of decisions. How should the resource be optimally 
managed? This is a question of efficient use of the resource. For the fisheries it 
would include how many fish to take, when, from where and using what 
techniques. For tourism it would include deciding how many tourists can enter the 
park, where, when and with what controls on their activities. Deciding on optimal 
management is difficult but is primarily a technical question. The second 
important and often difficult question is, who should contribute what to protecting 
the resource and receive what benefits in return? This is a question of the 
distribution of net benefits and there is no technically correct answer. 
The second issue really relates to the ability of the local users to design 
a management system that brings the greatest possible benefits to the user group 
as a whole. This is largely a question of whether the necessary information is 
available and credible, whether they receive competent advice and whether the 
ordinary users have confidence in their leaders and advisors so that they accept a 
well designed management plan. If the plan is poorly designed, or is perceived to 
be poorly defined, the users will not support it. 
Third, it is important for the users to be able to contribute their 
knowledge to the process and to feel that their views are adequately represented in 
decision-making. This will raise the quality of decisions and also make users more 
willing to support the plan and contribute voluntarily to its enforcement. Users 
must support the plan and recognise that enforcing it is in their interest. If they do 
not feel the rules are in their interest they may undermine them or allow others to. 
Any plan that requires people to make individual sacrifices for 
collective benefit requires monitoring of individual behaviour. It is important that 
people are observed if they break the rules and also that others have confidence 
that they would be observed. People are more likely to comply if they believe that 
others are complying also. The key question then is, who monitors behaviour? 
They must be people who are trusted by the users. If the users are unhappy with 
their behaviour they need to have some recourse to punish the monitors or replace 
them. This reduces the risk that monitors will be corrupt, will misuse power or 
will simply be lazy. In many cases the monitors will be other users. 92 
Once monitors think they have identified a transgression, there often 
needs to be a process to decide whether the rules really have been broken and how 
serious the transgression was. Monitors may be mistaken or biased or there may 
be special circumstances they did not take into account. This calls for a conflict 
resolution mechanism. All resource users, including, as far as possible, those who 
are punished, must consider judgements fair. This creates and maintains trust in 
the system so users will continue to support it and help the monitors identify 
future problems as well as helping to enforce any punishments. 
The form and intensity of punishment when a user is caught breaking 
the rules is important. It is tempting to make sanctions very high to strongly 
discourage rule breaking. In many cases, however, people break rules by mistake 
or because they are in particularly trying personal circumstances. Other users 
might understand and sympathise with the person who breaks the rule and may 
see that in different circumstances it could happen to them too. They will not want 
to impose strong penalties on others when they know they would strongly resent if 
they were imposed on them. If punishments are too severe, people will be tempted 
to forgive transgressors rather than impose the punishment. This will lead to 
weakening of the system as a whole because it sets a precedent for allowing 
people to break the rules with no consequences. It is better to identify how 
seriously the rules were broken and to what extent the user could not avoid 
breaking the rule. Small unintentional violations should receive small 
punishments; serious, intentional violations should be heavily punished. 
One final requirement is that the legal system allows resource users to 
use the legal system to enforce contracts or to create their own “legal” systems. 
Otherwise even a good, commonly agreed upon set of rules cannot easily be 
enforced. 93 
Evidence from the study of other local commons which succeeded or 
failed to self-regulate suggests that having a good management plan, effective 
monitoring and sanctions graduated to match the level of transgression appear to 
be necessary but not sufficient. Clear definition of the user group is clearly 
important under conditions where there is pressure from new potential users. The 
other characteristics, such as participation in decision-making, a mechanism for 
resolving conflict and legal support, appear to be valuable but not critical. 
In some situations local groups will be able to self-regulate because the 
externalities are all within the group. Where they fail for whatever reason they 
may need help from government. The list of requirements above might help to 
identify the form of support from government that would be most helpful. 
In one situation key to the Galapagos, local management alone will not 
solve the problems. The international community has a strong interest in the 
preservation of the Galapagos because of its unique ecosystems and biodiversity. 
Their interests are reflected indirectly through the interests of tourists and also 
through the activities of international agencies and non-profit groups working in 
Galapagos. 
5.3 Tourism  management 
Tourists pose some risk of introduced species both when they enter 
Galapagos and as they move between islands. They can also damage ecosystems 
directly by walking on them or swimming in them. These effects are mostly well 
controlled, particularly for the richer tourists who generally stay on cruise ships 
and are always accompanied by guides, as we discuss below. The more important 
impact of tourism is probably through tourists' demand for services such as food, 
water and waste disposal and the local jobs they support. Here we discuss the 
ways that tourism is controlled and the extent to which tourists still impose costs 
on the environment that they, and the tourism operators, do not bear. We then 
discuss the extent to which this might lead to excessive migration pressure.
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Tourism is the engine of growth of the Galapagos economy. It employs 
40 per cent of local residents and in 1999 had a value of around US$135 million 
for the economy of Ecuador and US$33 million for Galapagos.
87 Taylor et al 
(2002) estimate that tourism contributes 65.4 per cent of the Galapagos economy. 
Tourism has grown steadily since the late 1960s. In 1970 only 4500 tourists 
visited Galapagos.
88 In 2000 more than 70,000 visited. The composition of 
tourists has gradually moved toward higher spending foreign tourists and local 
economic benefits from these tourists has gradually risen. See Figure 5 for growth 
in tourist numbers since 1979 and the breakdown between Ecuadorian and foreign 
tourists. 
The Ministry for the Environment (formerly the Institute for Forestry 
and the Conservation of National Areas and Wildlife), through the Galapagos 
National Park, is responsible for planning, authorising, and controlling tourism 
within protected areas. They can judge when violations of controls have occurred 
and set sanctions. All tourism operators who work within protected areas must 
have authorisation from the Ministry for the Environment. Since the Special Law 
all new tourism rights will only be given to permanent residents. Existing tourism 
operation rights will be maintained and recognised but they can be transferred 
only to permanent residents. The government just passed a new resolution about 
tourism control in the Galapagos.
89 
Multi-day vessels must be registered with GNPS. They pay fees per 
passenger day to the National Park based on the class of vessel. Total passengers 
are indirectly limited by controls on tourist vessels. In May 1999, 82 tourist 
vessels with a total capacity of 1689 passengers were registered with GNPS. This 
is only an effective limit to the extent that utilisation rates do not change 
significantly. 
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In addition some smaller boats, including fishing vessels, offer scuba 
and day trips. Tourist boats operate with fixed itineraries to avoid overcrowding. 
Every vessel must have a licensed tour guide for each 16 people. Since March 
1998, all new tour guides must be permanent residents. 
Of course tourists do not have impact only within protected areas. Many 
stay some time in hotels on the mainland and eat at local restaurants. Their 
activities outside the protected areas are less controlled. The Ministry of Tourism 
is responsible for regulating minimum levels of quality in the tourism sector, for 
setting regulations (outside the Protected Areas) and for controlling the supply of 
services. Thus both the Ministries of Tourism and Environment have 
responsibilities for protected areas. Any new tourism infrastructure must be 
approved by INGALA. One of the conditions for approval is that it will have 
minimum environmental impact. 
As an indirect control on tourism, the government limits the number of 
flights and hence seats on the government-owned airlines that are the primary 
means of reaching Galapagos. Over 98 per cent of the seats are filled, so this is a 
binding constraint (Taylor et al 2002). Quarantine regulations clearly apply to 
tourists as well. All tourists pay a tourist entrance tax, ranging from US$100 for 
foreign tourists over 12 down to only US$3 for Ecuadorian residents under 12, 
upon entering Galapagos. The revenue from this is shared between the National 
Park, the municipalities, the Provincial Council, the Marine Research and various 
other Ecuadorian bodies. Five per cent of the funds pay for the inspection and 
quarantine service. The other funds can be used for education, sports and health or 
tourist services as well as for environmental protection, so much of the tax does 
not directly offset the environmental impact of tourists. 
Although a number of regulations control tourism, it seems likely that 
new tourism ventures could still have environmental impacts that outweigh their 
benefits unless significant care is taken in planning and control. Tourism ventures 
need to be chosen carefully to maximise their long-term economic and social 
benefits while minimising their environmental impact. 96 
Tourism has enormous potential for local development as well as 
benefits for Ecuador as a whole. As a result many people have ideas of how to 
expand the tourist sector. These clearly need to be implemented with care to 
protect the environment and maintain the long-term value of the resource. The 
total level of tourist activity must be limited to a sustainable level, so that requires 
careful prioritisation of different tourism projects. Different tourism ideas have 
very different economic impacts. Some local people hope to create major tourist 
developments on Isabela. Clear environmental risks are involved here and they 
would need to be weighed against the economic value of these developments. 
Another idea is to develop a university to study the Galapagos. This would not 
employ many local people because of the specialist skills involved, so might 
require migration of more temporary residents. It would, however, directly benefit 
from the unique local resources. In terms of ensuring environmental sustainability 
and the perception of sustainability, environmental certification of tourism 
operations is now beginning with some outside involvement to increase 
credibility. 
5.3.1  Tourism and migration pressure 
As the major economic driver of Galapagos, tourism is also the major 
driver of migration. If migration is limited increased tourism development will 
lead to skill shortages and high local wages and costs. Taylor et al (1999 and 
2002) create a model of the Galapagos economy that allows them to simulate the 
effect of an increase in tourism on migration (or wages if migration is restricted). 
Table 20: Estimated effects on migration and wages of a 10 per cent 
increase in tourism 
Island 
Variable Santa  Cruz 
San 
Cristobal Isabela 
Migration  5.02 1.28 1.71 
  Wage  Labour  5.72 1.51 1.57 
  Family  Labour 4.83 1.21 1.76 
Wage (without Migration)       
  Skilled  Workers  9.16 0.00 2.61 
  Unskilled  Workers  6.72 2.75 2.67 
Source: Taylor et al (2002) 97 
We see that a 10 per cent increase in tourism would lead to a roughly 
five per cent increase in the local workforce. If migration is possible this increased 
demand will be addressed through increased migration. If migration is limited 
wages could rise as much as six per cent for unskilled workers and nine per cent 
for skilled workers. This might be partly offset with active training of local people 
but often it is not easy to create these skills quickly. Prices would also rise 
significantly, particularly if migration were limited. Taylor et al (2002) also 
discuss some of the direct effects of increased tourism activity on water extraction 
and logging. 
The increases in local wages, shortages of skilled labour and higher 
local prices will all put pressure on the Special Law. If this leads to loosening of 
the migration controls, extra tourists will mean more migration and more 
environmental threat. If tourists, tourist operators and the local labour force they 
induce do not bear the costs of the increased environmental threat they will not 
consider the environmental costs and the level of tourist activity will be too high. 
The type of tourist activity will also be inappropriate. Rather than focusing on 
high value tourism with low environmental impact to maximise the value of the 
tourism resource to Ecuador, this valuable resource could easily be wasted 
through low value, high volume tourism. 
5.4 Fisheries  management 
Fisheries have environmental impact in three basic ways. First, from a 
purely economic standpoint, overexploitation of a fishery is inefficient and will 
cause social hardship in the long run as the stock is damaged. Second, fishing has 
effects on other species in the ecosystem through by-catch and changing the 
balance of the food chain. This is directly environmental damaging. Overfishing 
also could jeopardise valuable tourism activities if it damages the marine reserve. 
Third, if there is too much fishing activity there are also too many fishers. If 
fishing is not controlled appropriately it leads to excessive migration pressure. 
Fishing is a smaller part of the Galapagos economy than tourism but is 
still significant. Taylor et al (2002) estimate that fishing activities contribute eight 
per cent of Galapagos' GDP. 98 
On Isabela it contributes around 61 per cent of local GDP. Wilen et al 
(2000) give a good discussion of the history and current situation both legally and 
economically. Here we summarise key points salient to our analysis as well as 
supplementing their work with some more recent information focused on 
regulation. 
In 1997, 613 fishers were registered in cooperatives (Wilen et al 2000). 
This had grown to 956 by 2002. This is partly to do with the requirement to be in 
a cooperative to fish sea cucumber or lobster so may not reflect real growth. On 
the other hand it may well underrepresent active fishers. For example, in 2000 
around 80 per cent more people were fishing for sea cucumbers than were 
registered.
90 It is hard to know what has been happening to the numbers of active 
fishers. In the 1998 Census, 396 people fish as their primary or secondary activity. 
245 of these are full time and 97 part time. Revelo and Herrera (1999) (cited in 
Wilen et al 2000) state that there were 180 fishers in San Cristobal, 160 in Santa 
Cruz, 165 in Isabela and 370 who are not local, making a total of 868 fishers. 
Interviews by Wilen et al (2000) suggest that in 1999 there were 400–450 fishers 
active throughout the year. 222 fishing vessels were registered with GNPS in June 
1999. By the end of 2000, 417 vessels were registered. The total revenue from the 
“artisanal” fishery was estimated at around US$3 million between 1995 and 1997 
(CDRS 1999, cited in Wilen et al 2000). 
The fishing population is very diverse, including long-term local 
fishers, part-time local fishers, and short-term migrants from the continent with no 
interest in the long-term health of the fishery. There is relatively little cooperation 
among fishers across the different islands. A key feature of the history of the 
fisheries up to 1997 was strong resistance to controls, including violent protests. 
These were in particular responses to the complete closure of the sea cucumber 
and lobster fisheries in 1992 and subsequent stringent, though unenforceable, 
limits on sea cucumber. There is some evidence of overfishing. Fishers are 
compensating for lower catch-per-unit-effort by increasing their effort to maintain 
income. 
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The key risks in the fisheries are overexploitation of sea cucumbers and 
lobster, danger of industrial fishing in deep water and illegal shark fishing and by-
catch. Fishing has also been a significant migration driver, with many people 
arriving in the early 1990s when the lucrative sea cucumber fishery took off. 
Fishing is dangerous and fishers do recognise the need to conserve the fish stocks. 
The fishers want alternative employment opportunities, especially for their 
children, so they may be open to policies that allow them to move out of fisheries. 
5.4.1 Institutions 
Since the Galapagos Marine Reserve was established as part of the 
Special Law, fishing activity within the reserve (40 nautical miles from the 
baseline of the archipelago) has been limited to artisanal fishing. Artisanal fishing 
is defined in management plans (see below). Industrial fishing is banned in the 
Reserve. Only permanent residents who are members of the fishing cooperatives 
are allowed to fish. 
The Special Law of the Galapagos Articles 13-14 created an Inter-
institutional Authority (Autoridad Interinstitutional de Manejo, AIM). Its role is to 
establish a Conservation Management and Sustainable Use Plan, which defines 
permitted and prohibited activities within the Galapagos Marine Reserve as well 
as the details of fisheries regulations (fishing calendar, amounts, sizes, species and 
forms of allowable fishing). It also authorises scientific research on the 
improvement of policies for conservation and marine fishing development. The 
authority includes representatives from government, the research community, and 
the tourism and fishing sectors. One person represents all four fishing 
cooperatives. As we will discuss below, it is not clear that this representative 
accurately represents the wishes of the fishing community. Thus while fishers are 
formally represented, they may not feel their views are adequately represented. In 
addition, not all decisions are consensus—AIM operates by majority vote. The 
Management Plan is coordinated by GNPS and must be submitted to the INGALA 
council for approval (Article 15). 100 
Under the Conservation Management and Sustainable Use Plan 
required by the Special Law and negotiated with a range of stakeholders, 
Galapagos is zoned for different uses (Wilen et al 2000). Three basic zones are 
distinguished, port zones, limited use zones and multiple use zones. Limited use 
zones are coastal regions divided into sub-zones for “protection and comparison”, 
extractive and non-extractive use (for fishing and tourism), non-extractive use and 
temporary special management sub-zones for recuperation or experimentation. In 
the multiple use zone both extractive and non-extractive uses are allowed. 
There are no separate fish stock zones within the fisheries (e.g. for 
different sea cucumber stocks) partly because there is not enough information to 
know how to set them and partly because of the cost of monitoring compliance. 
The second relevant institution is the Committee of Participation 
Management (Junta de Manejo Participativa—JMP) which organises participatory 
processes. They make local decisions by consensus and send these decisions to 
AIM for a final ruling. 
The third important set of institutions is the four fishing cooperatives. 
Membership in these is compulsory for all fishers. A moratorium was imposed on 
entry to cooperatives from 1999 to 2003 after rapid entry in 1998. We were told 
that there is a consensus among the cooperatives to extend the limit on entry 
indefinitely.
91 The cooperatives are the formal representatives of fishers. They are 
primarily political bodies. In principle they could create their own regulations that 
would apply to all members. For example, cooperatives can in principle limit who 
gets quotas for sea cucumbers and boats. They are not marketing entities. Some 
specialist groups exist within the cooperatives. These could self-regulate but do 
not to date. They could, however, be advocates for regulations that would help 
them. 
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To date the cooperatives are not strongly organised. The elected 
representatives they send to JMP and AIM cannot engage in binding negotiations 
on behalf of their members. Many fishers are members only because it is a 
prerequisite for fishing. There is little or no organised cooperation among the four 
cooperatives, although they have overlapping interests. The leaders recognise the 
need to coordinate and cooperate but their members do not necessarily strongly 
support and trust them. In July 1999 a Boat Owners Association was established 
in an attempt to represent all fishers. 
Since 1998 cooperatives have not protected their rights by limiting 
entry to the fishery or protecting the fisheries against illegal entrants. Partly this 
results from a belief that having a larger group gives them more political power. 
In addition, some may feel that if conservation pressures rise, fishers won't suffer, 
more international funds will become available. Thus their lack of attention to 
conservation may reflect strategic behaviour. Finally, however, their institutions 
may simply be inadequately developed to effectively protect their interests. Now 
migration is being controlled and as the fishing community becomes more limited 
and more stable because of limitations on entry to cooperatives and more effective 
and fair regulation led by AIM and the National Park, they may be able to develop 
stronger institutions. 
The Director of GNPS is responsible for coordinating the process that 
leads to preparation of the Management Plan (Article 15 of Special Law). The 
National Park also manages marine research. They are responsible for 
coordinating conservation and sustainable use of the marine reserve. This role 
includes administering the instruments of policies and planning that the 
Management Plan requires. 
GNPS has the power to enforce the provisions relating to the Marine 
Reserve. They hold the register of fishing boats. A moratorium on the number of 
fishing vessels was imposed in the Special Law for five years. However, existing 
boat owners can replace their boats with larger vessels up to a limit defined in the 
Management Plan. 102 
Fishing is primarily controlled at ports and through controls on exports 
via airports. Export of dried sea cucumbers by boat is harder to control than 
lobster or whitefish (which need to be frozen or at least chilled) because there are 
many ports and many illegal opportunities for export. 
5.4.2  Sea cucumber regulation 
Sea cucumbers (Pepino de mar) are primarily sold to the Asian market. 
The industry took off in the early 1990s when they were highly profitable. Fishers 
could catch around 1,200 per day or 10,000 on a 12-day trip. All fishers collect 
sea cucumbers during the season. More diving accidents are associated with sea 
cucumber fishing than lobster. In 1999 alone, one person died and 29 needed to go 
to Guayaquil for decompression (Wilen et al 2000). 
The sea cucumber fishery was officially closed in 1992 and opened in a 
limited way in 1994 with a three-month season and a catch quota (550,000). It has 
been characterised by conflict and high levels of illegal fishing. In 1994, despite 
the catch quota, around six million sea cucumbers were taken even though the 
season was cut short. 
Current regulations are more complex but also involve more fisher 
participation. It is highly expensive to regulate relative to other fisheries. In 1999 
a stringent monitoring system was introduced. Boiling is only allowed on boats or 
in ports and drying is highly restricted outside of ports. Catches are monitored at 
the port. No-take zones were established in 1999 with local fisher involvement. 
In 2001 AIM set a limit of 4 million sea cucumbers for the season. They 
distributed individual quota for each fisher. The quotas were defined for only one 
fishing season. Quotas were allocated equally to all members of the cooperative, 
not based on historical catch. This meant that full-time fishers received no more 
quota than occasional fishers. Some quotas were traded but the market did not 
work well and some were not used. Some fishers feel that people paid too much 
for the quotas because it was difficult to assess their value in advance.
92 
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Now some of the quota trade contracts make the price depend on the 
fish price during the year. As a result of these problems, at least among some 
fishers individual quotas are not viewed favourably. 
It is not at all clear that the quota system will be continued. Fishing 
seasons are still used but these are simply a method of limitation, not based on 
biological factors. Illegal fishing still occurs outside of the season. Up until 1999, 
sea cucumbers were the most profitable fishing activity other than shark fin 
fishing (Wilen et al 2000). Sea cucumbers are becoming less profitable partly 
because of overexploitation, which raises costs, and partly because of competition 
from Mexico, which is lowering international prices. 
5.4.3 Lobster 
Around 29 per cent of local fishers' income comes from lobster (Wilen 
et al 2000). Lobster requires more skill to catch because divers need local 
knowledge about where to get them. Diving is dangerous but not as dangerous as 
for sea cucumbers. Divers are well paid. Unlike sea cucumber, lobster must be 
kept cold until it gets to market. The vast majority is sold frozen, not fresh, largely 
because of the species involved. Around 600 fishers are able to catch lobster. The 
stock of lobster appears to be rising but this may be for climatic reasons (El 
Niño); the size is falling, which suggests overexploitation. 
There has been a four-month lobster season since 1999 (before that it 
was 4-6 months, usually July through December). The dates of the season have 
changed from year to year because of the timing of negotiations with fishers, not 
for biological reasons. Tail size and taking egg-bearing females are also limited, 
though some leniency is allowed for undersized and gravid fish. Since 1997 
agreements have been reached between fishers and the National Park on 
monitoring, sales and permissible methods of capture. Compliance, especially 
with size and gravidity limits, has been rising since 1997. 104 
All exports must be registered and tracked. The only legal method of 
catching lobster is by diving (without scuba gear) and taking by hand without use 
of harpoons. Lobster divers don't use lobster traps. It is illegal to fish at night. No-
take zones were introduced in 1999. There has been a total allowable catch quota 
but this has not been enforced. 
5.4.4 Other  species 
5.4.4.a Inshore  whitefish 
The inshore whitefish fishery has been the backbone of the Galapagos 
fishing sector for decades. Recently they are of less commercial significance than 
lobster, sea cucumber and offshore fish. Whitefish are caught all year. The fishery 
is not so commercialised. A lot of the fishing is recreational or for local use. 
Cruise boats illegally catch fresh fish for their clients. There is a processing plant 
in Cristobal that allows export but other islands can't export whitefish because 
they can't process them. Most whitefish are sold locally for local consumption, 
and to tourist operators and restaurants. From January through March seco-salado 
(dried salted fish) is produced for continental Ecuador for an Easter festival. 
Currently there are no major conservation issues with most of these species, 
possibly because of technology limitations that limit exploitation. An exception is 
Bacalao, which has been exploited for decades. Its population shows signs of 
population decline. 
5.4.4.b  Offshore pelagic fisheries 
The Galapagos has in the past been a significant source of tuna, caught 
offshore by industrial fishers. Tuna was worth more than $8 million annually pre-
1997 (CDRS (1999) cited in Wilen et al 2000). The establishment of the 
Galapagos Marine Reserve had a big impact because it excluded most industrial 
fishers; few local fishers are capable of fishing for pelagic species. In 1999, only 
three local vessels were capable of catching tuna. In contrast, before 1998 around 
16 industrial boats were regularly fishing in what is now the Galapagos Marine 
Reserve. More locals would like to be involved in this fishery but it requires 
significant capital and experience. 105 
5.4.4.c  Direct environmental damage 
Overfishing is not the only cause of environmental damage. Longlining 
(Palangre) is a major concern because of its effect on birds, sharks and related 
species, and mammals. There are alternative methods but they are not yet widely 
used. Marine mammal by-catch is also a concern. 
Illegal fishing continues to be a problem both of commercial species 
and prohibited species. In particular shark fin is a significant problem. Sharks are 
a considerable tourist resource as well as possibly being a key environmental 
indicator. Up until now the impact on tourism has been limited because most of 
this fishing occurs in the north and west, far from most tourism. Shark fin fishing 
is extremely profitable. The incidence of illegal fishing was considered to be 
increasing up to 1998. 
5.4.5  Migration and fishing 
In the past, fishing opportunities, especially during the boom years for 
sea cucumbers, have appeared to be a significant migration driver. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests, however, that the impact may not be as great as believed. 
Divers do come to dive for lobster and sea cucumbers but they want to remain 
divers so return to Salango or one of the other two key areas on the mainland. 
They are generally not permanent migrants. 
General migration has had a big impact on fishing, however. The 
migrant divers create problems for local divers because they tend to have lower 
living costs; they do not live in Galapagos all year. They are now illegal because 
they are not members of cooperatives. 
People who migrate because of tourism opportunities have then moved 
into fishing sea cucumber during the season because little skill is involved in 
collecting sea cucumbers and the profits are high. It is generally believed that 
there are currently too many fishers. 106 
On the other hand, a total ban on new entrants into fishing may have 
adverse effects on the development of the fisheries. Migrants could come with 
good fishing skills and conservation knowledge. They can bring knowledge of 
new technologies, new methods, what is needed, where to buy it and how to use 
it. They can also provide sorely needed skills and contacts for distribution and 
commercialisation.
93 While fisheries regulation is inadequate, any increase in 
fishing efficiency, improvements in distribution etc. will lead to greater 
profitability and hence more fishing effort. This would be environmentally, and in 
the longer term economically, damaging. 
5.5 Summary 
We have established the extent and nature of subsidies to economic 
activities in Galapagos. These subsidies encourage increased economic activity 
and hence increased migration. Thus they directly conflict with desires to protect 
the environment. 
In terms of regulation, and the possibility that migration is encouraged 
by inadequate regulation, we have considered two major industries, tourism and 
fishing. Both have direct and indirect impacts on the environment. Both are 
currently regulated in a number of ways by a number of institutions. It is likely, 
however, that environmental externalities still exist. Those working in the industry 
are unlikely to take full account of the environmental impacts of their activities, 
not necessarily because they are not conscious of environmental concerns but 
because the commercial realities they face conflict with their concern. 
A sector we have not addressed is the research/conservation sector. The 
per capita impacts of researchers and conservation workers on the local economy 
may be even greater than the impact of tourism and fisheries because they are 
probably well paid relative to the average resident. Most of the expenditure on 
these activities goes on wages to people who live locally and therefore spend 
locally. Those who might care most about the environment may also be causing 
significant indirect damage. 
                                                            
93 Interview with Enrique Ramos, January 2002. 107 
This damage might be able to be reduced by limiting on-site researchers 
or compensating for the externalities they create through increased investment in 
conservation activities. Even conservation activities should take account of the 
indirect damage they cause and weigh this against the benefits they bring. 
The next section will consider some empirical evidence on the drivers 
of migration. The following section will propose and discuss a range of 
approaches to reduce environmental and migration pressure while simultaneously 
being aware of the local political realities that require some protection of the well-
being of local people. 108 
6  Empirical analysis of migration drivers 
6.1 Hypotheses 
In this analysis, we consider the characteristics of the provinces that 
people immigrate to Galapagos from, and also the characteristics of the provinces 
that people from Galapagos emigrate to. This gives us insight into the kind of 
people who want to immigrate to Galapagos. We are not attempting to identify the 
causes of immigration or emigration. The data is quite weak and we focus on 
identifying meaningful correlations. In Section 4.4, we discussed a simple model 
of migration. People will decide to migrate if their well-being will be greater in 
another place, that is: 
UiG(wageiG, amenitiesG) > UiO(wageiO, amenitiesO), 
A person’s well-being (U) depends on the wage they receive and the 
amenities associated with living in a certain place. In this section we consider the 
characteristics of provinces that may affect a person’s well-being and cause 
people to immigrate to Galapagos. Are people coming from provinces with highly 
skilled workers that are in demand in Galapagos and thus will receive high wages? 
Are they coming from provinces with much worse living conditions, or are they 
more likely to come from provinces with similar conditions to Galapagos? We 
also consider characteristics of the places that people from Galapagos emigrate to. 
Do they go to places with greater educational opportunities, i.e. higher future 
wages? Do they tend to go to places with similar socio-economic conditions to 
Galapagos? Are they also going to places with high demand for skilled workers? 
The drivers of migration have been discussed in detail theoretically in Section 4; 
here we look for empirical evidence to support these. 
6.1.1 Immigration 
We expect that people coming to Galapagos come because of better 
wage opportunities, and better amenities available to them, and because of family 
and community links. 109 
We expect that the people immigrating to Galapagos for employment 
reasons would have skills that are in demand there, e.g. tourism, fisheries, and 
research skills. So we expect more immigration from provinces with higher levels 
of education, i.e. a positive relationship. Also education may to some extent be 
correlated with greater mobility of the people, which would have the same impact. 
However, as highly skilled workers are more likely to be in cities this effect may 
be swamped in our analysis by the high number of unskilled people who also live 
in cities. So, once we have controlled for this effect using population density, we 
expect a positive relationship between immigration and education (negative with 
illiteracy). 
Immigration is also likely to occur from provinces that have low 
employment to provinces that have higher employment, as people are more likely 
to gain employment or find better wage opportunities in higher employment areas. 
Thus we would expect that the lower the employment level in the province the 
more likely people would immigrate to Galapagos, i.e. immigration would have a 
negative relationship with employment. 
In Table 22 we can see that employment is also positively correlated 
with education; the higher the education level the higher the employment level, 
and more educated people tend to be more mobile. This would lead us to expect 
that the higher the employment level, the more likely people are to migrate—the 
opposite effect to our wage opportunity hypothesis. To maintain the expectation 
that people would be more likely to migrate from provinces with higher 
unemployment, we must control for mobility. However, because we are 
measuring at the province level we cannot completely separate out the effects of 
mobility from those of employment opportunities. Consequently, inconclusive 
results may arise as a result of these two opposite effects. 110 
People tend to migrate to places with population density higher than 
where they left. People usually migrate to areas with better employment and 
learning opportunities available to them and this is more likely in cities (Glaeser 
and Maré 2001). In the case of Galapagos, the population density is much lower 
than the national average population density (see Table 23) but it has many of the 
same characteristics that make cities attractive. Usually, isolated and sparsely 
populated areas have a demand for low-skilled and agricultural labour. Galapagos, 
however, has a demand for high-skilled labour (as well as low-skilled), similar to 
labour demands in a city. This leads us to expect that more people will migrate to 
Galapagos from large cities because cities are a good source of the skills needed 
in Galapagos. That is, we expect a positive relationship between population 
density and immigration. 
In addition, in Galapagos there is a high density of attractive facilities, 
such as restaurants, and a high level of average education among the population 
(although there are some concerns about the quality); this makes Galapagos 
similar to a city. People are more likely to move to places that are culturally 
similar to those they left, leading us again to expect a positive relationship 
between population density and immigration. 
Another driver of migration is the effect of amenities; we predict that 
people are less likely to move to somewhere where the amenities or social 
conditions are worse. In general, we expect that people are more likely to move 
from provinces with worse amenities to places with better amenities, improving 
the amenities that are available to them. For example, people are likely to move to 
places that have better healthcare facilities, less poverty, and lower crime. People 
would be more likely to come from poorer provinces with a lower number of 
health professionals, higher child malnutrition, and higher crime. Thus we would 
expect a negative relationship between the number of health professionals and 
immigration, and positive relationships for both child malnutrition with 
immigration and crime with immigration. However, we may not see these 
empirically due to the reduced mobility of poorer, less-educated people. If we 
could control for mobility properly, we would expect a positive relationship 
between poverty/worse relative amenities and immigration to Galapagos. 111 
However, as before, we cannot completely account for mobility when 
measuring at the province level, so this may lead to inconclusive empirical results. 
Subsidies may also reflect the quality/quantity of amenities available in 
a province. In the case of Galapagos, higher relative subsidies are reflected by 
better amenities, leading us to expect that migration flows from lower to higher 
subsidies, i.e. a positive relationship between immigration and subsidies. 
However, poorer provinces with worse amenities may also attract higher 
subsidies, as they are less able to be self-sufficient, leading us to the opposite 
conclusion. So this measure may lead to inconclusive empirical results. 
We also expect that people would be likely to migrate to provinces that 
have a similar lifestyle, customs, and skills to where they came from. Coastal 
areas have more cultural similarities to Galapagos than inland areas. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that a lot of immigration to Galapagos is made up of fishers. If 
this were true, we would expect that people would be more likely to migrate from 
coastal provinces than inland provinces, once other factors are controlled for. 
People in coastal provinces also have better access to Galapagos by means of 
boat, making it easier to move to Galapagos. This would also result in a positive 
relationship between coastal situation and immigration. 
Generally, it is cheaper to move to places that are closer. The main 
source of transport to Galapagos is via airplanes. Thus we would expect that 
people are more likely to move from places that are closer to the airports that 
serve Galapagos in Ecuador, Quito and Guayaquil. 
People also are more likely to move to places where they have family 
and community networks. We are unable to test for this with our data as we 
cannot separate this network effect from other factors that make immigration 
attractive; we cannot tell whether people are moving to Galapagos because they 
have good networks there or if people are moving to the same places as their 
family and/or people from their community simply because they are similar and 
hence find similar places attractive. 112 
6.1.2 Emigration 
We expect that the flow of people leaving Galapagos will be made up 
of working people moving to get better or different jobs to those available on 
Galapagos, young people moving to get training, and people moving for personal 
preferences or lifestyle choices. 
We expect that people leaving Galapagos would be more likely to move 
to provinces with higher employment, where better wage opportunities are 
available to them. So we expect a positive relationship between emigration and 
economic activity. People moving for training would be more likely to move to 
provinces where they can gain further knowledge through interaction with 
educated people, i.e. provinces with higher levels of education, leading us to 
expect a positive relationship between emigration and education. Generally, 
population density is a strong attracting force for immigration, reflecting 
employment and educational opportunities that are more readily available cities. 
So we expect that people are more likely to move to the provinces with higher 
population density. 
We also suppose that people would not move to somewhere where the 
amenities and social conditions are worse. So we would expect them to be more 
likely to move to places with better socio-economic conditions. This means they 
will probably move to provinces with lower child malnutrition and crime. As with 
immigration, we expect that the level of subsidies will produce inconclusive 
results. 
People are more likely to migrate to places that have similar customs 
and skill demands to where they originate. So we expect that people from 
Galapagos would be more likely to emigrate to coastal provinces because of 
cultural, lifestyle, and skill type similarities. 113 
People are also more likely to emigrate to closer provinces as closer 
locations represent a lower removal cost and also may have more cultural 
similarities. Closeness can be thought of in terms of accessibility; Galapagos can 
be accessed either via boat or plane, so we expect that people leaving would be 
more likely to move to coastal provinces or provinces that are close to Guayaquil 
or Quito. 
As with immigration, with our data we cannot separate causal network 
effects from the coincidental similarity of preferences effects and so cannot 
analyse the network effect. 
6.2 Method 
We ran two separate pooled ordinary least squares linear regressions on 
gross flows of migrants with each observation being measured at the level of a 
province each year. The dependent variables, immigration and emigration, were 
calculated as a ratio of the population of the province of origin and destination 
respectively. Observations were weighted by province population size. 
•  Immigration = Immigration from province in the last five years / 
population of that province 
•  Emigration = Emigration to province in the last five years / population 
of that province 
As explanatory variables, we considered the following population 
characteristics: employment, education levels, poverty, health, crime, subsidies, 
and population density. When using these for analysis of immigration to 
Galapagos, we considered the characteristics of the province migrated from 
relative to those characteristics in Galapagos.
94 When considering emigration 
from Galapagos, we used the characteristics of the province migrated to relative 
those characteristics in Galapagos. 
•  Relative Characteristic = Characteristic of province—Characteristic of 
Galapagos 
                                                            
94 This has no impact on the significance of the relationship. It simply alters the constant, so can be 
thought of as a data normalisation. 114 
We included time as an explanatory variable, creating dummy variables 
for each year. This was used to control for changes in migration pressure over 
time resulting from factors that we cannot measure. 
Summaries of the data used in the immigration and emigration analysis 
can be seen in Table 21, correlations are given in Table 22, and characteristics of 
Galapagos versus the rest of Ecuador in Table 23. The province immigration, 
emigration, and population data was sourced from the 1974, 1982, 1990, and 1998 
censuses. However, the emigration data are available only for 1974, 1982, and 
1990. This provides 36 observation points for immigration analysis and 27 for 
emigration analysis. 
Wage opportunity effects were represented using a measure of the 
economic activity of the province, that is, the percentage of the population that is 
economically active as a percentage of the total population. To test for education 
or skill characteristics of the populations we considered illiteracy, average number 
of school years, and number of university graduates. The illiteracy rate used here 
is illiteracy as a percentage of population. The number of university graduates is 
measured as a percentage of the population over six years old. For amenity effects 
we considered poverty, the healthcare availability, crime, and subsidies. The child 
malnutrition rate was used as a poverty measure, where child malnutrition is a 
percentage of children under five years of age. For health care we used the 
number of health professionals as a percentage of the population. For crime we 
used homicide data, the number of murders per 100,000 people. Subsidies were 
represented using the ratio of municipal income coming from local sources over 
total municipal spending. As this ratio increases, the subsidy decreases. 
Economic activity, illiteracy, average number of school years, and the 
number of university graduates come from the 1974, 1982 and 1990 censuses. 
Values were extrapolated out to 1998 when used with the immigration data. Child 
malnutrition, and the number of health professionals, are sourced from Sistema 
Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador SIISE version 2.0 (CEPAR 2001). 115 
Homicide data is available only for 1999 and is sourced from CORDES 
"Corporacion de estudios para el Desarrollo", Padilla (2001). For these variables, 
because of lack of data from any other year, we have assumed them to be constant 
over time. 
Subsidies data is for 1990 and 1996. We averaged the rate over the two 
years and assumed that it was constant over time. The source of data for this is the 
Planning Office of the Ecuador Government, ODEPLAN (2000).
95 
We created a dummy explanatory variable for whether a province was 
on the coast or not to reflect the cultural similarities between coastal areas and 
Galapagos. We also considered distance to travel to Galapagos as an explanatory 
variable. We used distance from the two major cities, Guayaquil and Quito, as 
measures of distance from Galapagos, as most people would travel to these cities 
from their province and then fly to Galapagos, rather than travel by boat. To test 
for city effects we used the population density of a province. This was derived 
using the population and province area data. 
                                                            
95 Oficina de Planificación de la Presidencia de la República del Ecuador. 116 









    1969–1998 1 969–1990 
Dependent variable:  immigration (residence five years 
ago) per 100,000 people  465 (307)  227 (140) 
      
Explanatory variables:      
distance  distance to Quito or Guayaquil   97 (134)  102 (136) 
  Number of coastal provinces   12  9 
Explanatory variables 
relative to Galapagos 
values:      
  health professionals per 100 
people  -0.21 (0.14)  -0.22 (0.14) 
crime  homicide rate  5.9 (6.1)  5.7 (6.1) 
average number of years of 
schooling   -2.2 (1.3)  -2.2 (1.4) 
illiteracy rate   8.4 (7.0)  8.2 (8.5) 
education 
Per cent of population with 
university education   -2.1 (3.1)  -2.0 (2.8) 
poverty  malnutrition  3.6 (6.0)  3.9 (6.2) 
  population density  55 (32)   49 (26) 
employment  Per cent of the population 
economically active   -14 (4)  -12 (3) 
subsidies  average income/spending  17 (17)  16 (17) 
  Total number of observations  36  27 
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Table 22: Correlations among explanatory variables 
 Distance 
Health 











Distance  1.0                 
Health 
pro-
fessionals  -0.6 1.0                 
Homicide  0.0 0.1  1.0               
Years of 
schooling  -0.4 0.9  0.3  1.0             
Child 
malnutri-
tion  0.4 -0.6  -0.5  -0.8 1.0           
Popula-
tion 
density  -0.7 0.6  -0.2  0.5  -0.2  1.0         
Economic 
activity  -0.3  0.2 -0.4  0.0  0.2 0.2  1.0     
Illiteracy  0.0 -0.4  -0.2  -0.5 0.5  -0.2  0.4  1.0     
Univer-
sity 
education  -0.3 0.6  0.1  0.5  -0.4  0.6  -0.1  -0.7  1.0   
Subsidies  -0.3 0.1  0.2  0.0  -0.1  0.0  0.4  0.3  -0.1  1.0 
 
Overall, we observe that indicators of economic opportunity and local 
amenities are better in Galapagos than on the continent in general (see Table 23). 
This makes Galapagos attractive as a place to migrate to. 
Table 23: Mean socio-economic variables for Galapagos and the rest of 
Ecuador 
  Variable  Galapagos  Rest of Ecuador 
Health  health professionals per 100 people   0.56  0.19 
Crime   homicide rate   8.5  12.9 
average number of years of schooling   9.2  5.7 
illiteracy rate   5.6  19 
Education 
% population with university education   8.0  3.2 
Poverty  child malnutrition index   30  37 
Employment  % of the population economically active   45  32 




Table 24 shows the results from our regression analysis using 
immigration as the dependent variable. We have a very small number of 
observations, which severely restricts the number of variables that we were able to 
test simultaneously. Consequently, we only show runs resulting in significant 
relationships. 
Of all the skill/education measures, only illiteracy produced a 
significant regression result. A negative relationship was found between illiteracy 
and immigration (column one, Table 24), indicating that the higher the illiteracy 
in a province the less likely it was for people to immigrate to Galapagos from that 
province, or conversely the higher the literacy in the population the more likely 
people will immigrate to Galapagos. Thus the effect of higher mobility of more 
educated people seems to dominate the effect of the desire of people to move from 
provinces with fewer educated people to provinces with more educated people. 
When testing for wage opportunity effects, no significant relationship 
was picked up between immigration and economic activity. This was true even 
after controlling for either population density or skill effects using any of the 
education measures. So, there is no evidence to suggest that people are more 
likely to immigrate to Galapagos from provinces with higher unemployment. 
The second column shows the results from regressing population 
density against immigration. The population density coefficient is positive, 
indicating a positive relationship between immigration and population density of 
the province. This suggests that people were more likely to immigrate to 
Galapagos from provinces that had high population density, i.e. with large cities. 119 
Column three shows the results from regressing the number of health 
professionals against immigration, controlling for population density. The health 
professionals variable produces a negative coefficient, suggesting that the higher 
the number of health professionals, the less likely that people immigrated to 
Galapagos. This is consistent with an amenity effect; people are more likely to 
move to provinces with better health services, improving the quality of amenities 
available to them. 
The other amenity effects we analysed were child malnutrition, 
homicide, and subsidies. When we controlled for population density and the 
number of health professionals, we found a significant and negative relationship 
between child malnutrition and immigration (column three). This indicates that 
the higher the rate of poverty, the less likely it is for someone to immigrate from 
that province to Galapagos. In this case, the amenity effect is being swamped by 
the mobility effect, i.e. the people are less mobile in areas of high child 
malnutrition and so less likely to be able to move to places with better social 
conditions and amenities.
96 No significant relationship was found with either 
homicide or subsidies when regressed with immigration. 
A significant relationship was not picked up between immigration and 
coastal location even after controlling for population density, accessibility using 
distance from major airports, or economic activity. Thus there is nothing to 
suggest that people are more likely to migrate to Galapagos from coastal 
locations. 
As an accessibility measure, distance from airports produces a 
significant and positive result when regressed with immigration (see column 
four). Therefore, people are more likely to immigration to Galapagos from more 
accessible provinces. This may well, however, simply reflect the correlation 
between “distance” and population density. 
                                                            
96 We were concerned that the regression might be dominated by the two largest provinces. 
However, when we drop the two largest provinces this relationship still holds. 120 
When time was controlled for using time dummies, the significance of 
the explanatory variables disappeared; however, the coefficients on the 
explanatory variables remained similar. This implies that the loss of significance 
is due to the increase in the number of right hand side variables rather than the 
lack of a relationship over time between the population characteristics considered 
and immigration. Column five shows the relationship between time and 
immigrate; the coefficients increase with time until 1998, when there is a slight 
decrease. 
Table 24: Immigration to Galapagos (five years) per 100,000 people 
  1 2 3 4  5 
Illiteracy rate  -16 ** 
(7) 













  -1700*** 
(500) 
  






   - 0 . 6 8 *  
(0.37) 
 
1974 dummy       dropped 
1982 dummy      170 
(160) 
1990 dummy       380*** 
(150) 
1998 dummy       330*** 
(150) 











2  0.13 0.28 0.50 0.07 0.11 
N  36 36 36 36 36 
Note: Standard Errors are in brackets, *=10% significance, **=5% significance, ***=1% 
significance. Regression was weighted by population. Coefficients all rounded to two significant 
figures. 121 
6.3.2 Emigration 
Table 25 shows the results from regressions using emigration as the 
dependent variable. Again, we only show runs with significant coefficients 
because of the small sample size. 
Employment became a significant explanatory variable when poverty 
was controlled for, using child malnutrition (column one). This indicates that 
people are more likely to move to places with higher economic activity, when the 
amenity impact of poverty is held constant. These variables are slightly positively 
correlated (see Table 22). 
None of the education explanatory variables alone produced significant 
results when controlling for time. When accessibility was controlled for as well, 
using distance from major airports, the average number of school years did 
produce a significant result, with a positive relationship indicated. So, the greater 
the average education level in a province, controlling for distance, the more likely 
it was for some to emigrate there. This can be seen in column two of Table 25. 
Regressing with population density as an explanatory variable did not 
produce a significant result, suggesting that people were not necessarily more 
likely to migrate to places where more people are concentrated, i.e. cities. 
When considering amenity effects, we found a significant and negative 
relationship between child malnutrition, our poverty measure, and emigration 
when distance and time were controlled for (see column three). This suggests that 
the higher the child malnutrition rate, all other things constant, the less likely 
someone would have emigrated from Galapagos to that province. No significant 
relationship was picked up between either the homicide rate and emigration, or 
subsidies and emigration. So there is no evidence to suggest that people were 
more likely to move to areas with lower crime, or to areas with higher subsidies. 
No significant relationship was found with emigration and cultural 
similarities as measured by coastal location. This was true even after controlling 
for city effects using population density. There is nothing to indicate that people 
were more likely to emigrate to provinces on the coast. 122 
When analysing accessibility effects, the consistently negative 
coefficient for distance in all the regressions in Table 25 suggests that people were 
more likely to emigrate to provinces closer to major airports, i.e. provinces that 
were more accessible. 
In these regressions the time dummies for each regression were positive 
and increasing with time, indicating that emigration increased through time. 
Table 25: Emigration from Galapagos (five years) per 100,000 people 
  1 2 3 
Economic activity  22*** 
(7) 
  













1974 dummy  dropped dropped  dropped 



















2  0.73 0.82 0.79 
N  27 27 27 
Note: Standard Errors are in brackets, *=10% significance, **=5% significance, ***=1% 
significance. Regression was weighted by population. 
6.4 Summary 
People are more likely to immigrate to Galapagos from provinces with 
lower illiteracy rates, higher population density, lower number of health 
professionals, lower child malnutrition, and provinces that are more accessible. 
Illiteracy is both a wage/skill and mobility story. The lower the illiteracy rate in 
the population the more skilled people are on average, so the more likely they are 
to have the skills demanded in Galapagos and to be mobile. 123 
The positive relationship with population density reflects both the 
availability of the types of skills demanded in Galapagos and the similarities in 
cultures between Galapagos and cities. The negative relationship with the number 
of health professionals suggests an amenity effect, with people being more likely 
to move to places with better healthcare amenities. The negative relationship with 
child malnutrition rates suggests a mobility effect, with people being less mobile 
in places with higher poverty. 
In contrast to immigration, people from Galapagos are more likely to 
emigrate to provinces with higher education/skill rates and lower child 
malnutrition. People may be leaving Galapagos to get training that is not available 
to them there; thus they move to provinces with greater educational opportunities. 
They are also not likely to move to places with higher child malnutrition, or more 
poverty, as this would represent a decrease in the social amenities available to 
them. People are more likely to emigrate to provinces with higher economic 
activity, representing better wage opportunities, and to provinces closer to the 
airports, i.e. provinces that are more accessible. 124 
7  Potential policies to address migration 
and environment 
The overall objectives of this study are to find policies that will: 
1.  protect and enhance the unique environment in Galapagos 
2.  promote the welfare of people throughout Ecuador by making the best 
possible use of the resources in Galapagos 
3.  promote the welfare of the residents of Galapagos to gain their active 
support to create a sustainable future and to reward them for their 
efforts. 
We are seeking policies that bring a net gain to Ecuador, a country that 
cannot afford to subsidise global environmental benefits on a large scale. We 
believe there are many opportunities for win-win policies, where nearly everyone 
benefits, rather than having to force change on some groups for the benefit of 
others. More efficient regulation can make everyone better off. 
Any effective regulation must involve local participation as local people 
will necessarily implement and be involved in the enforcement of regulation. 
Local people often have the best information on the details that make a policy 
effective. The policies should be designed to minimise conflict. They must be 
simple so that good ideas will not fall down in implementation. Simpler 
regulations are also harder to manipulate and less vulnerable to misuse. Policies 
must take account of the limitations in human and institutional capacity in a very 
small community in a developing country. 
In Sections 2–6 we analysed key sources of environmental degradation 
and the causes and effects of migration to Galapagos. We analysed the problems 
that simple limits on migration can cause in the labour market and how these 
could lead to significant economic and social losses and pressure and ultimately 
breakdown in the Special Law. We have also analysed the underlying distortions 
that drive “excessive” migration. These sections were intended to deepen our 
understanding of the root causes of the problems Galapagos faces. They allow us 
to project future problems and also identify possible ways to minimise and avoid 
those problems. 125 
Our analysis suggests that the Special Law can have strongly positive 
effects on the environment and creates useful infrastructure. It also, however, 
creates problems of its own and needs to be complemented with additional efforts. 
Without further efforts to improve regulation, local wages for some occupations 
will rise steeply, putting increased pressure on illegal migration and efforts to 
subvert the application of the law. Local prices will rise, creating local resentment 
and increased inequality as only some groups benefit from higher wages. Skill 
shortages will intensify, limiting the development of the local economy and 
particularly of key sectors such as tourism. This will lead to loss of economic 
benefits both for local people and for Ecuador as a whole. Lack of flow of people 
into and out of Galapagos may create social stagnation. 
Population control is only part of an effective strategy for 
environmental protection. Environmental damage may be slowed by limits on 
population but will not be adequately addressed. The economic activities that do 
continue in Galapagos will not necessarily minimise environmental impact. Flows 
of people across the islands could intensify environmental damage even with 
constant population. In any case, the Special Law controls migration but not total 
population. Effective policy needs to address four questions: How many people? 
Who? What do they do? How do they do it? Different policies will address 
different questions and complement each other. 
The Special Law was the first step. It creates a basis on which other 
policies can be built. In this section we group potential complementary policies 
into four groups: 
1. policies  that  directly control population 
2.  policies that reduce the migration pressure that arises directly from 
government subsidies 
3.  policies that reduce the excess migration pressure and adverse 
environmental effects arising from poor regulation of economic 
activities, including tourism and fisheries 
4.  policies that directly mitigate the environmental effects of economic 
activity and population growth and the adverse effects of migration 
control. 126 
This section incorporates key proposals by other groups including 
MIGAMA, CDRS, and other local institutions and groups. We have not identified 
the source of ideas, partly because many are common across groups. It also 
includes new ideas that arise out of our analysis. We outline each possible policy 
and discuss its likely effectiveness in achieving our three goals, as well as the 
other, possibly unwanted, effects it might create. 
7.1  Directly control population: Improve systems for 
controlling migration flow 
The current problems with migration control are twofold. First, they 
have not yet been strongly enforced, so do not avoid illegal entry. Second, when 
they are strongly enforced they are likely to create problems in labour markets and 
distortions that lower welfare and create conflict. Some symptoms of this are 
already emerging as control tightens. 
One obvious policy is to ensure that the migration controls included in 
the Special Law are actually enforced. We discussed efforts and possible future 
strategies to do this in Section 2.3. As long as controls on migration are part of a 
successful strategy, we need to be able to track entry and exit of people and their 
legal status. We also need to be able to control illegal entry and overstaying 
effectively. If we decide that migration control should be more flexible this should 
be a deliberate policy, not something simply carried out through lax control. 
In terms of flexibility of migration control to avoid negative side 
effects, we need to think about the ultimate purpose of migration control. 
Migration control will be an essential part of overall population control and 
control of the entry of goods and people with their associated ecological risks. It 
may not be necessary to avoid migration altogether; however, our real targets are 
population growth and the level of entry of goods and people.
97 Population control 
could be achieved through higher emigration or lower rates of natural increase as 
well as through reduced migration. 
                                                            
97 Even these are intermediate goals. The ultimate targets are environmental protection and human 
welfare. 127 
Some people have suggested that Galapagos could absorb an ongoing 
increase in population of around 2.5–3 per cent.
98 The ability of the Galapagos to 
absorb new people in a sustainable way will clearly depend on the level of impact 
per person. This in turn depends on the quality of quarantine systems, regional 
planning and other local regulations. We discuss these further below (Section 7.4). 
A key strategic decision is the level of population growth the system aims to 
achieve. Currently this is not explicit but is determined by the number of 
temporary residency permits granted, natural increase (birth and marriage), and 
immigration and emigration of permanent residents. 
Given a target level of population growth, three key issues arise. First, 
if we are going to let in some additional people as temporary residents, who 
should be let in and through what process? Second, how can emigration be 
encouraged and facilitated? Third, can natural population increase be reduced? 
Higher emigration and lower natural increase allow a greater flow of temporary 
residents. 
7.1.1  Discretionary systems for control of temporary workers 
The current system for entry of temporary workers is based on a system 
similar to the US working visa system. An employer must sponsor the entrant and 
show that they cannot employ a local person to do the same thing. 
An alternative system for control of immigration that is commonly used 
for immigration between countries is a “point” system. Different characteristics of 
people, such as occupation, skills, wealth and age, are given different numbers of 
points based on the country's perceived needs. Only potential immigrants with 
high scores are able to enter. 
                                                            
98 They usually talk about this as migration at this level but we suspect they are really intending an 
increase in population of around this level. 128 
The advantage of this system is that the criteria for entry would be 
transparent. Entry would not be dependent on an employer's ability to use the 
immigration system. The criteria could be periodically revised with an explicit 
process to assess the needs of Galapagos. The disadvantages would be that in a 
tiny labour market like Galapagos, skill shortages will be extremely specific and 
general criteria are unlikely to supply the skills employers need. It is extremely 
hard to anticipate the needs of any labour market even in the very short term. The 
ability to respond to skill needs as they arise is an essential part of any system. 
A compromise system could involve general guidelines on the types of 
people who would be considered coupled with the current system of considering 
applications by employers on a case-by-case basis. Each year INGALA could 
report back on the characteristics of those granted temporary permits relative to 
the guidelines. This would provide useful information and would increase the 
transparency of the system to ensure that no particular groups are exploiting the 
system to their advantage or, conversely, being left out. It might also suggest areas 
where local education could reduce the need for temporary workers if certain 
occupation and skill groups are persistently coming in on temporary permits. 
These systems use bureaucratic processes that assess each application 
for temporary residency individually. They involve public servants in a 
discretionary process. Any discretion in decisions that confers considerable 
economic benefit on both the migrant and the employer invites corruption to let 
people in to meet the needs of friends and family. It can also be subject to the 
biases of local officials who have fixed ideas about the human capital needs of 
Galapagos. Local political pressure can be exerted to increase entry of certain 
types of people or limit others. This implies the need for higher level oversight, 
which is expensive. It also inevitably takes time, which can be costly for 
employers. 129 
Two other approaches would make the process simpler and almost non-
discretionary by forcing employers to make decisions about who they really need, 
and potential migrants to make decisions about whether they should really enter 
Galapagos, taking into account the true cost of immigration. One instrument, a 
“tax”, sets a price for entry but does not fix the number of entrants. It would 
probably be primarily used for temporary residents. The other, a “tradable permit 
system”, fixes a target for total population but does not set the entry price. This 
could be used for temporary and/or permanent residents. 
7.1.2  Tax on temporary residents 
The underlying problem with additional temporary residents (discussed 
in Section 4) is that each extra person puts additional stress on the environment 
and on local infrastructure. Thus we want to limit temporary residents to those 
who contribute more than the costs they impose. The key question is how to ration 
entry to Galapagos as a temporary resident. 
One answer is to assess the environmental and social cost of an extra 
person for one year and require that all temporary residents pay that cost. Then 
they will choose to come in if they have a job opportunity that will pay a high 
enough premium or if they get personal value out of living in Galapagos. The 
distortion is corrected and the optimal number and mix of people would enter. 
The level of the charge would need to change over time to reflect 
changes in environmental costs and the level of service provision that the new 
entrant would benefit from. If quarantine and land use planning systems are 
improved the environmental cost per person would be lower and maybe the tax 
could be lower. If in contrast the number of permanent residents is rising over 
time and pressure on the environment is increasing, the environmental damage 
caused by an extra person could be rising. If the subsidies to Galapagos residents 
(see Section 5.2) are reduced or made less accessible to temporary residents, the 
social cost an extra person imposes would fall and the tax could also fall. 130 
Rather than simply relying on the tax as a control mechanism, basic 
safeguards could also be applied to avoid entry of people such as criminals, those 
with past history of environmental infringements or those who have previously 
breached migration control regulations. 
Even if the tax were not applied at a level that covered the full 
environmental cost (which would be hard to estimate in any case), a low tax 
would reduce pressure for immigration and could complement the existing system 
of discretionary entry. 
This has some similarities with a “guarantee” system where the 
employers of temporary residents pay a bond when the temporary resident enters 
Galapagos, which is refunded when they leave. This is already in the regulations 
for Galapagos but it is not currently enforced. The basic purpose of the guarantee 
is to enforce compliance with exit after the permit expires rather than to limit 
entry. The cost of putting up a bond in advance would deter some employers, 
however, so may perform the role of a low tax. 
The proceeds of the tax could be used in a variety of ways. We will 
discuss the benefits of different options further under the later section on 
redirection of subsidies where similar issues arise (Section 7.2.2). 
7.1.2.a  Advantages and disadvantages of a “tax” system 
The benefit of a tax approach is that it directly addresses the underlying 
problem of excessive migration while putting on the minimum possible 
restrictions. People are left to make their own minds up about whether to enter and 
pay the tax (or equivalently employ a temporary resident and pay the tax); no 
bureaucrat controls this decision. The government needs very little information to 
implement a system like this. They do not need to plan how the economy 
develops, an impossible task. Those who employers most want, and those who 
most want to live in Galapagos, will enter. Finally, a tax would raise revenue that 
could be used either for direct environmental remediation or for local 
infrastructure that benefits permanent residents. 131 
At first glance a tax system where the tax might be actually paid by 
local employers may seem to disadvantage permanent residents. In fact the 
opposite is true. All locals and firms would benefit from the use of the tax revenue 
if it were directed to local infrastructure and services. 
Most permanent residents will find that they have increased protection 
from temporary residents who could lower local wages. The only workers who 
will lose are those with unreasonably high wages because of artificial scarcity in 
the local labour market. People who had to employ these workers will benefit 
from a tax both in terms of quality of the workers and cost. In general the costs of 
services that are provided locally will be less distorted, so unreasonable costs for 
employing people with specific skills will be avoided. For example, if there is an 
acute shortage of construction workers, more construction workers will pay the 
tax and enter and the costs of construction will fall to more reasonable levels. If 
there is not an acute shortage of a particular skill or occupation, but some groups 
previously said there was and facilitated entry, then under a tax system those 
employed in that skill will receive higher wages because temporary migration 
would fall. 
Employers will pay the tax only when the value of the temporary 
worker outweighs the extra cost. In some cases, where the worker is particularly 
keen to come to Galapagos, the worker might pay the tax themselves. The 
employer will face a much more flexible system with lower costs of dealing with 
INGALA and fewer delays. The employers who will lose are those who the 
previous system allowed to employ people who should not have entered, i.e. who 
imposed more costs than they provided benefits. Thus the only locals who lose are 
those who were gaining unreasonable returns from the previous discretionary 
system. 132 
It is true that under a tax system poor people will be less likely to enter 
as temporary residents. This is not really because they are poor but because poor 
people tend to have less valuable skills. Their skills are less likely to address 
shortages in the labour market. Where poor potential migrants are willing to do 
work that no locals are willing to do, it might still be worthwhile for their 
employers to pay the tax. Employers may also find that if they offer to pay 
enough, local people may be induced to take these jobs. If a family in Galapagos 
strongly wants to facilitate the temporary migration of a family member or friend, 
they can choose to pay the tax on their behalf. If a social goal is to help poor 
people from the continent there are certainly better ways to do this than by 
allowing a very small number of poor people to enter Galapagos. 
A tax on temporary residents was proposed in the original draft of the 
Special Law. The proceeds were to be directed to education and training. Because 
it was not included in the final draft a legal problem arises. Any new tax in 
Ecuador requires congressional approval. One option might be to require that 
employers of temporary residents contribute an equivalent amount of resources to 
the tax for local training or a fund for education and training. This would achieve 
a very similar outcome to the tax but might be more politically palatable. 
Both the discretionary entry systems and the tax affect only 
immigration and emigration of temporary workers. They do not automatically 
respond to emigration or internal population growth and do not encourage and 
facilitate emigration of permanent residents. 
7.1.3  Tradable residency permits 
We will first outline a basic tradable residency permit system and 
discuss the benefits and disadvantages of such a system. Then we will discuss the 
practical and political feasibility of using at least some elements of this system in 
the case of Galapagos. We will discuss how the ideas could be introduced 
gradually or partially. 133 
A pure tradable residency permit system would each year set a limit on 
the total number of permanent and temporary residents. This could be adjusted 
annually to account for natural population increase or to respond to increasing 
environmental concern. In contrast to the tax, where the key decision was how 
high the tax should be, the key decision here is the optimal number of people 
resident in Galapagos. Permanent residents would each receive a permit. 
Temporary permit holders might be required to pay for them. If the limit were 
greater than the number of people currently holding temporary or permanent 
residency status, extra permits could be sold and the revenue used for any 
purpose. If the optimal limit were below the current level of permits, the 
government would need to buy some of the permits back and some people would 
need to leave. 
The holder of each of these permits would need to be clearly tracked. 
Every permanent resident would have one permit and each temporary resident 
would have to acquire one before entering Galapagos. INGALA could use their 
database for tracking. 
Once ownership of each permit was established, any new person who 
wanted to enter would need to find someone to lease (temporarily transfer) or sell 
(permanently transfer) them a permit. Each entrant would be matched by someone 
who would leave so total population would be absolutely controlled. As with the 
tax, additional limitations could be put on new permit owners to exclude criminals 
etc. An additional restriction could be to allow someone to become a new 
permanent resident (i.e. allow people to buy permits rather than lease them) only 
if they have lived in Galapagos for a period of time already. The latter 
requirement might bring more social cohesion and make the new entrants more 
socially acceptable. Sales and leases would not be heavily regulated; they would 
simply need to be reported to INGALA and checked for legality before the 
transfer was finalised. The permit would not legally be transferred until it was 
reported, so people could not enter Galapagos without registering the permit 
transfer. 134 
7.1.3.a  Advantages and disadvantages of a “permit” system 
A permit system would maintain the goals of the migration control 
system established under the Special Law but would be much more flexible. It 
would address the problems of shortages of skills and the risk of social stagnation 
from a static population. It would discourage immigration and encourage 
emigration but would provide a mechanism so that anyone who really wanted to 
immigrate could. They would not be as tempted to immigrate illegally. 
Employers would be able to hire anyone they really want and would not 
have to use political processes or persuade bureaucrats to accept their applications 
for temporary permits. The government would not need to have information about 
skills shortages and make decisions about what type of people and skills 
Galapagos needs. If the total number of permits is about right in terms of the 
carrying capacity of the environment with current quarantine and environmental 
protection, then any person who decides to enter Galapagos and purchases a 
permit is bearing the true cost of their decision and hence will make a good 
decision for society without extra oversight. 
Emigration would be totally voluntary. All permanent residents would 
have an unassailable right to live with their descendants in Galapagos. If they do 
choose to leave, either temporarily or permanently, they would be rewarded for 
the reduced impact on the environment. 
One group of people who are most likely to leave are students and 
young people who want to study or develop their careers on the mainland. They 
would be able to lease out their permits to people who want to temporarily work 
in Galapagos while they are away. This would provide some resources to finance 
their learning experience. Those who are most likely to leave permanently are 
those who have permanent residency but are already not living in Galapagos; they 
simply want to keep their residency options open. The payment they could receive 
by selling their permit might make it worthwhile for them to give up that option. 
Leases and sales of permits by either of these groups will not reduce population 
much in the short run because neither of these groups were likely to be living in 
Galapagos anyway. Those who would not have lived in Galapagos might transfer 
their permits to people who really want to live in Galapagos. 135 
Thus a permit system might allow some population growth until the 
limit on permits becomes binding. It would be good to do a little research to find 
out how large these groups of students and non-resident permit holders are likely 
to be. INGALA data suggests that currently 2081 permanent residents live on the 
Mainland and 47 live in other countries. If the optimal limits on population are 
close to the current population actually living in Galapagos when a residency 
permit system is introduced, it might be wise to buy back some of the permits so 
the system does not lead to growth in population. 
In the longer term, people who are actually living in Galapagos may 
choose to leave. Those who are most likely to leave are those with skills that are 
not particularly in demand in Galapagos. They may choose to use the sale of their 
permit as capital to set themselves up on the continent. Existing families may 
move or this may happen over generations as some young people decide their 
future options are greater on the continent. Those with the weakest attachments to 
Galapagos are most likely to leave. These may be recent immigrants. 
As with the tax system, a permit system could raise money that could be 
used for a range of purposes. If all permits are immediately distributed to residents 
or sold, revenue would be earned only when the permits are initially sold. Current 
permanent residents and their children would not pay for their permits. If the 
government does not sell all the excess permits (not allocated to permanent 
residents), employers who want to employ temporary workers could simply lease 
permits from the government. When people lease a permit, they will pay about the 
same amount per year as the tax. 
One disadvantage of a tradable residency permit system is that it 
requires an explicit limit on resident population. This can be politically difficult. 
People cannot believe different things about what a policy implies for population 
growth because of ambiguities and uncertainties in the policy. They must face the 
implications directly. 136 
A second possible problem arises if the market for permits does not 
operate well. A first problem would be if the process of trading is made complex 
and so it is difficult for potential buyers to find and negotiate with potential 
sellers. This can be avoided by minimising government controls over the 
process—i.e. minimising paperwork—and by providing an electronic or other 
place where people can post statements of interest in buying or selling. People 
could advertise through local papers, deal through their existing networks or use 
the official “bulletin board”. 
If some group gains control over the process of selling and leasing 
permits they can still exercise discretionary control over who lives in Galapagos. 
They could arrange that their friends and employees can access permits more 
easily or at lower cost and exclude others. For example, large enterprises could try 
to stop their smaller competitors from accessing permits. If large enterprises 
simply value temporary workers more highly than small companies this is not a 
problem. It is only a problem if they use it in an anti-competitive way to 
deliberately harm the small companies. 
One particular concern would arise if it appeared that any group was 
being pressured to sell their permits when they didn't want to. If the market is run 
in a very simple way and all transactions are observable it will be much harder for 
anyone to manipulate the market in this way. INGALA could take the role of 
ensuring that the transactions are done openly and that both parties truly consent. 
It is extremely important that those who sell permits do so voluntarily 
and with informed consent. They would need to understand that if they sell the 
permit they renounce their right to live in Galapagos forever. If they wanted to 
move back they would need to buy a new permit. They need to have thought 
through the implications of this possibly major decision so they do not regret it 
later and resent the system. Currently people in Galapagos do not clearly 
understand the privileges associated with being a permanent resident and how 
valuable that right may be in the future. They could give it up without considering 
the loss sufficiently. 137 
A critical legal issue associated with a tradable residency permit system 
is that it would require that people could legally renounce residency in a binding 
way. If they sell their permit they must not later be able to claim residency again 
without buying a new permit. They should also be renouncing residency on behalf 
of their children because whoever buys the permit will be gaining residency on 
behalf of their children. The ability to renounce residency is not in the current law. 
Before considering implementing this system the government would need to seek 
good legal advice on whether renunciation of residency is or could be made 
legally binding. 
As with the tax, some people may be concerned that poorer people and 
small companies may not be able to afford to buy permits. We must always 
remember that those poor people who are already permanent residents are not 
affected by this (they gain a valuable asset). Poor people may be less able to 
immigrate than richer ones. The same arguments about whether allowing a few 
poor people to migrate to Galapagos is the best way to help poor people on the 
continent in Ecuador apply here. Galapagos is special in many ways, so the 
government may be able to get away with what will look like a policy that 
benefits richer people. In fact the Special Law already creates quite significant 
privileges for those fortunate enough to be permanent residents. The value of 
these privileges will become clearer with time. 
7.1.3.b  Transitional or partial permit systems 
We have described a permit system that applies to both permanent and 
temporary residents. It is also described as a stand-alone mechanism for 
controlling migration. It may not be possible to implement such a system in the 
short term. Several options could be used to phase in a system. 138 
One possibility would be to apply the system only to temporary 
residents. Permanent residents could not renounce their residency and have a 
permit to sell. However, instead of having a discretionary system for temporary 
permits, INGALA would simply limit the number of permits each year and sell 
those permits to the highest bidder. This could be expanded to allow permanent 
residents who are temporarily leaving Galapagos to lease their permits to 
temporary residents. This extension would not require that residents can renounce 
permanent residency. The permit's validity could be assessed each year; it would 
only be used for entry of a temporary resident as long as the permanent resident is 
out of the islands. 
Another way to phase in the system would be begin by allowing 
permanent residents to sell their permits only to the government or NGOs. This 
would mean the total allowable population would fall every time a permit was 
sold. This could lead to a perception that the system simply aims to reduce 
population. If, however, there were concern about letting people “buy their way” 
into Galapagos it would address that concern. 
Rather than introducing the whole system at once it would be quite 
feasible to allow a few discrete trades of permanent residency (where one person 
renounces it and another gains it) to demonstrate how it could work and how both 
parties could be better off. 
7.2  Reduce migration pressure created by subsidies 
The major benefit from subsidies, and the difficulty with reducing them, 
is that they provide significant benefits to permanent residents who can provide or 
withhold support for the policies needed to protect the Galapagos. Subsidies may 
also facilitate recruitment of skilled people by improving the quality of life. By 
making basic services much cheaper they raise the quality of life of all Galapagan 
residents. To the extent that these people would be poor otherwise, this is 
equitable. However, most indications suggest that Galapagans have high living 
standards relative to those on the continent. 139 
Subsidies also cause significant damage. We need to be clear how 
exactly they cause damage so that we can understand which subsidies, and what 
aspects of those subsidies, are most damaging. If we can reduce a few subsidies or 
change their form and thereby reduce damage a lot, we may be able to maintain 
many of the benefits for permanent residents while still achieving our 
environmental goals. 
Subsidies cause damage in two ways. First, they encourage excessive 
migration. Second, they directly encourage damaging behaviour. The key 
subsidies in Galapagos (see Section 5.1) are for transport, energy (fossil fuel and 
electricity), and public services that are much better than they would be if paid for 
locally, or if they received the same funding as on the continent. 
The effect of subsidies on migration pressure depends on the value of 
the subsidies to a potential new resident. The effect of subsidies on migration 
operates through their effects on the few people who are close to undecided about 
whether to immigrate to Galapagos or emigrate from Galapagos. They are the 
ones whose migration decisions will be changed. Since the law was passed, the 
new residents who might choose to move to Galapagos in response to the 
subsidies will mostly be temporary residents. Permanent residents are unlikely to 
have more children or alter their choice of marriage partner because of subsidies. 
Subsidies will, however, also affect permanent residents' incentives to leave 
Galapagos. 
Since the Special Law, legal temporary residents are mostly people with 
specialised skills. They will tend to have higher incomes and will tend to travel, 
use significant amounts of energy and value education and health services highly. 
Thus the current subsidies are likely to be very valuable to them. The sort of 
permanent residents who are most likely to emigrate are also likely to be young 
educated people who benefit significantly from the current subsidies. Thus the 
current level and form of subsidies might have significant effects on legal 
migration. 140 
Some people would argue that mobile, educated people with specialised 
skills are exactly the people Galapagos needs so it is good if the subsidies attract 
and retain them. If Galapagos truly needs them, however, employers will be able 
to offer them more generous salary packages, which would compensate them for 
any losses they would suffer from reductions in subsidies. These salaries would 
target only those who employers want to attract rather than affecting everyone in 
Galapagos. 
Illegal residents will not be able to benefit from the travel subsidies and 
are likely to be poorer so may consume less energy and may value education less 
highly. The subsidies will, however, affect their job opportunities. They will be 
affected by subsidies but perhaps less so. 
Subsidies can also have direct and often perverse effects on the 
consumption behaviour of all residents. The travel subsidies will encourage higher 
levels of travel, which in turn increase the risk of species introduction. Fossil fuel 
and electricity subsidies encourage greater use of fossil fuel, which increases the 
risk of spills. They also encourage more fishing (an energy-intensive activity) and 
more transport among the islands both for tourism and other purposes. The current 
overexploitation of fisheries in Galapagos means that any increase in fishing is a 
direct problem. More transport among the islands is particularly damaging 
because of species transfer. In contrast, subsidies for education or health might be 
inequitable or inefficient but they do not lead to directly environmentally 
damaging activities. 
As explained in Section 5.2, different subsidies are controlled by 
different organisations. Most are controlled by central government agencies. Some 
are specified in the Special Law so may be difficult to change. Thus reduction or 
even redirection of subsidies would probably require central government 
involvement. Local government has some control over the use of its resources for 
public services, so may have limited ability to redirect them. 141 
Resources provided by non-governmental organisations to activities in 
Galapagos also can have negative effects on migration. If they are used directly 
for environmental improvement their net effect is almost certainly positive. If, 
however, they are aimed at social improvements, care must be taken to ensure that 
the direct benefits to society from the programs are not offset by indirect damage 
from increased migration pressure. 
7.2.1  Reduction of subsidies 
Reducing subsidies would make immigration less attractive, so would 
make migration control easier to enforce. If a tax or permit system were 
introduced for migration, the tax could, and permit price would, reflect the value 
of the subsidies. If subsidies were reduced these prices could fall. That would 
probably make the systems work more easily and would reduce the incentives to 
corrupt the system or control the permit market. 
Even if it were possible to reduce only the subsidies available to 
temporary residents, this might have significant effects on legal and illegal 
immigration because temporary residents are likely to be most responsive to 
changes in the quality of life in Galapagos. This would have the advantage of not 
losing the support of permanent residents. Reducing the subsidies for temporary 
residents could probably be done only with travel subsidies. It would be difficult 
to have different prices for fossil fuels or electricity. It would be almost 
impossible to offer different levels of most public services. An exception is 
special training programs or scholarships for higher education where temporary 
residents are already ineligible. Even if it were technically possible it might cause 
social friction. 
Any of the subsidies could be either reduced or eliminated in theory. 
Reducing any subsidies would reduce all residents' perverse incentives to travel or 
use fuel excessively. Most consumers on the continent purchase fossil fuel 
through private gas companies (Texaco, Shell, etc.). 142 
Replacing Petrocomercial with private companies in Galapagos would 
allow removal of the subsidy or would at least make it transparent. This may not 
initially be profitable for the gas company because the market is so small, 
especially if there is a transition period where Petrocomercial still operates, but 
they may be encouraged to do it as part of an environmentally beneficial project. 
It could be combined with a move toward more sustainable fuel and more secure 
fuel management and transportation as part of a wider energy strategy. 
Alternatively Petrocomercial could simply raise their price to reflect the transport 
costs and environmental risk involved in providing fuel to Galapagos. 
Reducing the subsidy on diesel to electricity providers (either by 
directly charging more or by forcing them to purchase fuel from a private 
provider) would raise electricity prices and reduce electricity demand. Reducing 
the direct subsidy for electricity would have the same effect. These would both 
reduce diesel use, having a direct environmental impact, as well as reducing 
migration pressure. 
Although reducing subsidies is theoretically the most efficient way to 
reduce environmentally damaging distortions, reducing subsidies directly lowers 
living standards for Galapagos residents. Therefore it would have to be done 
slowly and will be limited by political factors. Thus we will also consider the 
possibilities for redirecting subsidies so that most people's living standards are 
maintained but the damaging effects are reduced. 
7.2.2  Redirection of subsidies 
Moving the subsidies away from products that mostly benefit more 
mobile richer people to those that affect immobile poorer people would tend to 
reduce net immigration. Subsidising basic education rather than higher-level 
education would target poorer people. They tend not to utilise higher-level 
education. Raising the quality of basic health that is accessible to all residents 
rather than specialised healthcare that might be mostly utilised by higher income 
people might induce less migration than the current subsidies. 143 
These shifts in the use of subsidies may, however, encourage illegal 
immigration, which may tend to involve poorer people. The value of this policy 
would depend on the strength of the overall migration controls. 
Moving subsidies from directly environmentally damaging activities to 
activities that have local social benefits but increase migration pressure would 
reduce the damage from subsidies. For example, reducing subsidies for travel and 
fuel use and increasing spending on education, sustainable water supplies, sewage, 
roads or health would be an improvement both socially and environmentally. 
Moving subsidies to directly environmentally beneficial activities such as 
quarantine, conservation education, control of introduced species, or rehabilitation 
of habitat would also have long-term benefits for the economy as a whole and 
hence for residents, but the social effects would be much more indirect, so such a 
change may not be popular. 
Given, however, that subsidies are mostly controlled by specific 
government agencies, it will generally be difficult or impossible to move the 
subsidy from one activity to a completely different one. Even within 
organisations, however, some subsidy shifts could be valuable. 
For example, if the purpose of the subsidy for TAME (Ecuadorean 
airline that flies to Galapagos) flights is to provide some access for Galapagos 
residents for essential visits to the mainland, this might be achieved with less 
impact if the number of subsidised flights were limited. At the moment, if some 
people travel frequently they receive most of the benefit. This was probably not 
the intention of the policy. Instead subsidised flights could be limited to one per 
resident per year (not transferable) with free flights for medical emergencies (with 
a certificate from a doctor). If this were a redirection policy rather than a policy 
that simply reduces the travel subsidy, the overall funding could be maintained by 
subsidising each flight more heavily. This might achieve the original objective 
without encouraging such high levels of travel or making Galapagos excessively 
attractive to the mobile, educated people who are likely to want to migrate there. 144 
Another possibility for redirection would come within the electricity 
sector. One of the subsidies for electricity comes through FERUM. Currently the 
consumer price of electricity is significantly lower than the production cost and 
FERUM covers the difference. FERUM has another program for construction of 
renewable or non-conventional energy systems. The current subsidy could 
therefore be transferred to one that shifts Galapagos away from reliance on diesel 
fuel. The consumer prices could either stay low or rise to the real cost, but in 
either case the environmental effects of the subsidy would be reduced. As long as 
diesel is so heavily subsidised it will be difficult for any renewable option to 
compete. 
7.3  Reduce migration pressure and mitigate 
environmental impacts: Policies to address 
inadequate regulation of resource use 
In this section we consider policies to address problems arising because 
of inadequate regulation of economic activity. Improvements in regulation of 
economic activity are complementary to policies that improve migration control 
or reduce or redirect subsidies. If economic activities can be regulated better so 
the activities impose less environmental externalities, the Galapagos will be able 
to support more economic activity and a greater population even while we protect 
the environment more. Better regulations encourage the right people to do the 
right activities in the right ways. Better regulation can also reduce pressure to 
migrate. 
One important form of regulation that is only beginning to be imposed 
in Galapagos is land use regulation. Currently there is very little control of 
residential or commercial development. This is being addressed through a new 
regional planning process coordinated by INGALA. Decisions on new 
developments need to take into account direct and indirect environmental impacts 
that are not covered by other forms of regulation. They must also take into 
account pressure on local infrastructure. 145 
Limits on land development are one effective way to restrict overall 
activity. If there are other forms of limits on activities (e.g. limits on number of 
tourists or on total population) the regional planning should focus on the location 
and exact form of tourism and residential developments rather than trying to use 
planning to duplicate the overall controls on the level of activity. Regulation 
generally works better with focused goals. 
One key aspect of land use regulation in Galapagos is the need to 
protect the boundaries of national parks. As the population and economy grow 
these will be under increased pressure. Already there is little undeveloped land 
around the major towns. Processes for making objective decisions on further 
development that avoid environmental damage need to be strongly established 
before the political pressure forces decisions on the basis of commercial benefit. 
Development is costly and difficult to reverse. 
We will now focus on two key economic activities that are fundamental 
to the Galapagos economy and have significant direct and indirect environmental 
impacts, tourism and fishing. We are looking for policies that will minimise the 
environmental impact of these activities while maximising their value. 
7.3.1 Tourism 
If we could assess the environmental cost of all tourism activities in 
dollar terms and force tourists and tourism operators to absorb this cost we would 
not need any additional policies. Tourists and tourism operators would make good 
decisions to maximise their economic benefit while minimising the environmental 
costs they impose. In reality these costs are hard to assess and it is difficult to 
match environmental charges directly to damaging or risky activities. Existing 
policies impose some of these costs through levies on proxy measures of damage 
and risk such as tourist days. 146 
In many situations we cannot measure or impose the costs and a more 
direct preventative approach is needed to complement these levies on proxies. For 
example, we cannot exactly observe the care taken to prevent species transfer as 
tourist boats move between islands. In any case we do not really know how to 
relate care to reduced risk of transfer and then to the environmental cost of 
increased transfer. In other cases if potential damage is unlikely but very large if it 
occurs, deterrence will be ineffective because we will be unable to force operators 
to pay a fine equal to the damage caused. Direct prevention can involve limiting 
total activity or reducing the impact of activities. 
To gain the maximum value from tourism while also protecting the 
environment we need to take all three approaches: encourage tourists and tourist 
operators to internalise the environmental costs they impose and hence change 
their behaviour to minimise them, directly control their behaviour to limit damage, 
and when environmental impacts per tourist have been lowered as far as is 
reasonable, limit the total amount of tourism. 
To gain local support and increase the benefits from tourism to Ecuador 
as a whole, policies should also take into account the extent to which Ecuadorians 
capture the gains from tourism. Encouraging and facilitating use of permanent 
residents as workers in the tourist sector, a key way to capture benefit, also 
reduces the pressure to bring in more temporary residents to meet tourist sector 
needs. 
7.3.1.a  Internalise environmental costs of tourism 
To a certain extent, tourists already pay at least part of the 
environmental cost they impose. Every tourist pays an entry fee for the National 
Park when they arrive at Baltra. In addition, tourist operators pay fees based on 
passenger days on their boats. Two issues remain. Are these fees at a level that 
really reflects the environmental impact? Are the fees responsive to different 
levels of impact depending on the length of stay and the activities undertaken? 147 
If the fees were used to prevent and ameliorate the environmental 
impact would they completely protect the environment? Currently the fees are 
used for a variety of purposes, so this is hard to tell. Even if they were, it is likely 
that the tourists would cause some damage that would not be corrected while other 
areas of the environment would actually improve. Thus it would be difficult to 
assess if the damage and gain were equivalent. For example, tourists may lead to 
introduction of a new species but finance effective captive breeding programmes 
to build up the turtle population on Española. 
Efficiency does not require that the charges collected be actually spent 
to repair the damage. They will encourage people to make decisions so that they 
will not cause damage they were not willing to pay for. The gain to the tourist 
exceeds the damage to the environment. The use of the funds is a separate 
decision that involves trading off welfare of Ecuadorians (e.g. spending on 
education and health) with the value of protecting the environment (e.g. spending 
on quarantine and captive breeding). 
The current per capita charge on entry to the Park does not depend on 
the length of stay. It also does not vary between those who engage in local 
tourism, which is more environmentally damaging, and those who join a cruise-
ship based tour. 
Charges should be regularly reviewed to assess whether they reflect the 
damage. The charge could be set higher than the damage to collect extra revenue 
for Ecuador. This might lead to over-protection of the environment but when 
foreign tourists are extremely keen to visit Galapagos the number of foreign 
visitors may not fall much even with a higher charge. The government might 
simply collect a lot more revenue from tourists. In contrast, the charge should not 
be set lower than the damage caused or Ecuador could lose from allowing tourists 
to enter because they degrade a valuable economic asset. This would be a 
particular concern where most tourist companies and most employees of tourist 
companies are not Ecuadorian citizens so the direct economic value is largely 
captured outside of Ecuador. 148 
One problem with charges as an instrument for environmental 
protection is that they do not effectively address situations where activity can 
cause very large damages if care is not taken. If a tourist operator is extremely 
careless and allows considerable damage they should be able to be fined to punish 
them and deter others from behaving in a similar way. Unfortunately if the 
damage is large enough the fine will be impossible to enforce. The courts will 
limit the fine for political reasons or the company will go bankrupt and not pay. If 
that happens other tourist operators will not be deterred from taking similar risks 
with the environment. A way to minimise this risk is to require tour operators to 
post a bond before they begin activity where the bond is large enough to cover 
most damage they could cause. Then there are no problems with not paying the 
bond back in the event that the operator is careless and large damages do arise. 
The government already holds the money so does not have to extract it. The tour 
operator does not necessarily need to have the money themselves to pay the bond. 
This might exclude many small operators. They could get an insurance company 
to provide a guarantee on their behalf and simply pay an annual premium. Then 
the insurance company will keep an eye on the operator to minimise their own 
risk. 
Thus charges on tourists and tour operators should be assessed to see if 
the level is sufficient. There might be gain in differentiating the charges more 
based on likely impact on the environment. Requiring that tourist permit holders 
post environmental bonds would encourage operators to prevent accidents that 
cause large environmental damage. 
7.3.1.b  Directly control tourist and tourist operator behaviour 
Charges are limited because they can only be imposed based on very 
simple measures such as the number of tourists and the number of days they stay 
and possibly the broad nature of the activity they engage in. They cannot easily be 
differentiated depending on exactly what the tourists are doing or how careful the 
tour operator is to avoid damage. Even if it were not unwieldy to have a range of 
different charges, it is difficult to observe the level of care taken. Finally, tour 
operators might not know the best way to avoid environmental damage. Direct 
regulations can be informative. 149 
Thus direct controls have a clear role in complementing charges. First, 
they can avoid large damage from discrete decisions (such as a new development). 
Regional planning is an important tool for this. Wherever large decisions are 
being made, local government (possibly the municipality and the National Park) 
should carry out an assessment of the local costs—both to the environment and in 
terms of infrastructure that government would need to provide—relative to the 
benefits. Developers should be encouraged to develop alternative proposals that 
impose less cost rather than making the decision one between some development 
and no development. This will allow compromise solutions to be found and lessen 
conflict. 
Some people have suggested that per tourist, locally run tourism is 
actually more damaging than the larger tourism operations. This could be directly 
addressed through stronger requirements for the use of educated guides in local 
tourism, and by strengthening control of tourism activities in towns. Continuing 
education of all locals involved in tourism would help them minimise the impact 
of their activities as well as improving the quality of the tourist experience 
offered. For example, local diving operations and tours of the bay may be 
relatively uncontrolled at present and the guides may not be as knowledgeable as 
they could be. Activities involving animals that can spread seeds, such as horse 
trekking, may be particularly damaging so that their scope and level should be 
restricted. Maybe they should even be gradually phased out. 
For all tours, an ongoing effort to organise tourist itineraries to 
minimise risk of species transport, keeping pressure on operators to take care that 
tourists do not spread species between islands, and avoiding extractive activities 
would reduce the impact per tourist. Monitoring the forms of transport used to 
reduce the risk of species transmission, for example using airplanes rather than 
large ferries for interisland transport, would have direct value. The cost of the 
transport should still reflect the environmental risk it imposes. One way to 
encourage this is to avoid developing a larger airport on any of the other islands so 
that flights are intrinsically limited. 150 
7.3.1.c  Limit total tourism 
A combination of charges and direct controls could minimise tourism's 
impact on the environment and at the same time raise the cost of tourism, so 
automatically reduce the total number of tourists. Thus it would not be necessary 
to limit tourist numbers directly. A limit is useful when other forms of control are 
constrained in some way. It can be particularly useful when the environment has a 
reasonably clearly defined carrying capacity and is particularly sensitive to 
increases in numbers above a certain level (i.e. a threshold effect). A limit can 
keep numbers below the carrying capacity. 
If a limit is to be applied it must be done in the most flexible way 
possible to avoid the use of the limit to protect existing ventures. Some limits 
already exist. The government limits the number of flights to Baltra. No flights 
come from the continent except to Baltra and Puerto Baquerizo Moreno. Total 
tourist numbers are indirectly limited through controls on the number of tourist 
vessels. One option would be to freeze the number of tourist vessels (or increase it 
more slowly) until we are sure that the environmental impact of tourism is 
controlled. This could create protectionism because new tourist operators could 
not easily get vessels. In addition, simply freezing tourist activity would not allow 
the types of tourist experience to adjust to provide the most valuable packages. 
Given that total tourism will be limited (either directly or through the higher costs 
implied by charges and strict controls) it is critical to focus the tourism that does 
occur on the unique opportunities offered in Galapagos as those will be the most 
lucrative for operators and valuable for Ecuador as a whole. 
For example, it is unlikely that it would be efficient for Galapagos to 
compete in the sun/sand/surf tourism market. It is too remote and the 
environmental costs, if taken into account, would make this unprofitable. A lot of 
places can offer this type of tourism, so the market tends to become saturated and 
the price tourists are willing to pay is lower. Galapagos could, however, link with 
sun/sand/surf tourism options offered on the mainland to provide a combined 
ecotourism and sun/sand/surf experience if that is what tourists desire. Galapagos 
attracts an unusual tourist demographic for its ecotourist experience and it is 
almost certainly most profitable to focus on its clear advantages. 151 
Tradable tourism rights 
One way to limit total tourists but allow flexibility in which operators 
are active in Galapagos, so that they are under pressure to provide excellent 
services and flexibility in the types of tourism experience offered, is to use a 
tradable tourism rights approach. The basis for this already exists in the tourist 
quotas used by the National Park. Here we will briefly discuss how the existing 
system could be extended and the advantages of that. 
Any tradable rights system must define the quotas to be traded, must 
assign clear ownership, and must set up a system for trading. The quotas here are 
currently defined in terms of passenger days. This could be expanded a little so 
each quota implies the right to a certain number of passenger days but also the 
responsibility to meet certain environmental standards. If these standards are not 
met, the operator’s quotas could be revoked. The environmental responsibilities 
could be applied directly as controls, or, when new quotas are allocated or sold, 
those who seek a quota could propose their own standards and ideas for 
environmental protection and remediation. These proposals could be taken into 
account in the tender process. This latter process was used effectively to control 
pollution from buses in downtown Santiago, Chile. Routes in the central city were 
limited and tenders to operate those routes were submitted with both a price and 
an environmental plan. 
Ownership of the passenger day quota is currently assigned through a 
process where new operators or those who want to expand need to seek additional 
quotas for themselves, which are added to the quotas of operators already doing 
business in Galapagos. In a tradable system, existing quota holders could have 
their quota “grandfathered” for a fixed period of time so they would not have to 
pay. They could gradually be made to face more stringent environmental 
standards. As new quotas are made available or existing quotas roll over, they 
could be tendered and sold at the highest price (weighed with the environmental 
considerations). 152 
When quotas are limited they become valuable. Operators will be 
willing to pay to buy them because their businesses will become more profitable 
with limited tourists and hence limited competition. If the Park sells quotas, the 
revenue can be used to fund conservation activities or more generally to provide 
benefits to Ecuadorian citizens. The benefits of better regulation will be captured 
by Ecuador, not the foreign companies. 
Alternatively quotas could be allocated to operators in a discretionary 
way. One disadvantage of giving the quotas away when they are scarce is that 
they are valuable and operators have an incentive to use political influence to 
obtain quotas. Large operators may be able to use the system to exclude small 
operators. A discretionary system is easy to operate without manipulation when 
quotas are not valuable, but comes under pressure when quotas are severely 
limited. 
Quotas can be sold in perpetuity (allocating rights forever) or for a 
limited period of time. The key benefit of allocating them in perpetuity is that 
tourist operators can make investments secure in the knowledge that they can 
continue to operate. The disadvantage is that very few quotas would be traded and 
it might be difficult for new tourist operators to buy quotas. Also, if quotas 
initially sell for very low prices, the Ecuadorian people may receive little benefit. 
Allocating quotas for 20 or 30 years where this is done in a rolling way with some 
quotas expiring every few years might be a good compromise. Tourist operators 
would need to replace some of their quota periodically. This would force them to 
reassess their operations and would create an active market. 
A quota system could effectively control tourist numbers, could be 
combined with incentives to improve environmental performance, and would still 
allow flexibility in the tourist sector. When operators have to pay for the right to 
serve tourists they would need to find ways to improve the quality of the service 
they provide. They would also need to match their packages more closely to what 
the highest-paying tourists want. This might lead tourism to focus more on 
wealthy eco-tourists and hence provide longer tours with more biology expertise 
involved. It might, however, lead to shorter tours where each tourist pays more 
per day for an intensive ecotourism experience. 153 
The sector could evolve to find which tourist services are most highly 
valued and hence most valuable to the tourist operators and Ecuador. Tourist 
operators would take the environmental impact into account in all their decisions 
because of the direct controls, payments for quotas, and the environmental 
conditions operators offer when they tender for their quota. 
The existing system of passenger day quotas could relatively easily be 
adapted to provide a more flexible system that also provides more value to 
Ecuadorian citizens. It could be done gradually to minimise disruption and 
political opposition from both foreign and local operators. 
7.3.1.d  Focus tourism to produce more local benefit (or at least to Ecuador) 
It is not sufficient that tourism is well regulated to control 
environmental impacts and maximise its total value. Ecuador is a relatively poor 
country and is concerned that its own citizens benefit from the use of its valuable 
resources. In addition, effective tourism and migration regulation requires local 
Galapagan residents' support. They will be more supportive of restrictive 
regulation if they can see that it provides benefit to them. Currently most tourism 
operations are run from the mainland or from other countries, so much of the 
benefit also goes outside. 
A key issue here is training locals and providing employment 
opportunities for them in tourism. When training is most effectively given on the 
job rather than through courses, it might be most effective to require that all 
tourism operators employ and train a certain percentage of Ecuadorian citizens (if 
the migration regulation is inflexible, permanent residents of Galapagos). If the 
more flexible migration controls discussed in Section 7.1 are implemented, the 
funds contributed through taxes or payments for residency permits could partly be 
directed toward local training. The basic training required is in biology/ecology, 
languages and the harder to define skills of working with tourists from developed 
countries who have high expectations about the level of service. The interpersonal 
skills involved in the latter can only be achieved through extensive contact with 
tourists or other foreigners as it is fundamentally a cultural issue. 154 
Forcing tourist operators to employ large numbers of locals will 
probably lower the quality of tourism in the short run because the necessary skills 
are not readily found among locals. Thus training is a long-term strategy and any 
policy designed to encourage it should be aware of the trade-off against the 
quality and hence the economic contribution of tourism. This is an issue that is 
beginning to be faced with the requirement that new guides are permanent 
residents of Galapagos. Despite recent training programmes there are few top-
quality experienced local guides. This problem will not be solved overnight. 
A second issue is making sure that the market for tourism operators and 
new ventures is open to Ecuadorian citizens. Administrative barriers that bias 
against Ecuadorian operations should be closely scrutinised. If there are genuine 
failures in the capital markets that make it difficult for good local operations to 
gain credit so they can expand, these could be addressed. Extreme care must be 
taken, however, not to subsidise poorly organised and planned ventures simply 
because they are locally owned. Frequently when operations cannot find credit 
from banks it is for a good reason. Helping ventures with management skills, 
business plans and training in tourism operations would probably be far more 
effective in creating local businesses that provide genuine local benefit than 
simply giving low-interest loans. 
7.3.2 Fisheries 
Here we seek effective ways to regulate fishing (recreational and 
commercial) that bring benefits to existing fishers while protecting the stock in the 
long term. The fisheries regulation must be developed together with fishers 
because their active and willing participation is essential.
99 In the past fisheries 
regulation has been associated with violent conflict. This is now being addressed, 
but it will be a continuing concern. 
                                                            
99 See Ostrom (1990) and Seabright (1993) for excellent discussions of the basic issues involved in 
cooperation in management of local commons. 155 
A first need is simply to improve the control and definition of the group 
of people interested in fisheries. The first steps toward this have been taken with 
the Special Law, which requires that all fishers are members of a cooperative, and 
the moratorium on entry to cooperatives. Complete lists of members are not yet 
fully established and a lot of illegal fishing still occurs, especially for lucrative 
catches such as sea cucumbers, lobster, and shark fins. In addition the cooperative 
is a very large unwieldy group, many of whom are not full-time fishers. When the 
group of fishers is clearly defined, some flexibility can be introduced to allow 
entry and exit from fishers. It is impossible to allow this when membership of the 
fishery is not observable. 
Once the group of fishers is clearly defined, cooperatives will have an 
increasing ability to self-organise to represent their interests and regulate 
themselves. They could be assisted in this slow, difficult task through advice and 
resources to help develop institutions and processes. CDRS, GNPS and others are 
already undertaking some of this work. No regulation can be truly effective 
without the effort and at least some support from fishers, so this is an essential 
ongoing human capacity-building exercise. 
Fisheries regulation requires effective reductions in total catch from 
fishing stocks (a particular species in a particular area) that are under pressure 
from overfishing. Limits can be imposed in a variety of ways. Some have the 
advantage of being easy to impose and monitor, but they may be extremely costly 
to fishers. For example, restrictions on gear are relatively easy to impose and tend 
to make fishing effort less productive, which reduces fishers' incentive to fish, 
thus protecting the stock. However, any environmental gains are achieved at the 
expense of the fishers' incomes and the development of the fishery. This may 
achieve environmental ends but at a high social and economic cost. It is likely to 
be resisted in the longer term. The restriction to artisanal fishers within the marine 
reserve is an example of this type of limit. 156 
The ideal system is one that limits annual catches of each fish stock to a 
harvest level that is sustainable given the initial stock when the system was 
introduced. The limits would be set taking into account ecological factors as well 
as the economic value of having a larger, and hence easier to harvest, fish stock. 
The total limit can be defined as number of tonnes of each fish stock. Each fisher 
then receives a certain number of tonnes of quotas for each stock. The allocation 
of quotas among fishers could be done by the cooperatives. Often allocation is 
based on historical catch, so truly active fishers receive most of the quota. This 
allows a smooth transition into a quota system because most people can continue 
to do what they were doing and little money needs to change hands. Alternatively, 
the cooperative could choose to sell the quota to their members and then distribute 
the revenue among the group. If the historical level of fishing is higher than the 
sustainable level, some fishers could be paid to give up their rights to quotas in the 
initial allocation. This buy-back could be funded either by government or 
environmental groups or could be funded out of future resource rentals paid by 
those who stay in the fishery. The fishers who remain will benefit from the newly 
sustainable stocks, so they will be better off even if they have to pay for the buy-
back. 
Ideally these quotas are transferable so fishers can enter or leave a 
particular fishery and can collect a set of quotas (different tonnages from different 
stocks) that matches the type of fish they would like to catch with the boat they 
have, their crew and their location. If quotas last for several years, or even in 
perpetuity (forever), fishers can make good long-term investment decisions about 
the types of boat and gear they want and potential fishers can make decisions 
about training to enter the industry. Stable long-term regulation provides security 
of investment and employment. The Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system 
proposed here avoids overfishing but puts the minimal possible limitations on 
who fishes, when they fish and how they fish. Thus the value of the fishery can be 
maximised. Individual transferable quota systems are used in fisheries around the 
world. 157 
A system of individual transferable quota should be complemented with 
some direct controls. For example, if fish have a breeding season during which the 
stock is vulnerable it can be a good idea to have a fishing season. This is not used 
as a mechanism to limit total catch but to control when fish are caught so the 
impact on the stock is minimised. If fishers understand the purpose of the fishing 
season and own quotas, they will recognise that it is in their interests to help 
enforce it. Gear restrictions similarly may be useful to avoid capture of undersized 
fish and by-catch. Again the purpose of the restriction is not to reduce total catch 
but to change its composition. 
For this system to work, entry to the fishery must be strictly limited and 
enforced. New fishers can enter only by buying quotas from existing fishers or by 
inheriting quotas. Total fishing must be controlled.  
7.3.2.a  Simpler systems and transition 
Any regulation has to be relatively simple because there are a large 
number of small operators in fisheries. This makes monitoring complex, and in 
addition many of the fishers are not well educated, so complex rules would be 
unduly burdensome. The current level of institutional capacity in cooperatives and 
the level of scientific knowledge about stocks probably would not allow a full 
ITQ system to be created in the short term. We would not know how to set 
appropriate limits, and monitoring of catches would be very difficult for many 
species. 
Simpler systems could be used instead or as a transition toward a long-
term ITQ system. These would have some of the flexibility of the ITQ system but 
would be simpler to administer. They would also be more familiar because they 
are closer to the current forms of regulation. They may be more acceptable to 
everyone involved. 158 
One possibility would be to have a tradable quota system on boats. The 
type of boats that can be used in the Marine Reserve is already limited under the 
Special Law. If it were not, a limit on the number of boats would probably simply 
lead to the use of larger boats. The National Park holds a registry of boats. It 
would be relatively simple to maintain the current moratorium in the Special Law 
on new vessel permits but allow existing permit holders to replace their boats or 
sell their boat permits to others (if they were going to sell their boat or use it for 
non-fishing purposes). If the same type of boats were used for tourist diving 
operations and fishing their use would need to be monitored, but this would be 
relatively easy. 
The current number of boats still allows overfishing, so this would need 
to be combined with a programme to buy back vessel permits and retire them, thus 
reducing the fishing fleet. This is a common feature of the introduction of any 
tradable quota system in an overexploited fishery. A buy-back achieves the 
environmental goal of reduced pressure while avoiding the conflict with fishers 
caused by forced cutbacks. 
Gradually the remaining vessel permits would become highly valuable. 
The group of vessel permit owners would be relatively small and clearly defined. 
They would have common interests in protecting the stock and excluding 
outsiders from the fishery. The owners of the vessel permits would have a 
stronger incentive to monitor other vessels to make sure they were not illegally 
fishing. 
One disadvantage of limits on vessels rather than total catch by species 
is that the system is not responsive to particular species that might be overfished. 
If, for example, sea cucumbers are highly profitable but also in danger of 
overfishing, the limit on the number of boats will not protect the stock. Fishers 
will still focus on sea cucumbers rather than other, less stressed, fish stocks. 
Similarly this system does not encourage fishers to focus their effort in locations 
where the stocks are strongest. 159 
Economically, systems with limits on the number of vessels will tend to 
lead to overuse of the vessels and introduction of more powerful vessels that can 
harvest more fish. Fishers will also be encouraged to fish throughout the year 
rather than focusing on the most profitable and safest seasons. An effective level 
of environmental control on overfishing will probably require very tight limits on 
the number of vessels. An ITQ system might have more vessels that are used in a 
more restricted but more effective way. 
A third possibility would be to limit the number of fishers rather than 
boats or catch. The current system, where fishers must belong to a cooperative, is 
an example of such a system. The difficulty is that the existing number of 
registered fishers is enormous. If they all fished full-time the fishery would be 
rapidly destroyed. Many, however, are not really active in the fishery. They may 
fish part time or simply maintain the option for themselves or their children to 
fish. Suppose a tradable permit system were set up where every current member 
of the cooperative received a tradable permit to fish. If the cooperative or others 
wished to reduce fishing activity by reducing the number of fishers they would 
need to reduce the number quite considerably before they would have any impact 
on total fishing effort. The first “fishers” to sell their permits would be those who 
were not really fishing anyway. This is a difficult problem even when there are 
genuine proposals for full-time fishers to be paid to leave the fishery. For 
example, the Diving Association has proposed that a group of 50–60 divers be 
paid to stop fishing and move into creating a tourist diving operation. There is no 
guarantee that other fishers in the cooperative will not simply replace their fishing 
effort. 
One way that cooperatives could gradually reduce their size would be to 
require that members are active fishers. Being “active” could be defined as having 
a certain number of days of fishing activity over every, say, three-year period. As 
long as fishing vessels or total catch were limited, this would not increase total 
fishing activity, but it would gradually separate out serious fishers from the part-
time fishers and make the cooperatives smaller, more manageable groups. 160 
A final option that arises quite frequently in discussions related to 
Galapagos is the idea that other economic opportunities should be offered to 
fishers to encourage them to leave fishing. Given the high level of danger in 
fishing and its poor economic outlook these could be popular. If the economic 
options of potential fishers could be improved it could also be environmentally 
effective. This would require clearly enforced restrictions on who can enter the 
fishery and a broad programme that benefits a wide range of fishers. 
One particular proposal is to expand tourism on Isabela to take pressure 
off the local fishery. Would this be effective? Probably not, because the group 
who can fish from Isabela is not clearly defined. If some of them did find jobs in 
tourism and move out of fishing, other fishers would probably come from other 
islands to take their place. The total population in Isabela would increase and the 
level of fishing activity would not fall. In addition, it is not at all clear that local 
fishers would get the jobs in tourism. They are not necessarily trained for those 
jobs and may not find them attractive. It is more likely that the new tourism jobs 
would be filled by internal migration to Isabela from Santa Cruz and San 
Cristobal with no particular impact on fishing activity. Tourism could only 
displace fishing if fishers or their children were trained for tourism jobs and if the 
expansion in tourism were great enough to reduce the total supply of potential 
fishers in Galapagos as a whole. This could happen in the long run (assuming total 
population is effectively controlled) but is unlikely to be an effective strategy in 
the short run. It may take a generation or more to change education levels and 
focus so that local people are so much more heavily employed in tourism that they 
leave fishing voluntarily. 
In summary, a combination of defining cooperative membership 
clearly, human and institutional capacity-building in cooperatives, improved 
scientific knowledge, and gradual reductions in the number of vessels and fishers 
is likely to be the most effective long-term strategy. 161 
Regulation needs to be developed together with fishers, needs to be 
complemented by strengthened knowledge and institutions, and needs to be 
simple. In the short run environmental imperatives may require that these efforts 
are complemented with cruder forms of regulation, such as fishing seasons or gear 
restrictions, that protect the fishing stocks. As other forms of regulation become 
more effective these restrictions could be altered so they do not act as limitations 
on total effort. 
7.4  Reduce impact of migration and migration controls 
7.4.1  Reduce environmental impact of migration through protection and 
remediation 
As economists, this is not an area of expertise for us. We will simply 
summarise some of the key points made by others more knowledgeable about this. 
In particular we draw heavily on suggestions put forward in Charles Darwin 
Research Station (2001). 
7.4.1.a Environmental  Protection 
Given that the single largest environmental issue in Galapagos is 
introduced species, the most important protective measure would be better 
quarantine systems. Quarantine could be improved by increased use of controls in 
Guayaquil and Quito before people and goods enter Galapagos. Use of scanners 
and dogs would improve inspectors’ ability to identify risky goods. Increased 
cooperation with the military and marine transport companies would close some 
current loopholes in the quarantine system. Improving education of inspectors and 
permanent residents, cargo transporters and tourist operators so that they 
understand why quarantine is valuable and what activities create the highest risks 
would probably reduce efforts to circumvent controls, reduce the transport of 
potentially risky items and increase support for the quarantine system. Creating a 
system to quickly identify and address new introductions could allow them to be 
controlled before they spread too far. Improving quarantine and the reaction to 
new introductions seems like an immediately valuable use of resources. Clearly it 
cannot avoid all risk but it can reduce it. 162 
The second key problem appears to be the spread of species among the 
islands. Controlling transport between islands so that there is less movement, and 
so that people and goods that move are inspected to reduce the risk that they will 
spread species, could reduce this. Some islands, such as Isabela, are particularly 
vulnerable to introduced species. Avoiding large increases in population or 
activity on these islands, not introducing direct flights from the continent, 
restricting the ports that can be used for cargo vessels from the mainland, and 
minimising or controlling the impacts of transport from other islands might be 
particularly valuable in these cases. The economic impacts of any restrictions 
might be minimised by understanding why people need to travel between the 
islands and where possible providing alternative ways to achieve those goals. One 
suggestion was to improve telecommunications so that fewer people need to travel 
simply for meetings. 
If severe restrictions on transport and development causes economic 
loss to the current population of the smaller populated islands (Isabela and 
Floreana), the populations are small enough that their aspirations could be 
relatively easily and cheaply met without development on the islands themselves. 
If the environmental cost of economic development on these islands is very high, 
any efforts to help these communities should be focused on the individuals in the 
existing communities, even if this involves helping them to move elsewhere, 
rather than on providing improved community services on the islands. Improving 
services will encourage people to stay and will encourage new people to move to 
the islands, thus exacerbating the environmental problems. Providing scholarships 
for education or grants to enable current residents to establish businesses or 
careers elsewhere could be more valuable to them and more effective in the long 
run. 163 
Within each island, the spread of species could be reduced by avoiding 
the use of animals for transport and by encouraging landowners to control the 
pests on their land. Some people have suggested that landowners should be 
encouraged to expand agriculture onto land that is currently abandoned because it 
both reduces the pests (the land is in productive use) and reduces the need to 
import food. This idea, and particularly the part that promotes self-sufficiency in 
food, sounds like an expensive and possibly ineffective option and should be 
carefully compared to other, possibly more direct, ways to control the spread of 
pests from agricultural land. 
Any new road, airport or port, and any new developments within the 
boundaries of the National Park increase the risk of species introduction and 
spread. Residential developments and abandonment of agricultural land also 
increase risk. Regional planning that takes into account the effects of new 
development on species transport would be valuable. Risks need to be clearly 
identified and weighed against the economic value of each proposed development. 
Where a development does go ahead, systems would need to be created or 
strengthened to minimise their impact. The costs of these systems should be borne 
by the developers. 
7.4.1.b Environmental  remediation 
In some cases, avoiding environmental damage will be extremely 
expensive or impossible. Instead of pushing protection to the limit it might be 
better to use the resources for environmental remediation and accept a trade-off. 
For example, however careful we are about quarantine and rapid reaction, some 
new species will be introduced to Galapagos. Once a good quarantine and reaction 
system is established it might be better to spend additional resources on captive 
breeding, elimination of existing pests or restoration of habitat on abandoned 
agricultural land. This would be an ecological decision that should take into 
account the economic costs of different ways to improve environmental outcomes. 164 
7.4.2  Reduce impact of migration controls on social well-being 
In Section 2 we emphasised the pressure that the migration restrictions 
in the Special Law put on the economy and society in Galapagos. If these are not 
addressed effectively, either the Special Law will severely limit the potential of 
the Galapagos to contribute to Ecuador's development or the controls on migration 
will break down under intense economic and social pressure and environmental 
degradation will accelerate again. 
In Section 7.1 we discussed ways to make the migration restrictions 
more flexible. These are a key way to reduce the economic and social pressure 
arising from limits on population. They could, however, be complemented using 
other policies. If none of the options in Section 7.1 can be implemented, these 
other approaches will be critical. Here we discuss three commonly raised 
possibilities. 
7.4.2.a Education 
Why is education important? 
First, education is probably the fundamental driver of development. It is 
almost certainly the only truly effective way to raise local living standards and 
ensure that Ecuadorian citizens and Galapagan residents receive a higher share of 
the benefits that flow from the unique resources in Galapagos. 
Second, when there are migration controls that constrain the local 
labour market, improved education can help avoid shortages of key skills that 
either paralyse developments that require these skills (such as high quality 
ecotourism) or push wages in specific areas to extremely high levels, creating 
resentment and making it impossible for ordinary local people to obtain certain 
services. 
Third, people with better general education tend to be more mobile. 
They are able to find good opportunities in a range of places. Thus if they don't 
have skills that are specific to Galapagos and would be happy to live elsewhere 
they will be able to emigrate, reducing population pressure and allowing others 
with essential skills to enter. 165 
Fourth, people with better general education are more likely to 
understand the importance of conservation as well as the actions needed to sustain 
it. As we will discuss in Section 8, improved local human capital is essential to 
build effective institutional capacity to regulate migration, tourism and fisheries, 
and for environmental protection and remediation. 
How could the education of Galapagos residents be improved? 
The first key thing is that we need to define the goals of improvements 
in education. In our discussions with people interested in the issues, all agreed that 
education was important but sometimes they had contradictory goals. Is the goal 
to facilitate emigration or build local human capacity without immigration? Is the 
goal to train people for specific well-defined tasks such as being tourist guides or 
to provide general skills that they can use in a wide range of ways to respond to 
changing labour market needs? 
Partly the goals depend on the context. If migration control is extremely 
inflexible it will be critical to be able to train people for specific niches. One way 
to address the problem of goals when the overall context is uncertain (as it will 
continue to be) is to consider the roles of different types of education. Education 
happens both within and outside schools, formally and informally, and both in 
Galapagos and in continental Ecuador (or even overseas). Different sources of 
education have different roles. 
It is extremely difficult to predict the needs of the job market in the 
short term, let alone the long term. This will be even more acute in a tiny 
economy such as Galapagos where the number of people in each job is very small 
and in many cases vacancies arise sporadically, as individuals retire or move 
away, rather than continuously. In modern economies most workers will need to 
have a number of different “careers” through their lifetime. This makes it risky to 
make the education too specific, particularly at an early level. School-level 
education should aim for excellence in general skills that can be applied in a wide 
range of jobs. 166 
That said, in the specific environment of Galapagos where many jobs 
involve interaction with tourists or foreign researchers, additional emphasis on 
foreign languages and understanding of foreign cultures would probably be 
valuable for all students. 
Teacher salaries in Galapagos are relatively high because of the Special 
Law. They are not linked, however, to teacher performance, and because of the 
migration laws there is little competition for teaching jobs. The quality of teachers 
could be addressed through teacher training or through performance assessment to 
identify and reward good teachers and remove poor ones. Bringing in temporary 
residents as teachers, particularly when they have specific language and cultural 
skills, could be valuable. They could teach students and also help with training of 
local teachers. One particular shortage is teachers who can teach English. Foreign 
temporary teachers could teach both students and teachers. Another problem is the 
poor quality of facilities and equipment. Teaching budgets used to be controlled 
by the Ministry for Education, but the state has significantly reduced its spending 
on education in Galapagos in recent years. INGALA is now investing in education 
reform. 
Efforts are already underway to improve formal education in 
Galapagos. Integrated education reform has been going for nearly two years. It 
aims to redirect education to needs. Servicio Ecuatoriano de Capacitación 
Profesional is helping with capacity-building by providing instructors. An 
education study was done by the National Polytechnic, which would provide more 
ideas on useful approaches to improving both school and post-school education. 
Once young people have a good basic education, post-school education 
can focus more on specific skills targeted at specific labour market niches. These 
skills could be provided through local training. For example, permanent residents 
are trained locally to be tourist guides. The wealth of local scientific knowledge 
available through the National Park and the Research Station and the need for 
local experiences and knowledge unique to Galapagos facilitate this. They would, 
however, still benefit significantly from much more detailed university level 
training in natural sciences as well as international experiences to improve their 
language skills and knowledge of and comfort with different cultures. 167 
Tax breaks are available for training permanent residents (Title VI 
Special Law). The cost of the training can be deducted from income declared for 
value added taxes. Several programmes offer fellowships for permanent residents 
to study outside Galapagos. They are offered by the research station and jointly 
with INGALA and Instituto Equatoriano de Credito Educativo (five per year). 
One issue with these is that many students do not return to Galapagos. When 
training has the goal of filling local labour market niches, those who are trained at 
local expense should be encouraged to stay in Galapagos as long as they are 
needed. Fellowships for university study are too expensive a mechanism to 
encourage general emigration and would encourage only emigration of the most 
skilled locals. This problem could be addressed by making return for a given 
period a condition of the fellowship. Students would not necessarily have to return 
immediately after graduation, it might be valuable for them to get a couple of 
years of job experience first. They could be given the option of repaying the 
fellowship if they choose not to return. One way to do this is to make the 
fellowship a loan that is forgiven if the student returns to work for a long enough 
period of time. 
A key decision is what skills fellowships are provided for. Analysis of 
persistent shortages in the local labour market could identify skills that are highly 
likely to be needed for a long period of time. These may not be glamorous 
university-level skills but could be skills needed by mechanics, secretaries, chefs, 
travel agents, and carpenters. Training that is more oriented towards trades might 
be provided through a combination of courses and apprenticeships that could be 
on the continent. 
Relatively uneducated people cannot necessarily recognise the value of 
quality education or even its existence. It is critical that people can see the value 
of education and see that young people with better education get better jobs. 
Ideally parents and students will be critical consumers of education and will put 
pressure on institutions to help and encourage them to provide better service. 
Supplying better education will be much less effective if there is no demand and 
desire for improved education. 168 
We are not education experts, but one key word of caution when putting 
extra resources into education is always to remember that the quality of education 
is at least as important as the quantity. Simply increasing teacher numbers, 
reducing class sizes, or providing local opportunities to gain tertiary qualifications 
will have little value unless they lead to real learning. Paper qualifications that are 
not backed by real skill are of no value to employers and in the long term have no 
value for their recipients either. Having more local opportunities to do university 
degrees through distance learning could be counterproductive if those who 
graduate find that employers still do not want to hire them. This is particularly 
important when considering whether to increase educational opportunities in 
Galapagos relative to facilitating study on the continent for Galapagan residents. 
Who should pay for improvements in education and training? 
Any policy to improve education and training requires resources. The 
design of the policy often defines who will provide those resources. Four 
considerations could suggest roles for different funders. First, key beneficiaries of 
improvements in the supply of specific skills are those who face staff shortages. 
Those who face the most critical shortages are currently applying for temporary 
residency permits to bring in workers from outside. If as part of this process they 
were required to contribute to the training of permanent residents (see the 
discussion of a “tax” in Section 7.1 also) they would have a reduced need for 
temporary resident workers in future. Tourism operators who currently employ 
many temporary residents but will be forced in future to employ more local 
workers might also be major beneficiaries from specific training programmes, so 
could be expected to contribute possibly by providing on-the-job training through 
apprenticeships. 169 
Foreign companies capture much of the economic benefit from tourism 
in Galapagos. As one strategy to gain local benefit, these foreign companies could 
be encouraged/required to contribute to training. Their contribution would have 
short-term benefits to Ecuador through funding a useful activity; in the longer run, 
the skilled Ecuadorian workers that result would be able to work in the tourist 
sector and hence gradually capture more of the benefits of the unique resource. 
Foreign companies’ most effective contribution may be through on-the-job 
training. Simply requiring that they employ locals would probably not be 
sufficient. They need to be encouraged to actively provide training. 
Education will have some environmental benefits if it reduces pressure 
on the Special Law and hence facilitates population control. It might also have 
benefits through increased conservation awareness. These environmental benefits 
are shared globally but particularly accrue to Ecuador as owner of the resource. 
Thus there is some justification for additional government subsidies for education 
in Galapagos. There are tax subsidies for training in Galapagos. 
Galapagos already receives nearly five times as much funding per 
student as the average on the continent, however.
100 The justification for central 
government funding arising from the environmental benefits that flow to Ecuador 
may be offset by equity arguments that would suggest that extra government 
spending should be focused on the most deprived Ecuadorian citizens. In addition, 
as we have discussed in Section 7.1, we need to be careful that policies aimed to 
reduce pressure on the Law do not make the Galapagos more attractive and hence 
increase migration pressure. Some of the increased education spending could 
come from within the Galapagos through redirection of existing resources and 
particularly subsidies. 
                                                            
100 1999 data from Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador, SIISE, 2001. 170 
7.4.2.b  Direct limits on wages or prices 
In Section 2, Figure 11 showed the effect on local wages from 
restrictions on the labour supply caused by migration control. If migration control 
is inflexible, wages will need to rise a long way to match the local supply of 
skilled labour to the demand as economic opportunities and hence labour demand 
rises. If migration control were made more flexible wages would still rise but not 
so far. 
People in Galapagos are beginning to notice increases in wages in some 
sectors, including construction and agriculture. These create problems for 
employers and consumers of those services. Two responses are proposed. The first 
is to allow more migration into these sectors. This would solve the short-term 
problem but in the long run undermines the purpose of the Special Law. The 
Special Law will gradually cause wages to rise in many sectors, not just these, and 
if the response is always to allow more migration, migration will not be 
controlled. 
The second response is to legally limit wages in these sectors. As we 
see in Figure 18, a limit on wages at the 1998 level would lead to acute labour 
shortages if the demand for labour continues to rise. S is the 2002 shortfall 
between labour supplied and labour demanded at the 1998 wage level. It is likely 
that larger companies and those able to offer attractive non-wage conditions (e.g. 
training, health or pension subsidies or job security) would have first pick from 
the limited labour pool. The limited numbers of workers would not necessarily 
even be used where they are most valuable. What is worse, with wage limitations 
local people would have no incentive to train so they can do these jobs. The 
shortages would persist or get worse. 171 
Figure 18: Effects of wage controls on labour market shortages 
Wage limitations are a superficially appealing solution to an observable 
symptom of the migration controls but would be very damaging economically and 
possibly socially. 
Direct limitations on the prices of goods produced by scarce labour 
would have similar damaging effects. If the goods cannot be produced outside of 
Galapagos and imported, shortages would arise. Any system for rationing the 
limited goods available would be economically inefficient and probably unfair. 
7.4.2.c  Increase participation of women in workforce? 
One other policy that could ameliorate labour shortages would be to 
increase the labour force participation of those already in Galapagos. To a certain 
extent this would happen automatically if wages are allowed to rise, and as 
women get education that equips them for the labour market opportunities. It 
could be facilitated through increased emphasis on education of girls, on 
retraining programmes for women, and on removing barriers to labour force 
participation such as access to childcare. The main barriers are likely to be 
cultural. There are disadvantages to having more women working when they have 
children, which families will balance against the attraction of extra income. 
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Similarly as wages rise older people may tend to keep working longer. 
If they have skills that are scarce, this will reduce pressure on the labour market. 
Removing any barriers or disincentives for healthy older people to work if they 
choose could have value. Both of these are, however, fairly limited solutions to 
the problems of increasing labour demand with a relatively fixed population. 173 
8  Capacity building needs 
We have discussed capacity building at the individual level to address 
labour market shortages. To implement effective policies to reduce migration 
pressure and control population, specific individual skills are needed and some 
institutional development will be needed. Policies need to be designed to be 
effective given the capacity that exists but if it is possible to improve that capacity 
in clearly defined ways, the options for effective policy will broaden. Some 
essential policies are currently not implemented as a result of capacity problems. 
Better capacity in institutions does not have to relate to more capacity. 
Increasing the number of people in policy roles, and the size of institutions, could 
in itself be a major contribution to migration. Bringing in outside consultants 
contributes extra visitors and more economic activity in the Galapagos and hence 
increases environmental risk. 
Improving the quality of staff and institutions while minimising the 
quantity needs to be the clear aim. Several people have suggested that Galapagos 
has too many institutions for a group of islands with fewer than 20,000 people. A 
larger number of institutions will not necessarily provide better regulations and 
service. Duplication, lack of coordination and lack of concentration of resources 
are likely to arise when funding and related functions are spread among 
institutions. Resources may be diverted into unproductive competition among 
institutions. Reducing the number of institutions and the overlap of functions 
between institutions could improve their performance of those functions as well as 
directly reducing population pressure and pressure on labour markets. 174 
8.1 Capacity  needed  for migration control 
We discussed the capacity needs for more effective migration control in 
Section 2.3. The basic need is for a good registry of permanent and temporary 
residents, a system for tracking entry and exit of all people and enforcing 
compliance with the regulations, and a good process for deciding who should gain 
temporary residency. INGALA is currently addressing these needs. The quality of 
the infrastructure they create should continue to be monitored, as it is the linchpin 
of any migration control system. 
8.2  Capacity needed for effective regulation of economic 
activities 
We have discussed regulation in three main economic areas—land use, 
tourism and fishing. Capacity to regulate tourism through the National Park seems 
to be well developed, though the roles of other institutions may need to continue 
to be harmonised. The capacity to regulate and promote local tourism is more 
poorly developed and needs attention. 
Fisheries face a serious problem of lack of capacity, particularly in the 
areas of research and the ability of fishing cooperatives to contribute to the design 
and implementation of regulations. Stronger definition of the role and 
membership of cooperatives and reductions in the total number of fishers would 
help them to build their own institutions. Providing some expert assistance and 
direct training on design and implementation of fisheries regulation and 
continuing the processes of active participation by involving fishers in decisions 
will continue to raise capacity. 
To an outsider it appears clear that Galapagos has too many 
municipalities and government bodies involved in regional planning and provision 
of local infrastructure given the very small population. Many of the municipal 
functions could be combined. This would not only reduce the need to duplicate 
skills but would ensure harmony and coordination of services across islands 
within Galapagos. 175 
For example, one institution could easily control water supply. If the 
number of institutions were reduced, the ratio of communication and consultation 
time to actual implementation would fall. Training of staff would be more 
productive because the training resources could be focused on a smaller number 
of staff who would each have greater influence and control in their area of 
responsibility. 
While formally combining municipalities might be legally and 
politically difficult we understand that there are no legal barriers to agreements to 
share responsibilities so that one municipality takes responsibility for one function 
and another for another. INGALA could coordinate this if necessary. INGALA 
legally controls work done and money spent by municipalities. They have chosen 
to exert indirect influence, for example, by hiring a consultant who works with all 
parties. They might want to put some effort into simply reducing the number of 
relevant parties where possible and most valuable. 
In general the multiplicity of organisations makes any progress on 
regulation difficult and costly. It makes it difficult also to identify the extent of 
subsidies to Galapagos because there are so many channels for indirect subsidy. It 
will tend to lead to overregulation, with many different, possibly conflicting, 
rules. When regulation becomes too complex it either stifles economic activity or 
the regulation is ignored in practice. Reducing the number of institutions may be 
difficult because the Galapagan regulatory structure simply mimics that in other 
provinces but it would be worth investigating whether functions could be 
combined either formally or informally. 
Finally, quarantine is another area where increased capacity would be 
enormously valuable. Improvements in border control would have direct 
environmental benefits. 176 
9 Summary  and  recommendations 
In the body of this report we first identified the goals and problems 
(symptoms), then analysed the sources of problems and potential for achieving 
goals (diagnosis) and finally used our analysis to derive ideas for changes in 
policy that would effectively move toward the goals (prescription). 
9.1  Identify symptoms of concern and define clear final 
goals 
We began by exploring the current legal, administrative and statistical 
information on migration and population growth. Drawing on written and 
statistical sources as well as interviews, we identified the issues of current and 
potential concern and the basic goals that all share in their concern about 
migration and the environment in Galapagos. 
We found that it was very important to separate final goals from 
intermediate mechanisms aimed at achieving those goals. Migration is not the 
only problem, nor is migration control the final goal. Population increase does 
increase environmental pressure but it only partly results from immigration; it is 
also strongly affected by natural increase and low levels of emigration. 
We also found that some environmental problems result from poor 
regulation unrelated to population. Regulations aimed at controlling migration 
were themselves creating economic and social problems that would ultimately 
undermine them. Without addressing the problems faced by the people who are 
able to control the environment in Galapagos, the Galapagan residents and, more 
broadly, Ecuadorians, we consider that we cannot effectively address the 
environmental issues. While this paper focused on migration, we sought to put it 
in the context of the wider issues. 
Thus we defined the social goals this study aims to help achieve as: 
1.  protect and enhance the unique environment in the Galapagos 
2.  promote the welfare of people throughout Ecuador by making the best 
possible use of the resources in Galapagos 177 
3.  promote the welfare of the residents of Galapagos to gain their active 
support to create a sustainable future and to reward them for their 
efforts. 
9.2 Diagnose  problem 
Once we had a clear idea of the goals and problems, we worked to 
diagnose the sources of those problems. We began by summarising the theory 
about what drives migration. We then applied these ideas to the particular 
situation in Galapagos. Our analysis suggests that the Special Law can have 
strongly positive effects on the environment and create useful infrastructure. It 
also, however, creates problems of its own and needs to be complemented with 
additional efforts. 
Without further efforts to improve regulation, local wages for some 
occupations will rise steeply, putting increased pressure on illegal migration and 
efforts to subvert the application of the law. Local prices will rise, creating local 
resentment and increased inequality as only some groups benefit from higher 
wages. Skill shortages will intensify, limiting the development of the local 
economy and particularly of key sectors such as tourism. This will lead to loss of 
economic benefits both for local people and for Ecuador as a whole. Our 
empirical analysis combined with statistics on the characteristics of immigrants 
and emigrants (Table 6) both suggest that up until 1998, immigrants tended to be 
skilled people coming from large cities, while emigrants were often leaving for 
higher education, training or employment opportunities on the continent. These 
flows were healthy for the Galapagan economy and society; hindering them 
through inflexible regulation would create economic and social stagnation. 
We found very high levels of subsidy for a number of activities. These 
subsidies not only make the economy in Galapagos more active and life there 
more attractive, thus encouraging migration, but also encourage environmentally 
perverse behaviour such as excessive travel and fossil fuel use. We found 
relatively good regulation of tourism, the largest sector, though with some 
potential for improvement, but quite poor regulation of fisheries. The problems 
with regulation have made migration more attractive in the short term (before the 
resources are degraded) and also lead to direct environmental damage. 178 
9.3  Identify possible solutions: Recommendations 
The Special Law was an important step. It creates a basis on which 
other policies can be built. Here we simply list policies that we believe should be 
implemented or explored further. The details of the policies, their justification and 
their advantages and disadvantages are discussed in Section 7. 
9.3.1  Policies that directly control population 
Enforce existing law and regulations, especially: 
•  tracking and deporting of illegal residents 
•  enforcing guarantee system for temporary residents. 
Directly reduce labour demand: 
•  Improve efficiency of public services to minimise staff. 
•  Minimise research staff who work on site and trips by NGO and 
government officials through careful consideration of which activities 
must be carried out in Galapagos and which could be done elsewhere.  
Explore possibility for: 
•  creating a “point” system to assess potential temporary migrants in a 
less discretionary way. 
•  implementing a “tax” system through requirements for employers of 
temporary residents to provide local training or funds for local training. 
The tax would allow other regulations on entry to be relaxed so the 
process for controlling temporary migration involved less discretion. 
Explore possibility of creating a tradable residency system, specifically: 
•  legal possibility of renouncing permanent residency 
•  use of permit system for temporary residency 
•  leasing but not sale of permanent residency permits 
•  sale of residency permits in a few discrete cases. 179 
9.3.2  Policies that reduce the migration pressure that arises directly 
from government subsidies  
Reduce subsidies where possible: 
•  Reduce fuel and electricity subsidies. 
•  Restrict TAME subsidies to one flight per resident per year and medical 
emergencies. 
•  Increase effectiveness of tax collection in Galapagos to make services 
more self-funding. 
Redirect subsidies: 
•  Target subsidies more toward permanent residents and poor. Focus on 
the original purpose of the subsidies. For example: 
•  use more funds for school-level education and basic health services. 
•  Use electricity subsidies to promote use of renewable energy rather than 
to subsidise consumer prices. 
•  Redirect subsidies to quarantine and conservation where possible. 
9.3.3  Policies that reduce the excess migration pressure and adverse 
environmental effects arising from poor regulation of economic 
activities including tourism and fisheries 
•  Strengthen land-use regulation through improved regional planning 
processes. 
Tourism: 
•  Regularly reassess charges for tourists and tourism operators.  
-  Are levels appropriate? 
-  Should charges vary more by activity and length of stay? 
•  Improve control of local tourism. 
-  Enforce the same environmental rules as for larger tourist 
operations. 
•  Apply ongoing attention to itineraries, form of transport, and pressure 
on guides to help avoid species transfer. 
•  Explore the possibility of total tourism limit with transferable permits. 
-  Could be based on existing quota system. 180 
-  Tourism operators could be required to meet environmental 
standards as well as being required to own quotas 
•  Train locals to bring more benefit from tourism to residents of 
Galapagos. 
- Business  management. 
-  Tourism skills: languages, hotel management, catering, 
ecology/conservation. 
Fisheries: 
•  Strengthen cooperatives by: 
-  Reducing numbers or creating preferential membership for active 
fishers. 
-  Continuing capacity building in cooperatives. 
•  Explore possibility of creating an Individual Transferable Quota System 
in the long term. 
-  Assess scientific research programs to see if they are collecting 
necessary information. 
•  Explore short-term possibilities for creating tradable quota system for 
vessels. 
-  Buy-back program for vessel quota as part of establishing tradable 
quota system. 
•  Strengthen short-term regulations to protect stocks. For example: 
-  make fishing seasons appropriate to biology of species as well as to 
limit catches and be consistent from year to year  
-  use gear regulations to protect species in a biologically appropriate 
way as well as reduce efficiency (to discourage fishing) in the short 
term 
-  possibly relax regulations to serve only a complementary function 
as more efficient regulations are implemented. 181 
9.3.4  Policies that directly mitigate the environmental effects of 
economic activity and population growth and the adverse effects 
of migration control 
Environmental Protection: 
•  Strengthen quarantine system and system for rapid response to 
accidental species introduction.  
•  Explore ways to minimise travel among the islands, e.g. improved 
telecommunications. 
•  Direct any assistance for less populated islands toward the people who 
are already resident (whether they continue to live there or not) rather 
than to general development and services on those islands. 
Reduce social impacts of migration control: 
•  Make migration control more flexible. 
Education: 
•  Improve education in schools. 
-  Emphasise general skills that could be used anywhere but with 
special emphasis on languages, conservation and foreign cultures. 
-  Use temporary residents as language teachers and to train local 
language teachers. 
- Introduce  performance-related  rewards for particularly good 
teachers rather than raising all salaries and conditions.  
•  Improve education for adults—post-school. 
-  Fund some improvements in post-school training through “taxes” 
on foreign companies and employers of temporary workers. 
-  Focus post-school training on locally needed skills. 
-  Use scholarships for training outside Galapagos for less glamorous 
“trade” skills as well as for university education. 
-  Make each scholarship a loan which is non-repayable only if 
students return to work in Galapagos. 
•  Emphasise quality of education. 
•  Avoid direct limits on wages and price; these would exacerbate 
problems. 182 
9.4  Implementation and capacity building 
•  Emphasise institutional quality, not quantity/size. 
•  Reduce the number of institutions involved in regulation if possible. 
•  Strengthen local participation and self-regulation, e.g. fisheries 
cooperatives, involvement of community in regional planning. 
•  Strengthen quarantine system. 
9.5  Further studies that should be conducted to more 
accurately inform policy makers 
Two critical areas arose repeatedly in discussion and during analysis 
and we were unable to address them sufficiently. The first is a better 
understanding of the demographics of the permanent resident population so that 
we can project the natural increase in the population. In future natural increase 
may be more important than migration. 
The second is the commonly floated idea of agricultural self-sufficiency 
as a way to address the problem of introduced species spreading from agricultural 
land. We are somewhat sceptical that this would be an effective or economical 
approach to this problem. It may also create significant unanticipated problems. 
Before any moves are made in this direction this policy and alternative ways to 
address the same problem should be carefully explored. 
Many of our recommendations take the form of “explore…”. Many 
others need more investigation before a decision could be made on whether and 
how they should be implemented. We will not repeat the list here. This report 
covers a wide range of issues so cannot cover any in real depth. In addition we are 
outsiders and good policy design requires local participation and local 
information. These are suggestions for directions that we feel would be valuable 
to explore with more applied research. All the information collected for this 
project is available in Appendices or on disk so that future researchers will not 
need to replicate our work but can move forward to develop a range of effective, 
equitable policies. 183 
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Appendix A: Data Appendix  
Table A1: Passengers moved to and from Galapagos (in thousands) 
Tourists  1991  1992 1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Foreigners  25 30 38 44 32 42 46 32 40 42 57 
Domestic  32 29 26 33 34 41 37 27 24 35 45 
Residents  15 13 10 13 15 17 19 17 25 50 44 
Total  73  73 75  89 80 100  102  75 89 128  146 
Note: These numbers do not include passengers transported with special tariffs, group tariffs, 
promotions, or courtesy tariffs. 
 
For the majority of the data used in preparation of this paper is available for download at 
www.motu.org.nz/building-capacity/dataset/galapagos.187 
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